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This thesis searches for that which is sacred to Jacques Derrida and ultimately 
concludes that if anything is sacred to him it is the other. This concern for the sacred is an 
attempt to ascertain Derrida’s relevance and value for religious traditions. Derrida’s ideas 
serve to destabilise (sacred) centres in religious traditions in order to find place for the 
(excluded) other. Hence, a central theme of this dissertation is that there are no stable centres. 
I have attempted to demonstrate this in the structure I have followed, a structure that is 
“centred on” decentring ideas that, while not arbitrary, could have been substituted for others: 
negative theology, the other, detours, khôra and différance. In order to combat logocentrism 
with regard to my descriptions of these ideas, I have avoided isolating a central binding logic 
to govern their interpretation. Instead, I have endeavoured to submit specific Derrida articles 
to a “fine-grained” examination in an attempt to allow “other” readings to persist. 
Khôra is the decentring centre of this dissertation. Taking the idea from Plato’s 
Timaeus, Derrida describes khôra as the place (without space) and the receptacle (without an 
inside or outside), that is the condition for everything that is. Khôra is neither sensible nor 
intelligible. It is a third way or third genus (triton genos). Khôra includes that which 
logocentrism excludes and since khôra is indiscriminately hospitable to all others, the centre 
cannot be finally determined (even though I have placed khôra at the centre) and logocentric 
ideas are undone. 
This interpretive framework is applied to a (sacred) Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) 
reading of Genesis 1, which states that the days of Genesis 1 are literal 24-hour days. Via the 
play of différance, the dogmatic claims of this centre are challenged while apparently 
excluded detours (others)—for example, myth, analogy, and science—are brought into the 
foreground. I further extend this play by substituting the SDA centre of “literal days” with the 
decentring notion of “without form and void” (Gen. 1:2). This “places” (something like) 














First and foremost, I would like to express thanks to my supervisor, Professor James 
R. Cochrane. His time and effort, his guidance and knowledge, his patience and 
encouragement, are deeply appreciated, as well as his sense of humour, which always enabled 
me to laugh when things were getting a bit serious. I do not think it is wise to read Derrida 
without a sense of humour. 
Thanks must also go to my undergraduate lecturer, Professor John Webster, who 
opened my mind and taught me how to learn. It is a gift I cannot repay and this small 
acknowledgement merely emphasises my continued indebtedness. There is no intended 
reciprocity or exchange. 
Thanks to Professor Douglas R. McGaughey for his online seminars and teaching me 
that before Jacques Derrida there was Immanuel Kant. One day, I will bend my mind to 
figuring out exactly what that means, although I imagine it means many things. 
Thanks to my bursary student, Peter Victor, for his intelligence and fortitude. He 
gamely read more Derrida than any theology undergraduate should have to and acted as the 
perfect sounding board for many of my ideas, no matter how outlandish.  
 Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Monique, for love, patience and, most importantly, 















Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 5 
1. Searching for the Sacred in Derrida ............................................................................. 12 
1.1. Religion and the Sacred.................................................................................................... 15 
1.1.1. Religion .............................................................................................................................................. 16 
1.1.2. Negative Theology ............................................................................................................................. 28 
1.1.3. The Sacred .......................................................................................................................................... 36 
1.2. The Other ........................................................................................................................ 47 
1.3. Sacred Centres ................................................................................................................. 62 
1.3.1. Logocentrism ..................................................................................................................................... 63 
1.3.2. Detours .............................................................................................................................................. 69 
1.3.3. Messianism ........................................................................................................................................ 86 
2. Khôra ......................................................................................................................... 97 
3. SDA Uses of the Creation Narrative ........................................................................... 113 
3.1. A Hermeneutical Framework .......................................................................................... 114 
3.1.1. Centring the Discourse ..................................................................................................................... 115 
3.1.2. Différance ......................................................................................................................................... 124 
3.1.3. Fundamentals .................................................................................................................................. 139 
3.2. Without Form and Void ................................................................................................. 147 
3.3. Playing with Genesis 1 ................................................................................................... 160 
3.3.1. Seventh-day Adventism: Fundamental Belief #6 ............................................................................. 160 
3.3.2. The Profane Other ........................................................................................................................... 165 
3.3.3. Playing with Science ......................................................................................................................... 175 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 180 
Appendix A: The Triton Genos in the Structure .............................................................. 183 



























The structure of this dissertation is a major component of its meaning. It is not 
entirely linear. I will elaborate on this further, but firstly it will be helpful to acknowledge the 
linear nature of the structure, the normal way one would expect to read any piece of writing: 
from the first page through to the last page. In this linear sense, the thesis has a movement 
towards deconstructing a specific understanding of the creation narrative in Genesis 1.  
It is pertinent, before continuing, to note that I am writing from within the context of 
the Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) Church. This context is of particular relevance and interest 
to me since I am currently employed by the SDA Church as the lecturer of systematic 
theology at Helderberg College (Somerset West, South Africa), which is largely responsible 
for training South African SDA pastors. SDAs have been aligned with, let me say, a 
conservative evangelical Christianity in that despite very specific distinctive beliefs, they do 
hold to the notion of the Trinity and the deity of Christ. Additionally, however, one of the 
principal signifiers of SDA identity is the Sabbath and the belief that it should be practiced on 
the seventh day (Saturday). Part of the reasoning behind this is the apparent connection 
between the Sabbath and the days of creation in Genesis 1. It is this connection that drives 
certain sectors within the SDA Church to insist on specific interpretations of Genesis 1. 
There is currently a move in the SDA Church to sacralise a very particular reading of 
the creation narrative in Genesis 1 by centring an inviolable understanding (that is, making it 
dogma), namely, that the “days” of the creative acts of God in Genesis 1 are six literal, 
historical, consecutive 24-hour days. This logocentrism
1
 is considered by its advocates to be 
stable, inviolate, and sacred. Any attempt to destabilise or question the validity of this centre 
is not merely to suggest an alternative reading of the text, but is considered to be an attack on 
the very identity of Adventism.
2
 Because this idea is considered to be sacred to Adventism 
                                                          
1
 I will return to this notion of logocentrism in some detail, but for the moment it is enough to describe 
it as a pre-understanding that governs the meaning of a text, an idea that one takes to the text to which all further 
interpretations of the text are subject. 
2
 Occasionally, I use the term “Adventism” as shorthand for “Seventh-day Adventism” acknowledging 












(or, at least, to a hugely influential, possibly majority, faction within Adventism), to play
3
 
with it is to profane it, and such profanation could serve as adequate justification for the 
expulsion of anyone within the Church who might question its validity.  
SDA identity is defined in what is known as the fundamental beliefs, currently 
divided into twenty-eight paragraphs. These beliefs can only be amended at a General 
Conference (GC) in Session
4
 which occurs once every five years. Currently, the relevant 
fundamental belief (#6: Creation) has a wording that allows for interpretations that do not 
necessarily require that the days of Genesis 1 be understood as literal, historical, consecutive 
24-hour days. Hence, an agenda item which has the intent of effecting a change to this belief, 
one that will explicitly embody this literalist version, is to be voted at the GC Session in 
2015. Currently, then, there is leeway within the SDA Church that allows for other 
interpretations of Genesis 1, but since this agenda item for 2015 is endorsed by the GC 
president himself (Ted Wilson), this is no insignificant attempt merely to explain what the 
SDA Church (apparently) believes with more clarity. It carries an implicit threat towards all 
SDAs who differ, particularly those in Church employ.  
The linear structure of this thesis thus has the intent of invoking certain ideas of 
Jacques Derrida in order to question this interpretation of Genesis 1. Since this move in 
Adventism is a sacralising of a particular interpretation of Genesis 1 (it is to be included in 
the fundamental beliefs of the Church which serve to identify what it means to be an SDA), I 
seek to determine how Derrida’s thought can be applied to ideas of the sacred. After all, if 
nothing is sacred to Derrida, then it is questionable whether a religion with a direct concern 
for that which is sacred, would have any use for any of Derrida’s ideas. To put this another 
                                                          
3
 The idea of “play” is a significant idea for this dissertation, and I am not intending a unique meaning. 
It has the idea of frivolity, fun and not taking things too seriously, as well as not being strictly governed by 
inviolable rules. Since it is also used in conjunction with creation narratives (as will become evident as this 
dissertation unfolds), play is also related to what one might term a creative spirit, a keenness for something 
novel and different—even boredom with endless repetitions of the same and, hence, expressing an openness to 
the other. Daniel Migliore, for example, suggests that God’s creative “work” is better described as play: “We 
often speak of the creation as the ‘work’ of God. That way of speaking has its place, but it may connote 
something routine and mostly unpleasant, which is unfortunately the way work is often experienced in human 
life. It may be more helpful, therefore, to think of the creation of the world as the ‘play’ of God, as a kind of free 
artistic expression whose origin must be sought in God’s good pleasure.” Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking 
Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1991), 93. 
4
 The SDA Church has a representative system of governance that is headed by a body known as the 
General Conference (GC). When the GC is in Session, delegates from SDA congregations elect the various 
officials that constitute the GC, the principal being the GC President. Various amendments to the Seventh-day 












way, if nothing is sacred to Derrida, then any religion with a concern for the sacred will 
ultimately be annihilated if it submits to Derrida’s hermeneutical theory—and it is not my 
intent to annihilate Seventh-day Adventism. 
This dissertation is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I attempt to 
identify Derrida’s relation to the sacred by: a consideration of Derrida’s approach to the 
sacred within religious traditions (since I am dealing with a religious tradition, Seventh-day 
Adventism); an examination of “the other”—primarily via Derrida’s explication of the phrase 
tout autre est tout autre
5
—(since if anything is sacred to Derrida it is the other, something I 
will attempt to demonstrate throughout this dissertation); striving to identify what a sacred 
“centre” might be for Derrida (always remembering that he tends to deflect the centre to the 
edges in order to bring the periphery into focus). In this opening chapter, I attempt to show 
that if there is a sacred centre for Derrida, it is not located in the centre. It is elsewhere. It is 
for this reason that the heart of his work cannot be clearly located and identified. It is 
described in terms of negation (like negative or apophatic theology). It is a search for the 
other, something different, and something not yet present. It is not to be found on well-
travelled paths, but on seemingly insignificant detours.  
With this in mind, it is possible to understand the rationale behind the second chapter 
of this dissertation, which is an examination of Derrida’s invocation of khôra drawn from 
Plato’s creation story in the Timaeus.
6
 Khôra can be described as a place (without space) 
upon which everything that “is” is inscribed. Khôra makes way for both signified and 
signifier. The two co-exist, words and things.
7
 As Derrida points out, Plato’s Timaeus is 
concerned not only with the creation of the sensible and the intelligible, but with the origin 
and nature of discourse itself. Khôra is the epitome of decentring. It has no centre and no 
periphery. As a “receptacle,” it nevertheless has no inside and no outside. It is a featureless 
desert with no points of reference. As such it indiscriminately accepts everything and 
                                                          
5
 This phrase submits to various translations, since it does not have a single stable meaning, but can be 
loosely translated as “every other is wholly other.” 
6
 For my own reference purposes, I have primarily used Plato, “The Timaeus,” in Francis Macdonald 
Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966), 21-360; and Plato, Timaeus, trans. by Benjamin Jowett (Teddington: Echo 
Library, 2006). 
7
 This is the case in Genesis 1 where creation is accompanied by and even preceded by the word: “And 
God said, ‘Let there be light’” (Gen. 1:3 [NIV]). To put this another way, there is the creation of things 
(signified) which by their presence and absence require representation (signifiers). This simultaneously “gives 












prioritises nothing. This unsettles anything that claims to be the centre—for instance the idea 
that the days of Genesis 1 are literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour days
8
—since a definitive 
centre on the one hand tends to exclude or push aside that which disagrees, and on the other 
hand, provides a locus that khôra cannot abide. It is out of concern for the other that Derrida 
is drawn to ideas that decentre. Khôra could also be described as an abyss serving as a 
disjunction at the centre, a bottomless void at the heart of the dissertation, located at the 
centre, denying that there is a centre.  
The final chapter addresses the logocentric notion that insists the days of Genesis 1 
are literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour days. However, this project is not interested in 
examining the text of Genesis 1 to suggest a “better” interpretation or identify a “better” 
centre, even though I will suggest another centre, one that is analogous to khôra. This is not 
an exegetical exercise that attempts to discover what the text (Genesis 1) is really saying or 
an attempt to find the best reading of the text. Logocentric views seek to control what one can 
say about a text. In this sense, to approach the text with a prior understanding is to fail to treat 
the text with the proper respect. However, since Derrida argues that language cannot escape 
différance,
9
 it is inevitable that logocentric views will also differ with themselves.  
Once one realises that there is a play of différance within language itself, then one 
also realises that no matter how precisely one defines something, it also says something else. 
This “something else” comes about because of différance. The moment one places a 
particular linguistic formulation at the centre, one has drawn différance with it. There is a 
detour within the apparently restricted terminology that strives to admit no other. It is for this 
reason that this hermeneutic does not disagree with the idea that Genesis 1 consists of six 
                                                          
8
 The fusing or comparing of ideas in the Timaeus and Genesis 1 is not a novel one. For example, Philo 
in “Questions and Answers on Genesis” examines Genesis 1 with recourse to ideas in the Timaeus and suggests 
that significant parts of Genesis 1 (for example the creation of human beings on day six) are related to the 
intelligible and not the sensible world. In contrast to the SDA view that the six days of creation are “literal 
days,” Philo suggests that the six days are not related to a chronological necessity of a six day creation but rather 
to the “ideal” nature of the number six. “And he [Moses] says that the world was made in six days, not because 
the Creator stood in need of a length of time but because . . . of all numbers, six is . . . the first perfect one.” 
Furthermore the events of the first day are related to the idea of creation “which is perceptible only by the 
intellect, as the account of the first day will show.” Philo, “Book 1: Philo on Creation,” in The Writings of Philo 
Judaeus of Alexandria, trans. C. D. Yonge, http://ecmarsh.com/crl/philo/book1.htm (accessed February 22, 
2012). 
9
 I use Derrida’s term différance without introduction at this point, although some sort of clarification is 
probably needed. For the moment it is adequate to understand it as meaning that language differs with itself 
(there is no single meaning) and that meaning is deferred (there is a deferred—future—meaning that differs with 












literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour days. It agrees, only more so. It is in this rigorous 
agreement that stoically clings to this centre that the other, via différance, appears and, 
despite all efforts to hold to the pre-determined centre, displaces the centre. In other words, 
once one acknowledges that the days of Genesis 1 can only be referring to literal, historical, 
consecutive 24-hour days, one stumbles upon différance which exposes the days to being 
something else. In this way the logocentrism is displaced to the periphery as part of the 
discourse, a possible detour, but certainly not the exclusive truth of the matter. Not only is the 
apparently stable centre of the “days” of Genesis 1 displaced, but also the very notion of the 
fundamental belief itself is undone. After all, something fundamental is concerned with 
finding the ground that establishes, the inviolable root, and yet the play of différance is not 
escaped by merely claiming it is escaped (by calling something fundamental). There is 
always another way, what I shall refer to (borrowing from Derrida who borrows from Plato) 
as a triton genos (a third type or third genus).
10
 
This then leads me to the primary element of the structure of this dissertation which is 
not linear at all. In this non-linear structure, it is important to realise that my goal is to outline 
a hermeneutic, rather than to challenge logocentric ideas in SDA interpretations of Genesis 1. 
The debate over interpretations of Genesis 1 within Adventism merely serves as a case study 
or an example of the hermeneutical method I am attempting to outline. In this sense, since 
Adventism merely supplies an example, it is also somewhat arbitrary and could have been 
substituted for any number of other textual analyses, biblical or otherwise. 
To understand what I call a structural hermeneutic of the triton genos (a phrase that is 
roughly descriptive), it is necessary to grasp Derrida’s invocation of khôra. As I have already 
noted, khôra, in a sense, serves as a precondition for the created order as well as all the 
significations that arise from this creation. Derrida unpacks khôra as the third part (located in 
the centre) of Plato’s Timaeus. Thus, khôra is not a part of the created order, sensible or 
intelligible, but rather is a third genus that has no content of its own and a “receptacle” that 
embraces everything that “is.” Since khôra is not part of creation and precedes all 
significations that refer to creation, it also precedes language. It is neither a word nor a 
concept. Thus, the Greek “word” or the designation “khôra” is an appellation (a way of 
naming something that cannot be named) that is necessary because of the constraints of 
language (which use words), even though khôra cannot be finally described by language. For 
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 Jacques Derrida, “Khôra,” in On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit, trans. Ian McLeod (Stanford: 












this reason Plato’s discussion on khôra occurs in between the sensible and the intelligible in 
the flow of the narrative itself. Khôra is, therefore, defined structurally. The actual structure 
of the Timaeus, in Derrida’s analysis, defines khôra (to the extent that one can define 
nothing) over and above any words that are used to describe what khôra “is.”  
It is this explication of meaning in structure that I have followed in this dissertation.
11
 
The whole point of “placing” khôra at the centre of the dissertation is in order to decentre the 
structure. This is, perhaps, my most significant allusion to deconstruction: a structure in 
deconstruction.
12
 Khôra has no centre, no landmarks, and no points of reference. At the 
centre is that which admits everything but identifies with nothing. Every other is accepted, 
but none is foregrounded. Khôra is, therefore, incompatible with logocentrism. This is why 
placing khôra at the centre destabilises any definitive central logic. I have consistently used 
the idea of Plato’s triton genos as a hermeneutical device within the structure to persistently 
search for the other, any other. The structure is, therefore, divided into triplets each of which 
is organised around a central motif that functions to decentre and deflect: negative theology, 
the other, detours, différance and khôra. The reason for this, as I have already indicated, is 
because if one is to name something as “sacred” to Derrida, it is the other: Not so much the 
wholly other in the sense of a definitive God, but any other, the other that differs, the other 
that possibly will appear over the horizon, the other that challenges our current 
understandings and can be approached on the via negativa, in the desert far from the beaten 
path. If one is to discover the other, then when texts are read, they must be read with 
precision and care. This is not a slack and careless “anything goes” hermeneutic where 
specific meanings are not taken seriously. 
I am emphasising two “things” that Derrida esteems. The first, as I have already 
stated, is the other, and the second is the text. A faithfulness to the text means it cannot be 
bound by our interpretations. John Caputo observes that deconstruction consists “in a fine-
grained reading of the text, of the literality and textuality of the text, slowly, scrupulously, 
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 See Appendix A. 
12
 While deconstruction is obviously present in my dissertation, I have not relied specifically and 
directly on deconstruction, but rather on other of Derrida’s ideas, notably, khôra, detours and différance. While 
one could argue that these are the means or tools by which deconstruction occurs, there is nevertheless a 
difference. For instance, I refer to the “play of différance” which, while related to deconstruction, is not 
precisely the same thing. Neither is taking a detour necessarily congruent with deconstruction. However, as I 
have said, deconstruction is present in the very structure of the dissertation, and the fact that I make reference to 
différance does not mean that deconstruction would not have also provided a workable hermeneutical centre. 
Part of my dissertation is to indicate how the centres I have chosen are substitutable, and could have been other 












seriously, in releasing the still-stirring forces that ‘philosophy’ and logocentrism strive to 
contain.”
13
 This leads me to state something else that this dissertation is not. It is not an 
attempt to arrive at some sort of a summary statement about what Derrida is saying, a cover-
all piece that distils the essence of Derridean thought into a neat package that can serve as a 
reliable logocentrism for anyone who wants to understand Derrida. It would be bizarre indeed 
if I were to spend considerable time discrediting logocentrism only to apply the very concept 
to Derrida’s work. 
It is, therefore, necessary for me to present very careful and thorough readings of very 
specific texts in order to avoid logocentrism. There is an inevitable generalising and 
summarising, a centring of the discourse that occurs. I do not think it is wholly possible to 
avoid this. However, I have endeavoured to follow “a fine-grained reading” of certain of 
Derrida’s texts “slowly, scrupulously, seriously.” In particular I have followed this pattern for 
the centres—khôra, detours, the other, différance, but also for logocentrism, hospitality, and 
decentring. I have selected specific essays and chapters by Derrida and unpacked them line 
by line. Yes, I have reworded the text and tried to express clarity and cohesion. I have tried to 
make sense of Derrida’s text and to this end have provided considerable explanation. I have 
also omitted many nuances of the original text. Nevertheless I have endeavoured to follow 
the contours and detours of these texts in order to let something other persist, even while I 
draw very particular conclusions. This does not mean that my reading of the text is any better 
than other readings. The point I wish to emphasise and re-emphasise is that there are no 
definitive centres, certainly not here anyway. And the whole point of decentring is to preserve 
that which Derrida esteems: the other. There is another way (triton genos) and while the other 
may be concealed, its residence—on khôra—should not be denied, deliberately excluded or 
pushed to the periphery. I use the word “esteem” but I think it carries the same weight that 
some would give to “sacred.” This is why the central component of my thesis title is “the 
sacred other.” 
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 John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: 












1. Searching for the Sacred in Derrida 
To discover what is sacred to Derrida, it is necessary to describe exactly what is 
meant by the term “sacred.” The word, with its multiple religious affiliations, tends to thrust 
one into a quagmire of terminology and designations that defy consistent meaning. The word 
“sacred,” even if one wishes to “avoid” subscribing to Derrida’s notion of différance, does 
not allow for a single definition. Occurrences of the word in Derrida’s corpus are relatively 
infrequent and it is debatable whether any of these actually refer to that which Derrida 
himself might view as sacred. Despite this, I want to at least have an initial point of 
departure. By sacred, I mean that which is inviolable. This could further be defined as “secure 
from profanation or violation” or, possibly, “unassailable.”
14
  
But even here it is necessary to proceed with caution and distinguish between that 
which should not or ought not be violated, from that which cannot be violated. Religions 
have “things,” “ceremonies,” “times,” and so forth, that are considered sacred, and the word 
“inviolate” is a possible substitution for sacred. Inviolate carries the connotation of purity and 
virginity. In this sense, inviolate means “sacred, sacrosanct, inviolable” (though not much is 
learned from using these terms), but also “intact” and hence, “having the hymen unbroken; 
‘she was intact, virginal.’”
15
 The virgin as an example of the sacred means that it is possible 
to violate the sacred, in fact the sacred is always in danger of being violated. The notion of 
blasphemy and profanity in Judaic and Christian traditions perhaps “speaks” to this kind of 
violation. In this sense, the sacred could be profaned, blasphemed or violated, but it should 
not be.  
It is prudent for me to take a detour and discuss deconstruction at this point, since the 
idea of a sacred “thing” remaining “intact” is problematic for deconstruction. The very notion 
of deconstruction requires a breaking down and a building up, a destruction and 
reconstruction. If something is subjected to deconstruction, it is scarcely being treated as 
sacred. It has been violated. Nothing is sacred to deconstruction, since its very status as a 
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 Miriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “Sacred,” http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/inviolable?show=0&t=1318075807 (accessed October 7, 2011). 
15
 WordNet Dictionary, s.v. “Sacred,” http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/Inviolate (accessed 












thing makes it deconstructible.
16
 With regard to texts and writing, Gayatri Spivak advances 
the following: “Here is another [‘description of deconstruction’
17
]: ‘. . . the task is . . . to 
dismantle [déconstruire] the metaphysical and rhetorical structures which are at work in [the 
text], not in order to reject or discard them, but to reinscribe [emphasis added] them in 
another way.’”
18
 It is true that deconstruction does not mean destruction, but then profanation 
and violation can also be distinguished from destruction. The sacred by its very nature does 
not present itself for deconstruction. 
My own concern for what Derrida might view as sacred was prompted by a statement 
made by John D. Caputo in Deconstruction in a Nutshell: 
Deconstruction is a blessing for religion, its positive salvation, keeping it open to constant 
reinvention, encouraging religion to reread ancient texts in new ways, to reinvent ancient 
traditions in new contexts. Deconstruction discourages religion from its own worst instincts 
by holding the feet of religion to the fire of faith . . . . Deconstruction saves religion from 
seeing things, from fanaticism and triumphalism. Deconstruction is not the destruction of 
religion but its reinvention.
19
 
Since the sacred frequently finds residence in religious traditions—and certainly this 
is my particular focus—reinventing these traditions may necessitate a re-evaluation of what a 
tradition considers sacred. But to touch the sacred is to play with that which should not be 
touched. In fact, Caputo, himself, refers to deconstruction as an “evangelical [Christian] room 
clearer” which he therefore “sometimes camouflages as ‘radical hermeneutics.’”
20
 The 
evangelical trepidation with regard to deconstruction may well be justified. The tradition 
which I will be examining—Seventh-day Adventism—holds certain “things” to be sacred, 
e.g. the Sabbath, the Bible, the Sanctuary and others could be named. Because these things 
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 Conversely, one could argue that everything is sacred to deconstruction, since its very status as a 
thing makes it deconstructible—i.e. the object of deconstruction’s attention. The point here, though, is that since 
deconstruction does not allow things to remain precisely as they are (perceived), but upsets this sameness or 
stasis, any static sacred understanding is automatically compromised—one might say subject to profanation. 
Perhaps, with regard to khôra, the notion of an openness to, acceptance of or, even, respect for everything that 
“is” could be akin to viewing everything as sacred.  
17
 The phrase “description of deconstruction” is Spivak’s and appears in her previous sentence.  
18
 Jacques Derrida, Marges de la Philosophie (Paris: Edition de Minuit, 1972), 256, quoted in Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, translator’s preface to Of Gammatology, by Jacques Derrida (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), lxxvi. 
19
 Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 159. 
20












are exhibited by their presence and a particular understanding of this presence, they are 
inevitably available for deconstruction.  
Of course, deconstruction is not something that happens from without. It is not 
something performed by pernicious academics, for example, who, looking on from without, 
bring a whole new set of ideas that upset the sacred applecart, as it were.  
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not 
possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. 
Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one 
does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and 
economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is 
to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction 
always in a certain way falls prey to its own work.
21
 
Deconstruction happens simply because the existing structures contain within 
themselves the trace of their own incoherence or, perhaps, to phrase this less critically, the 
trace of the other. Although a particular hermeneutic may appear to provide a single “truth,” a 
careful examination employing this very hermeneutic will reveal that there are “others” that 
have been excluded. A significant aspect of this thesis is to show how these others can be 
revealed with regard to Derrida’s notions of khôra and différance. The point here, though, is 
that the other may be recognised by some-one outside of the structure, but not because they 
have added anything extraneous to the structure, rather it is because they are not blinded as 
are those within who have restricted their sight by a single-minded adherence to the single 
“truth” they have identified.  
The closing phrase of the above quote—“the enterprise of deconstruction always in a 
certain way falls prey to its own work”—brings into question the idea that the very tools that 
Derrida uses can be identified as “sacred” for Derrida. Is deconstruction, itself, sacred to 
Jacques Derrida? Tempting as this idea is, it is not especially helpful because deconstruction 
is something that happens or is intrinsic to something else (that could be regarded as sacred). 
It is not really a point of reference. Perhaps, it could be argued that what deconstruction 
cannot touch, or that which deconstruction cannot deconstruct is sacred. Certainly, the 
product of deconstruction can also be deconstructed. That which has been deconstructed is 
not immune to deconstruction. 
Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself become a desire to 
reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And 
as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at 
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least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability 
must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other 
words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, 
always already a palimpsest.
22 
Even more decisively, Spivak comments: “Deconstruction is a perpetually self-
deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance.
23
 No text is ever fully 
deconstructing or deconstructed.”
24
 This means that the work of deconstruction is never done. 
Once deconstructed, the result of deconstruction becomes the subject of deconstruction itself, 
and so on indefinitely. The implication of this, for any religious tradition, is that one will 
never be able to deconstruct it to the point of some “sacred remains”—something that 
remains after deconstruction is “done” which itself cannot be deconstructed. In other words, 
if one is looking in a particular religious tradition for something that is sacred to 
deconstruction (that which cannot be deconstructed), one is liable to be disappointed. 
1.1. Religion and the Sacred 
Before specifically examining the idea of the sacred in Jacques Derrida’s works, it is 
essential to identify, to some degree, at least, Derrida’s understanding or critique of religion. 
If the sacred is to be associated with religion (although it is not necessarily so) or is viewed as 
a subset of the religious, then the relation between the two is not a peripheral issue that can 
remain unexplored. Derrida’s attitude to organised religions that give themselves a definitive 
identity is not exactly positive, and there is little doubt that Seventh-day Adventism is both 
organised and carefully defined. If (traditional) religion itself is problematic to Derrida, then 
anything sacred within that religion is merely fruit of the bad tree, as it were, and is not 
secure from violation. 
Between these two notions—the religious and the sacred—there is, perhaps, a third 
way, that is, the way of negative theology. This third way, while exposing one to ideas of 
theology and God, turns out to direct one, not so much towards God (where one may presume 
that the sacred might be found) but rather texts, interpretations, translations, discourse and 
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“detours, locutions and syntax.”
25
 In other words, negative theology, for Derrida, is more 
important for its value as a rhetorical device than its goal of finding God by the way of 
negation. First, however, I will consider Derrida’s view of religion. 
1.1.1. Religion 
Religion, wherever it finds concrete expression, is generally problematic for Derrida. 
Frequently he embraces the word in quotes: “religion.” This occurs notably in the title “Faith 
and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,”
26
 first 
published in 1996. In 1994, Rodolphe Gasché, while acknowledging that “the notion of God 
is essentially . . . intertwined for Derrida with a variety of threads, traces, marks, or 
indicants,” also noted only three “major texts in which Derrida addresses questions of 
theology.”
27
 In 1997, John Caputo suggested a certain “religiosity” in his title The Prayers 
and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion,
28
 but had removed the quotation 
marks. Acknowledging that Caputo is quoting Derrida,
29
 the subtitle could have been 
(perhaps more logically) encased in quotation marks, possibly “Religion without Religion” or 
even, Religion without “Religion” (other derivatives could obviously be suggested)—the 
quotation marks, of course, always implying that to associate Derrida with religion is 
possibly an absurdity (something that is already evident or, at least, implied in the phrase 
“religion without religion”). Although, one should be cautious of even claiming this much, as 
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Kevin Hart notes: “It is as though Derrida has realized that the word ‘religion’ must be held 
with pincers, or as though the word has just realized that Derrida has taken it up and so raises 
its eyebrows in astonishment. Does religion scare Derrida, or should it be scared of him? 
Perhaps a little of both.”
30
 Once the quotation marks are added, one adds to the complexity of 
meaning, not only of the word religion,
31
 but also of the quotation marks themselves 
(particularly with some-one as concerned with significations as Derrida).  
In 2005, under the editorship of Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart, Derrida and 
Religion: Other Testaments was published.
32
 This contained the transcript of an interview 
with Derrida as well as numerous essays written by scholars of both religion and 
deconstruction. Prior to the mid-1990s this would, no doubt, have appeared an odd pairing, 
but no more odd than that of Derrida and Religion. In justification of their title, Hart and 
Sherwood initially comment that “given all that Derrida has given to religion, we wanted to 
acknowledge the gift”
33
 and then add more decisively:  
The once timid, now increasingly confident “and” in our title intimates a reciprocal influence 
between “Derrida” and “religion”: as Derrida draws on religious texts and phenomena to write 
of, say, the performative risk of the word, the bereavement of experience, or the opening to a 
justice to come, so his acts of writing suggest new ways of thinking of religion, a long way 
from limited secular tropes of possession and identity, such as having a religion, being 
religious, or having a God.
34
  
Certainly, Derrida introduces and uses concepts associated with religion in order to 
deconstruct and reinvent religions that have atrophied into rigid systems that are frequently 
oppressive. These concepts that proliferate in Derrida’s writing and have been employed by 
scores of scholars to deconstruct religious practices and texts, are often obviously understood 
as connected to one or another particular religion. Gil Anidjar, for example, states: 
[T]here is moreover the undeniable fact that the study of religion has already benefitted 
greatly from Derrida’s extensive contributions and the growing recognition that, clearly, 
Derrida has spoken and written on religion, on the following terms of “religion”: God, for 
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example, but also theology, negative theology, “a new atheistic discourse,” and the touch of 
Jesus and of Jean Luc Nancy . . . ; Islamic alms, circumcision (Arab, Jewish and other), 
angels, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam and other religions . . . ; the Kabbalah, the Hebrew 
Bible and the New Testament, Paul, Augustine, The Talmud, messianism and messianicity, 
forgiveness, hospitality, prayer, and his prayer shawl . . . ; the spirit and the letter, and 
German Jews and Arab Jews . . . ; and more.
35 
Over and above these terms that have an obvious religious flavour, Dawne McCance 
in Derrida and Religion
36
 suggests ten “key terms” that “belong to the overall weave of 
Derrida’s work,”
37
 while acknowledging the limitation of this list not only with regard to 
what is excluded, but also in the sense that what one gains in generally defining these terms 
comes at the cost of separating them from Derrida’s texts within which they are embedded. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to engage Derrida on religion without being conscious of these 
concepts, which, as I have noted are not necessarily religious terms: deconstruction, 
phonocentrism, difference, trace, khôra, text, the impossible, hospitality, the messianic, and 
autoimmunity. McCance adds, in passing, the following: aporia, gram, iterability, pas, 
parergon, and supplement.
38
 McCance then limits herself to examining ten of Derrida’s key 
texts that pertain to religion, but also highlights his work Of Grammatology, published in 
1967, to suggest it is “probably the first text that students of Derrida should read.”
39
 Of 
Grammatology although not explicitly or obviously about religion, is littered with religious 
allusions both direct and indirect. 
John D. Caputo, probably more than anyone, has explored the religious themes in 
Derrida’s work. In this regard, we could further add to the list of “religious” terms: spectres, 
democracy, justice, the gift, the secret, the name, the other, passion, mourning and death; and 
the list need not stop there.
40
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But what of the term “religion” itself? Jonathan Z. Smith suggests that historically—
“prior to the sixteenth century”—the word “religion” had a meaning largely “irrelevant to 
contemporary usage.”
41
 With reference to “Roman and early Christian Latin usage,” Smith 
observes that the various forms of the word—religio/religiones (noun), religiosus (adjective) 
and religiose (adverb)—“were cultic terms referring primarily to the careful performance of 
ritual obligation.”
42
 Smith further acknowledges three possible etymologies derived “from the 
root *leig,
43
 meaning ‘to bind,’ rather than from roots meaning ‘to reread’ or ‘to be 
careful’.”
44
 In view of its dubious etymological origins, it is interesting that Derrida follows 
an etymology of religion that is somewhat opposed to deconstruction. 
Acknowledging the Latin root religio, Derrida outlines Emile Benveniste’s 
examination of the word “religion” beginning with the direct translation “scruple”: 
This is where the expression religio est, “to have scruples”, comes from. . . . This usage is 
constant during the classical period. . . . In sum, religio is a hesitation that holds back, a 
scruple that prevents, and not a sentiment that guides an action or that incites one to practice a 
cult. It seems to us that this meaning, demonstrated by ancient usage beyond the slightest 




Benveniste mentions Cicero’s additional etymology: legere—meaning “read” or “harvest, 
gather.”
46
 One therefore ends up with re-legere or “re-read” or “re-gather.” Derrida notes this 
etymology together with another possible Latin etymology: ligare—meaning to bind or join 
together—which gives rise to re-ligare “linking religion to the link, precisely to obligation, 
ligament, and hence to obligation, to debt etc., between men [sic] or between men [sic] and 
God.”
47
 These “two semantic sources perhaps overlap. They would even repeat one another 
not far from what in truth would be the origin of repetition, which is to say, the division of 
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 These ideas of “repetition” and “the same” suggested by both etymologies are 
evocative of the problem of religion itself. The concern is that religio or religion suggests, on 
the one hand, “a persistent bond that bonds itself first and foremost to itself” and, on the 
other, a “resistance or a reaction to dis-junction. To ab-solute alterity.”
49
 From an 
etymological standpoint, at least, Derrida’s understanding of religion is quite alien to 
deconstruction and is closer to the antithesis of différance. 
Within religious traditions, there are texts which are viewed as sacred: the Bible, for 
example. What is Derrida’s attitude to such sacred texts and the way they are used to instruct 
and inform beliefs systems? Of course, the Bible itself cannot be “blamed” for the way it is 
interpreted, and Caputo, for example, clearly finds resonances between deconstruction and 
certain readings of the Bible as evidenced in his statement to Derrida: “One of the things that 
fascinated me about your work . . . is how much what you say about justice resonates with 
the biblical notions of justice and care for singularity [emphasis added], as opposed to the 
philosophical notion, where justice is defined in terms of universality, of the blindness of 
justice.”
50
 The difficulty with this statement is not that such “resonances” or connections 
cannot be made from Scripture to Derrida’s thinking, but rather the suggestion that the Bible 
has a stable position on what “biblical notions of justice” are.
51
 For instance, one could 
equally claim that what Derrida says about faith resonates with biblical notions of faith or, 
more specifically, Pauline notions of faith, as though “biblical notions” and “Pauline notions” 
only allow for one understanding with which everyone agrees. Derrida’s response is clear: 
“First, I have no stable position on the texts you mentioned [emphasis added], and I can 
receive the most necessary provocations from these texts as well as, at the same time, from 
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 Derrida can find these same resonances (“the most necessary 
provocations”) in the texts (“Plato and others”) that Caputo suggests, at least implicitly, do 
not have these evident resonances (“as opposed to the philosophical notion, where justice is 
defined in terms of universality”). More importantly, though, is the fact that because religious 
dogmatism uses texts such as the Bible as evidence of its “rightness,” deconstruction would 
treat any claims to be definitively “biblical” with suspicion: 
For me, there is no such thing as “religion”. Within what one calls religions—Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam, or other religions—there are again tensions, heterogeneity, disruptive 
volcanos, sometimes texts, especially those of the prophets, which cannot be reduced to an 
institution, to a corpus, to a system. I want to keep the right to read these texts in a way which 
has to be constantly reinvented. It is something which can be totally new at every moment.
53
 
Derrida has no issue or problem with the Bible. The difficulty is when a religious group 
interprets the Bible and then names this interpretation “biblical” as though it is the only valid 
interpretation amongst all others.  
Derrida seems to be attracted to particular philosophers and theological thinkers rather 
than the Bible. With regard to the above quoted passage, for example, Derrida observes that 
he “would distinguish between religion and faith. If by religion you mean a set of beliefs, 
dogmas, or institutions—the church, e.g.—then I would say that religion as such can be 
deconstructed, and not only can be but should be deconstructed, sometimes in the name of 
faith.”
54
 At this point Derrida notes his affinity for Kierkegaard who is “a great example of 
some paradoxical way of contesting religious discourse in the name of a faith that cannot be 
simply mastered or domesticated or taught or logically understood, a faith that is 
paradoxical.”
55
 Unlike (many) Christian theologians, Derrida is not interested in discovering 
a hermeneutical method by which he can “correctly” unpack or exegete the Bible. Caputo 
states that what has fascinated him is the degree to which Derrida’s notion of justice 
“resonates with biblical notions of justice . . . .” This is not a fascination that Derrida, 
himself, shares. Derrida is drawn to—one might say is fascinated by—various philosophical 
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thinkers. In this case, he is attracted by Kierkegaard’s analysis of faith which “is not 
religious, strictly speaking; at least it cannot be totally determined by a given religion.”
56
  
Returning to the notion of “religion without religion” and what this phrase might 
mean, one could be tempted to rephrase it as “religion without ‘a set of beliefs, dogmas and 
institutions’,” particularly in the light of Derrida’s usage of the phrase in The Gift of Death, 
where Derrida examines Jan Patočka’s
57
 critique of historical Christianity.
58
 I will follow 
Derrida’s argument carefully in order to unpack this phrase “religion without religion.” 
Derrida examines “Is Technological Civilization Decadent, and Why?” in Jan 
Patočka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History:
59
 “Patočka relates secrecy [French: 
le secret meaning both secrecy and a secret], or more precisely the mystery of the sacred, to 
responsibility.”
60
 Not unlike Levinas (I will examine Levinas’s relation to the sacred later), 
Patočka warns “against an experience of the sacred as an enthusiasm or fervor for fusion, 
cautioning . . . against a form of demonic rapture that has as its effect, and often as its first 
intention, the removal of responsibility.”
61
 Patočka wants to distinguish between religion and 
“the demonic form of sacralisation.”
62
 Religion, on the one hand, has a responsibility to the 
other (the phrases initially used by Derrida are “religion presumes access to the responsibility 
of a free self” and “responsibility on the other”) and, on the other hand, exhibits the demonic 
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Patočka examines the notion of “religion, in the proper sense of the term”
64
 and in this 
Patočka is concerned to examine his own religion, that is, the Christian religion. Religion, 
then, properly exists “once the secret of the sacred, orgiastic, or demonic mystery has been, if 
not destroyed, at least integrated and finally subjected to the sphere of responsibility.”
65
 
Religion is a passage to responsibility. Religion makes the orgiastic or demonic mystery 
subject to itself, but, more than this, “religion comes into being the moment that the 
experience of responsibility extracts itself from that form of secrecy called demonic 
mystery.”
66
 This is done, according to Patočka “only in order, at the same time, to freely 
subject itself to the wholly and infinite other that sees without being seen.”
67
 With this in 
mind, Patočka asks why modern Europe suffers “from ignorance of its history [which could 
be described as a Christian history], from a failure to assume its responsibility, that is, the 
memory of its history as history of responsibility.”
68
  
Patočka argues that Platonism, in the first place, incorporates the demonic 
mystery/the orgiastic sacred, while Christianity represses Platonism. The logic of Patočka 
follows this structure: “We escape the demonic orgiastic by means of the Platonic triumph, 
and we escape the latter by means of the sacrifice or repentance of the Christian ‘reversal,’ 




 has not adequately freed 
itself from “the Platonic triumph” (through which it also incorporates the orgiastic sacred), 
and because the trace/spectre of Platonism is repressed, it is not recognised or noticed as an 
illegitimate presence in Christianity. Christianity has not yet fulfilled its own promise. That 
which is authentically Christian has not yet come to fruition: “What has not yet come about is 
the fulfilment . . . in European politics, of the new responsibility announced by the mysterium 
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tremendum. There has not yet been an authentically Christian politics because there remains 
this residue of the Platonic polis.”
71
 Christian consciousness cannot reflect on the Platonic 
thinking it represses and is also incapable of reflecting on the orgiastic mystery that 
Platonism incorporates. What a (Christian) person is is not adequately thematized and this 
inadequacy “comes to rest on the threshold of responsibility.”
72
 Responsibility calls for a 
decision that is not merely repetition, and so responsibility is “tied to heresy” or (in the 
vocabulary of the Catholic Church) “divergence from a doctrine.”
73
 Since responsibility is 
now a “divergence or departure” that is separate from “what is publicly or commonly 
declared”—in other words, responsibility is heresy—it is, therefore, destined “to the 
resistance or dissidence of a type of secrecy.”
74
 
Patočka’s Christianity, therefore, (which has not existed throughout European history) 
breaks absolutely with Catholic (or Protestant) orthodoxy. It is herein that one can begin to 
understand why Derrida compares Patočka’s Christianity to a “religion without religion.” For 
Derrida, however, the Christianity of Patočka, or that of Patočka’s text, “is of limited 
pertinence” since the “Christian themes can be seen to revolve around the gift as gift of 
death.”
75
 Derrida then names the themes: “infinite love (the Good as goodness that infinitely 
forgets itself), sin and salvation, repentance and sacrifice.”
76
 These themes have a “logic that 
at bottom . . . has no need of the event of a revelation or the revelation of an event.”
77
 It is 
this “revelation” that enables a discourse on religion that is related to dogma or an article of 
faith. Derrida is drawn by these themes—infinite love, sin and salvation, repentance and 
sacrifice—but has no inclination to connect them to any divine epiphany, and would rather 
examine them without regard for any orthodox religious affiliations that could be implied by 
them: hence “religion without religion.” In this respect, Derrida suggests other thinkers: 
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Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Ricoeur, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger. All of these 
may be said to “belong to this tradition that consists in proposing a nondogmatic doublet of 
dogma, a philosophical and metaphysical doublet, in any case a thinking that ‘repeats’ the 
possibility of religion without religion.”
78
  
Derrida, himself, has no interest in the religious or theological dogma of Christianity. 
His interest in Christianity is only piqued by the fact that it is historically unavoidable in the 
European context. He is bound by this history to speak of religion (Christianity) and is 
inevitably drawn into a discourse that is at its root religious, discussing religious themes, with 
religious significance. The very fact, however, that he invokes Patočka who is “heretical” 
with regard to Christianity, indicates that this idea of the “possibility of religion without 
religion” is not going to fit into any neatly defined Christian (or religious) system of dogma. 
The point, here, is that Derrida ascribes the term “religion with religion” to certain other 
philosophical and theological thinkers, but not directly to himself, although it does appear to 
be something with which he is willing to align himself.  
Kevin Hart also suggests that “Derrida’s later thoughts on religion can be organized 
around his phrase ‘religion without religion’.”
79
 The evident dilemma with this phrase is that 
if the first “religion” is the same as the second “religion” then one is left with nothing. If, 
however, the first “religion” does not denote or connote the same meaning as the second, then 
it becomes necessary to differentiate one from the other. It could also be added that the term 
itself may be a disparaging one. For example, Terry Eagleton refers to Derrida’s Marxism in 
Specters of Marx as “Marxism without Marxism, which is to say a Marxism on his own 
coolly appropriative terms.”
80
 Eagleton, then, (sarcastically) translates Derrida’s description 
of what this Marxism might be into a comparable religious idiom. The double irony being 
that what he has written rings true, if one removes the sarcasm:  
It would not be difficult to translate this [Derrida’s appropriation of Marxism] into tones of a 
(suitably caricatured) liberal Anglicanism: we must distinguish the spirit of Christianity [The 
particular Derrida quote begins similarly: “We would be tempted to distinguish this spirit of 
the Marxist critique . . .”] from such metaphysical baggage as the existence of God, the 
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divinity of Christ, organized religion, the doctrine of the resurrection, the superstition of the 
Eucharist and the rest.
81
  
Eagleton, hence, implies that Derrida with his use of sans (“without”) is simultaneously 
purging the concept of the meaning that it basically intends—in this case Marxism or 
Christianity—thereby annihilating the point of the designation. Marxism without Marxism, 
Christianity without Christianity or, religion without religion are, respectively, no longer 
Marxist, Christian or religious. But is this what Derrida really intends with this use of sans? 
In “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy,” Derrida proposes the 
phrase “apocalypse without apocalypse.”
82
 The word “without” is placed in “the so necessary 
syntax of Blanchot, who often says X without X.”
83
 Elsewhere Derrida describes this as a 
“strange syntax.”
84
 Caputo in defining sans—which he does in a subsection incorporating the 
phrase “An Apocalypse sans Apocalypse”
85
 in its title—relates it to “prayers and tears,” a 
phrase that shapes the title of his book and evokes ideas of worship and religion: 
When Derrida speaks of his prayers and tears in Circumfession, he means not the determinate 
prayer of a determinable faith, but the deeply affirmative invocation, the oui, oui. Such a 
prayer would be . . . a prayer without a prayer, the prayer of the sans, in a religion without 
religion, a religion of the sans. This sans separates Derrida’s prayers and tears from, even as it 
joins them to, the determinable faiths.
86
 
At the very least (and this “least” is allowed by the fact that in the phrase “religion without 
religion,” for example, there is still a “joining” to religion, an acknowledgement of religion), 
the sans used by Derrida is in order to critique determined religions and distance himself 
from them. 
The sans is also a technique of negative theology which Derrida notes with reference 
to Augustine via Meister Eckhart who often “cites the ‘without’ of Saint Augustine, that 
quasi-negative predication of the singular without concept, for example: ‘God is wise without 
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wisdom, good without goodness, powerful without power.’”
87
 With Derrida’s affinity for the 
methods and techniques of negative theology, there is little wonder that sans finds regular 
expression. 
I would like to suggest that if one is to apply this phrase “religion without religion” to 
Derrida, then a clear window into what could be meant is provided by Derrida’s description 
of the messianic as “messianicity without messianism.”
88
 I will elaborate on this phrase later 
but for the moment it is worth noting that Derrida prefers the word “faith” to religion. With 
respect to Derrida’s understanding of the messianic, Caputo heads a section in the chapter 
“The Messianic: Waiting for the Future”: “Faith Without Religion.”
89
 And then, with 
reference to Specters of Marx states that “deconstruction turns on faith, but on faith ‘without 
religion,’
90
 faith as distinguished from religion in the sense of the several religious 
messianisms, on faith as non-knowing . . . .”
91
 Quoting Derrida precisely, it becomes 
increasingly evident that there are terms that Derrida prefers and, quite clearly, “religion” is 
not one of them and belongs in the realm of that which can—and probably should—be 
deconstructed: 
Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible as 
the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancipatory 
promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a messianism without religion, even a messianic 
without messianism, an idea of justice—which we distinguish from law or right or even from 
human rights—and an idea of democracy—which we distinguish from its current concept and 
from it determined predicates today.
92
 
If one is to turn to a faith divested of all religion, this does not necessarily mean that the 
sacred or the holy is also removed: “All sacredness and all holiness are not necessarily, in the 
strict sense of the term, if there is one, religious.”
93
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1.1.2. Negative Theology 
Derrida’s work, almost from the outset, has been aligned with negative theology and 
this alignment has often been stated as an indictment, largely, it seems, in order to suggest 
that Derrida’s work was somewhat without content itself, or worse, nihilistic:  
[Very] early on I was accused of—rather than congratulated for—resifting the procedures of 
negative theology in a scenario that one thinks one knows well. One would like to consider 
these procedures a simple rhetoric, even a rhetoric of failure—or worse, a rhetoric that 
renounces knowledge, conceptual determination, and analysis: for those who have nothing to 




In addition, negative theology taken to its limit could be said to result in atheism or, at least, 
be likened to atheism. As Derrida observes: “The apophasis is a declaration, an explanation, 
a response that, taking on the subject of God a negative interrogative form (for that is also 
what apophasis means), at times so resembles a profession of atheism as to be mistaken for 
it.”
95
 And yet, Derrida also notes that though negative theology “inclines toward atheism, 
can’t one say that, on the other hand or thereby, the extreme and most consequent form of 
declared atheism will have always testified [témoigné] to the most intense desire of God?”
96
 
A question to which Derrida responds with a typical “yes and no.”
97
 It is not necessary to 
unpack Derrida’s meaning here, save to note that Derrida’s “atheism” or use of negative 
theology is evidently not borne of hatred towards God, nihilistic tendencies or, indeed, as a 
means to justify or sustain unbelief. 
While Derrida has been aware of the semblance of negative theology in his methods, 
he has also maintained a distinction: “So much so that the detours, locutions, and syntax in 
which I will often have to take recourse will resemble those of negative theology, 
occasionally even to the point of being indistinguishable from negative theology.”
98
 Not only 
this, negative theology has a fundamentally paradoxical relationship with positive theology, 
as Caputo observes in analysing Derrida’s “fascination” with “the impossible situation in 
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which negative or apophatic theology finds itself.”
99
 It denies “that it is possible to speak of 
God even while, as theology, it keeps on speaking.”
100
 
By way of example, Hans Küng in Does God Exist?
101
 is careful to examine the 
“great tradition of theologia negativa, descending from Neoplatonism” and found in the 
works of Pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus Eriugena and Meister Eckhart.
102
 Derrida, himself, makes 
extensive reference to Eckhart in “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials.”
103
 Küng notes that even 
Aquinas maintained that “any determination applied to God by analogy with man [sic] or the 
world requires a negation,”
104
 and that God’s essential nature is concealed from human 
reason. Hence, Aquinas concurs with Pseudo-Dionysius when he asserts that “all that man 
[sic] knows of God is to know that he [sic] does not know him [sic], since he [sic] knows that 
God surpasses all that we can understand of him [sic].”
105
 Küng’s insights, however, are 
primarily driven by the work of Nicholas of Cusa, who asserted that “God is accessible only 
to ‘instructed ignorance’,” and “any kind of affirmative theology without negative theology 
turns God into a creature of our mind and worship of God into idolatry.”
106
 Küng offers the 
following conclusions, which suggest an uncanny resonance with deconstructive thought (and 
one should note that while Küng—this work was published in 1982—is highly cognisant of 
Heidegger’s contributions in this regard, there is no evidence whatsoever, no reason to 
suppose, that Derrida has directly influenced him at all): 
God cannot be grasped in any concept, cannot be fully expressed in any statement, cannot be 
defined in any definition: [God] is the incomprehensible, inexpressible, indefinable. . . . Every 
statement on God therefore must come through the dialectic of affirmation and negation, 
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every experience of God must come through the ambivalence of being and non-being. Before 
God, all talk emerges from listening in silence and leads to speaking in silence.
107
 
Nevertheless, this resonance, in truth, is ill-founded, since (and this is true of Küng’s project) 
“negative theology is always a higher, more refined way of affirming that God exists, or 
hyperexists or exists-by-not-existing, that God is really real or hyper-real or sur-real.”
108
 
Negative theology is in the service of the God of onto-theology, “delivering a service of 
which the metaphysics of presence can only dream.”
109
 Derrida’s recourse to the “discursive 
resources of negative theology”
110
 should not be confused with endorsement. “For Derrida, 
negative theology is an event within language, something happening to language, a certain 
trembling or fluctuation of language.”
111
 
This means that if Derrida is to speak of God, he cannot merely have recourse to the 
language of negative theology. But, then, how is one to speak of God? “How to avoid 
speaking of Being?”
112
 Derrida, refers to two instances where Heidegger “explicitly proposed 
to avoid . . . the word being.”
113
 The first is to write “being” (sein) under erasure (sous 
rapture), that is, crossed out, thus signifying both presence and absence.
114
 The second is to 
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not write the word being, in which regard Derrida quotes Heidegger
115
—“If I were yet to 
write a theology, as I am sometimes tempted to do, the word ‘being’ ought not appear 
there”
116
—and then offers this response:  
Hasn’t Heidegger written what he says he would have liked to write, a theology without the 
word being? But didn’t he also write what he says should not be written, what he should not 
have written, namely a theology that is opened, dominated, and invaded by the word being? 
With and without the word being, he wrote a theology with and without God.
117
 
Of course, Derrida’s relationship to Heidegger has been described, with considerable 
justification, as a “complex, ambivalent and constantly evolving dialogue.”
118
 In the same 
article, albeit in the endnotes, Derrida makes considerable reference to the work of 
philosopher and Christian theologian Jean-Luc Marion. Although Derrida is not completely 
unequivocal in his praise of Marion, his comments indicate that the manner in which Marion 
writes has parallels with deconstructive thought or, at least, avoids the pitfalls of onto-
theology.  
Derrida notes that in God Without Being
119
 (French: Dieu sans l’etre), Marion, writing 
“by an analogous but no doubt radically different gesture” to Heidegger’s “being under 
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erasure,” similarly “inscribes the name of God under a cross” with its obvious allusion to the 
crucifixion.
120
 In addition, “Dieu sans l’être” is a “magnificent title,”
121
 says Derrida.  
Its very suspension depends on the grammatical vacillation that only French syntax can 
tolerate—precisely in the structure of the title—that is, of a nominal or incomplete phrase. L’ 
may be the definite article of the noun être (God without Being), but it can also be a personal 
pronoun—object of the verb to be—referring to God, from God to God Himself [sic] who 
would not be what He [sic] is or who would be what He [sic] is without being (it) (God 
without being God, God without being): God with and without being.
122 
Derrida’s notion of the trace gives an insight into exactly what distinguishes Marion’s God 
Without Being from negative theology. Gayatri Spivak notes that Derrida “gives the name of 
‘trace’ to the part played by the radically other within the structure of difference that is the 
sign.”
123
 This statement is elaborated: 
. . . Derrida suggested that what opens the possibility of thought is not merely the question of 
being, but also the never-annulled difference from the “completely other.” Such is the strange 
“being” of the sign: half of it always “not there” and the other half always “not that.” The 
structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is forever absent. 
This other is of course never to be found in its full being. As even empirical events such as 
answering a child’s question or consulting the dictionary proclaim, one sign leads to another 
and so on indefinitely.
124
 
The sign, by its very presence, marks an absence, and this mark is the trace, that is, the 
exemplar of différance, in that it differs in the evident meaning of the sign, and this meaning 
is deferred (not present). This is unlike negative theology which negates in order to affirm 
and, according to Spivak, also differs from Heidegger’s “being under erasure” which, she 
suggests, “might point to an inarticulable presence.”
125
 For Derrida, the “trace under erasure” 
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is “the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the 
origin that is the condition of thought and experience.”
126
 
Since, then, for Derrida, “negative theology is an event within language,” one can 
further locate negative theology within the trace: “But Derrida is not . . . ruling out religious 
faith, or negative theology; rather he resituates them, relocates them, finds their site (lieu) 
within the trace.”
127
 Having said this, it is also evident that différance, like deconstruction, 
like negative theology, “turns on its desire for the tout autre.”
128
 But negative theology 
reduces this wholly other to God, whereas différance and deconstruction do not have any 
specific other in mind. “The other is God or no matter whom, more precisely, no matter what 
singularity, as soon as any other is totally other [tout autre est tout autre].”
129
 
The idea of the trace refers to that which is not evidently present. Do the negations of 
negative theology move it outside of language, as such? It is a question that Derrida reiterates 
in “Sauf le Nom.” “Isn’t it [negative theology] what, in essence, exceeds language, so that the 
‘essence’ of negative theology would carry itself outside of language?”
130
 Derrida addresses 
this question while keeping in mind the validity or lack thereof of the proposition: “What is 
called ‘negative theology,’ in an idiom of Greco-Latin filiation, is a language [langage].”
131
 
Since negative theology could be described as a “rarefaction” or “desertificaion” or “kenosis” 
of language, it tends to direct one away from language (the written words and concepts) 
towards the trace. It is here that the relation of negative theology can be seen with regard not 






Derrida in moving back to an originary point that may locate the “site” in which 
negative theology takes “place,” refers, via Angelus Silesius and The Cherubinic Wanderer, 
to creation and the notion of play: “God plays with creation. All that is play that the Deity 
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gives itself: It has imagined the creature for Its pleasure.”
134
 Negative theology, since it has 
no specific reference within language, “can only present itself as one of the most playful 
forms of the creature’s participation in the divine play.”
135
 Derrida, in asserting this, should 
not be seen as actually ascribing to a specific idea of God, the “God” of negative theology, 
for instance, but it is no surprise that in searching for this “place” of “play,” Derrida takes a 
detour, namely, khôra: 
Is this place created by God? Is it part of the play? Or else is it God himself?
136
 Or even what 
precedes, in order to make them possible, both God and his Play? In other words it remains to 
be known if this nonsensible (invisible and inaudible) place is opened by God, by the name of 
God (which again would be some other thing, perhaps), or if it is “older” than the time of 
creation, than time itself, than history, narrative, word, etc. It remains to be known (beyond 
knowing) if the place is opened by appeal (the response, revelation, history, etc.), or if it 
remains impassively foreign, like Khôra, to everything that takes its place and replaces itself 
and plays within this place, including what is named God. Let’s call this the test of 
Khôra . . . .
137
 
Derrida is suspicious of definitive answers to the questions he has p sed. “It remains to be 
known” he tells us twice, and once suggests that it is “beyond knowing.” Is the play of 
negative theology something “instituted” prior to creation in the sense that God precedes 
creation? The question is problematic because it assumes too much. It strives to reach beyond 
language to God, but since one is trying to reach God with recourse to the name of God, 
which is actually located in language itself, one is trapped. Negative theology itself needs to 
break the shackles of language if it is going to reach anything other than the name. “The 




Derrida uses the tower of Babel narrative
139
 in an attempt (at least analogically) to 
locate the “place” that gives space (is hospitable) to negative theology, which itself has the 
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goal of discovering the other—recall that the goal of the builders at Babel was to reach God. 
What is lost at Babel is the originary universal language that was fragmented into a myriad of 
“other” languages. The narrative is “at once construction and deconstruction.”
140
 There is the 
construction of the tower and a universal language and there is a tower in deconstruction and 
confusion, and a multiplicity of tongues. To reach God is not possible by the confused 
languages simply because this was the very reason that God confused the languages. Yet the 
universal pre-Babelian tongue is not available and so it is necessary to find another way, a 
third way: negative theology. Since God cannot be found by affirmations in the confused, 
multiple post-Babelian languages, negative theology provides an alternative route that is not 
tied to any particular language while nevertheless utilising the “detours, locutions and 
syntax” of language. As an oscillation between the universal and the multiple, “‘negative 
theology’ is caught, comprised and comprehensive at once.”
141
 Furthermore, the narrative of 
Babel itself is a “(hi)story” that is tied to the sensible and is an affirmation of events, whether 
one wishes to speak about the construction of the tower or its deconstruction. Derrida, hence, 
suggests “an indeconstructible Khôra”
142
 as another place, a third option:  
the place that gives rise and place to Babel would be indeconstructible, not as a construction 
whose foundations would be sure, sheltered from every internal or external deconstruction, 
but as the very spacing of de-construction. There is where that happens and where there are 
those ‘things’ called, for example, negative theology and its analogues, deconstruction and its 
analogues, this colloquium here and its analogues.
143
 
In this movement towards where negative theology is located in relation to language, I am 
striving to highlight a coalescence, let me say, of third ways/types (triton genos) which I 
believe can assist in unravelling a road to the sacred. These are khôra, différance and detours. 
Just as negative theology is a third way (between the universal and the multiple) that reaches 
towards the God of Babel, these are other ways that can lead towards the sacred. Before 
examining these third ways, I will try to identify that which is sacred to Derrida.  
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1.1.3. The Sacred 
The sacred tends to identify itself with religion or the religious. One might even 
suggest that the sacred is located within religion. But since religion in any traditional or 
definitive sense is problematic for Derrida, the sacred needs to be disentangled from any such 
religious affiliations. In order to accomplish this, I will unpack Derrida’s uses of the sacred, 
few of which are unequivocally positive. This, in a large part, occurs because of the obvious 
binary oppositions that are presented by the very word: sacred/profane; sacred/common; 
sacred/demonic as well as other related categories, such as clean/unclean; holy/unholy etc. 
Ultimately, in order to find a stable (the adjective is not without irony) site (for want of a 
better word) for a particular understanding of the sacred that is consistent with Derrida’s 
thinking, I will take a detour through Derrida’s ideas of khôra and the messianic. 
What Derrida means when he uses the word “sacred” is not immediately evident nor 
is it necessarily consistent. The French—sacré—clearly sharing a common root with the 
English, provides no obvious additional insight. In a biblical context, one stumbles on the 
word “holy”—the Hebrew root being transliterated qdsh. Whether in the verbal form 
(qadash) or as a noun (qodesh), the idea of holiness or the sacred is denoted—including the 
idea of being separated or set apart. Hence, the sacred stands in direct contrast to that which 
is “common or profane” as in Leviticus 10:10: “You must distinguish between the holy and 
the common, between the clean and the unclean” (NIV). Here “qodesh occurs as the 
antithesis of hol (‘profane,’ ‘common’).”
144
  
The cultic activities of biblical Israel, according to Gerhard von Rad, “have their place 
and significance in and for a world which in God’s sight was divided into clean and unclean, 
holy and secular, blessing and curse.”
145
 This idea of holiness began with the land which was, 
in fact, “Jahweh’s land” (Lev. 25:23) and all that fell within this land, e.g. the camp (Lev. 
6:4), Jerusalem (Isa. 52:2) as well as the city wall (Neh. 12:30), the Temple hill (Ps. 24:3), 
the Temple (1 Kings 9:3), the Tabernacle in the wilderness (Num. 1:51), the vessels and parts 
of the Tabernacle (Num. 4:15), the priests (Lev. 21:1-15) and their clothes (Ex. 29:29), and 
the offerings (Lev. 6:2).
146
 Incorporated in this idea of the holy, then, is implied an inward 
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and an outward, or an inside and an outside. In this regard, von Rad notes: “The description 
of the Philistines as ‘uncircumcised’ . . . shows to what a degree the contrast between 
outward and inward was still felt to be a sacral and not a national matter.”
147
  
Notions of “clean and unclean” were extended to food, sickness and sexuality. For 
example, in the latter category, “anyone who was in a state of special cultic immediacy to 
Jahweh . . . had to abstain from sexual relationships. . . . Serious sexual offences polluted not 
only the offender but even the land.”
148
 These binary ideas—sacred/profane, holy/unholy, 
clean/unclean—that were applied to matters that concerned day to day living provided a 
tension that pointed to the ultimate binary: life/death. In short, “every uncleanness was to 
some extent already a precursor of the thing that was uncleanness out and out, death.”
149
 
Kim Knott in The Location of Religion, quoting Veiko Anttonen, points out that 
“people participate in sacred-making activities and processes and significations according to 
paradigms given by the belief systems to which they are committed, whether they be 
religious, national or ideological.”
150
 With regard to human sexuality, Knott observes that 
gender difference—male and female—presents categories that society, in particular Western 
society, for the most part has sacralised into a stable dichotomy. The idea that homosexuality 




What this reveals is the way in which, in modern, mixed Judeo-Christian/secular cultures, 
what we call the “sacred” is still at work. The “fundamental category boundary” of gender 
difference (on the basis of which heterosexual relations are posited) continues to be invested 
with special value. Its “sacred” quality, which goes unnoticed much of the time, comes to the 




The issue for Knott is that the boundaries, so clearly inscribed, precisely delineating the 
sacred—in this case, gender distinction mitigated by homosexuality—are actually 
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“precarious.” This very precariousness makes homosexuality “a cause for anxiety and a 
contagious condition which is seen to threaten collective order and survival.”
153
 In a biblical 
(New Testament) context the offence of the contagion (disease) is placed side by side with 
demon possession: “And at even, when the sun did set, they brought unto [Jesus] all that were 
diseased, and them that were possessed with devils.”
154
 In a religious (Christian) context, 
then, binaries often function to identify ultimate evil and anyone who disagrees (threatens the 
stability of the dichotomy) may be identified as a servant of the demonic. 
The alignment of the demonic with the sacred, as noted earlier, finds expression in 
Heretical Essays on Philosophy of History in Derrida’s analysis of Jan Patočka’s “Secrets of 
European Responsibility.”
155
 Here the sacred is connected negatively with “a form of 
demonic rapture” which is variously, but most notably named, “the demonic secret” and “the 
orgiastic sacred.”
156
 This orgiastic sacred is a kind of magical religion, something mystical 
and fantastical that can enrapture adherents by its allure, but has no evident foothold in 
ethical or moral considerations, and thus, in Patočka’s usage, according to Derrida, stands in 
contrast to responsibility. Religion can only be considered once these notions of the secret 
and the sacred have been “surpassed.”
157
 “In the proper sense of the word, religion exists 
once the secret of the sacred, orgiastic, or demonic mystery has been, if not destroyed, at least 
integrated, and finally subjected to the sphere of responsibility.”
158
 In this regard, then, 
“Religion is responsibility or it is nothing at all.”
159
 The sacred, is something “divine” that is 
separated from the human and “religion comes into being the moment the experience of 
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responsibility extracts itself from the form of secrecy called demonic mystery.”
160
 The 
(orgiastic) sacred is thereby distanced (negatively) from religion.
161
 
Related to this is the manner in which Levinas makes a clear distinction between the 
sacred (le sacré) and the holy (la sainteté).
162
 In Nine Talmudic Readings, Levinas aligns the 
sacred with sorcery, opposing it to the holy, thus making the sacred (le sacré) negative and 
the holy (la sainteté) positive. Derrida is not unaware of this distinction and notes the 
“dissociation” that “Levinas wishes to maintain between a natural sacredness [emphasis 
added] that would be ‘pagan’, even Graeco-Christian, and holiness [emphasis added] . . . of 
(Jewish) law, before or under the Roman religion.”
163
 In a certain sense, this Levinasian 
sacred is not totally unlike Patočka’s orgiastic sacred with its relation to the magical and the 
demonic, that which Levinas distinguishes from the Jewish notion of holy (qdsh).
164
  
I have always asked myself if holiness, that is, separation or purity, the essence without 
admixture that can be called Spirit and which animates the Jewish tradition—or to which the 
Jewish tradition aspires—can dwell in a world that has not been desacralized. I have asked 
myself—and that is the real question—whether the world is sufficiently desacralized to 
receive such purity. The sacred is in fact the half light in which the sorcery the Jewish 
tradition abhors flourishes.
165 
Levinas sets up an opposition between “holiness . . . to which the Jewish tradition 
aspires” and “a world that has not been desacralized.” This world provides the sacred (sacré) 
ground (because it is not sufficiently desacralized) “in which the sorcery the Jewish tradition 
abhors flourishes.” Levinas then spends considerable time explaining how sorcery is 
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condemned in Jewish tradition, and likens it to “challenging the Assembly on High,”
166
 and 
“the desacralization of the sacred.”
167
 But if sorcery (which is evil) is the “desacralization of 
the sacred” then that means that the sacred (sacré) is a “good” in this usage. This is borne out 
when Levinas goes on to call the “real sacred” (as opposed to, presumably, a “pseudo-
sacred”) “holiness” and “the service of the Most High.”
168
 However, Levinas does not refer to 
the holy (sainteté) with any sort of ambivalence; the holy is that which unequivocally relates 
to the divine, by which is meant the God of Judaism. The sacred could have its origin in the 
holy and become a perverted Judaism, but it is usually a reference to a perversion that is 
foreign to Judaism: “Peoples perverted to such a degree that the earth vomits them. Sorcery, 
then, would be a phenomenon of perversions, absolutely foreign to Judaism itself. It is the 
sacred (le sacré) of others!”
169
 All other gods and mythologies are idolatry where “Jewish 
monotheism does not exalt a sacred power, a numen triumphing over other numinous powers 
but still participating in their clandestine and mysterious life. . . . Monotheism marks a break 
with a certain conception of the Sacred.”
170
 This conception of the sacred distinguished from 
the God of Jewish monotheism “as regards the Divine . . . is merely atheism.”
171
 In other 
words, since there is only one God (monotheism) the sacred applied to anything else 
represents rejection of (or lack of belief in) the one God and, hence, is atheism. 
The Judaic distinction between the sacred and the holy (as followed by Levinas) finds 
a similar echo in the Greek New Testament terms for holy: hierós, and hagios. Hierós “on the 
one side denotes the power of the divine sphere, on the other the sanctity of what belongs to 
deity, whether by nature, primal law, or custom,” and “is the most common sacral and cultic 
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term in the Greek world.”
172
 The Septuagint, “feeling the pagan sense of the term”
173
 
(hierós), renders the Hebrew qdsh with hagios. Similarly the New Testament “shows that 
Christianity shares the LXX shunning of this sacral term of paganism.”
174
 A curious 
exception to this is 2 Timothy 3:15 where the Scriptures, by which commentators often infer 
the Old Testament Scriptures,
175
 are referred to as hierá, that is, Holy (heirá) Scriptures. One 
would have thought that the author of Timothy would have preferred hagios, the word used 
for the Holy Spirit (2 Timothy 1:14), if all that was meant was the Hebrew Scriptures. In any 
event, generally, at least, the Bible (both New and Old Testaments) implies a distinction 
between what is sacred (hagios) in both the Judaic and Christian sense, and what is 
considered sacred (hierós) by all others (non-Christians and non-Jews).
176
  
In Writing and Difference, Derrida appears to disagree with Levinas’s understanding 
of the sacred (the apparent dichotomy suggested by le sacré and la sainteté), and in this 
regard refers to Heidegger in “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas.”
177
 The first reference to the sacred in this essay sees Derrida objecting 
to Levinas’s prioritising of speech over writing, pointing out the incoherence of Levinas’s 
stance with the question: “[How] could Hebraism belittle the letter, in praise of which 
Levinas writes so well?”
178
 
Later in the essay, Derrida prefers Heidegger’s understanding of the sacred to the 
Levinasian position. Derrida maintains that Heidegger’s “site” of the sacred “is not a pagan 
cult” as it is not “an empirical Here but always an illic: for Heidegger, as for the Jew and the 
Poet.”
179
 This “illic” refers to a place but not a presence. It has the connotation of “over 
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there.” Derrida points out that “the Site is never a given proximity but a promised one.”
180
 
Heidegger’s “thinking of Being” does not parallel Levinas’s “pagan cult of the Site,” because 
“the Sacred of which it speaks belongs neither to religion in general, nor to a particular 
theology, and thus cannot be determined by any history of religion.”
181
 In order to speak of 
God or gods, one must presuppose the sacred, or the notion of divinity or deity. This is true, 
Derrida points out, whether one speaks from a position of faith or atheism, since divinity, 
deity and the sacred are not God, but indicate the space within which God can be conceived: 
That the gods and God cannot be indicated except in the Space of the Sacred and in the light 
of the deity, is at once the limit and the wellspring of finite-Being as history. Limit, because 
divinity is not God. In a sense it is nothing. . . . Wellspring, because this anticipation as a 
thought of Being (of the existent God) always sees God coming, opens the possibility (the 
eventuality) of an encounter with God and of a dialogue with God.
182 
The reason that Levinas’s critique fails is that both his negative co cept of the (pagan) 
sacred (le sacré) and his positive concept of the (Judaic) holy (la sainteté) are contained in 
Heidegger’s understanding of the sacred. The site for sacred paganism to be thought is the 
same site for the Holy God of Israel to be thought. This notion of the sacred that is more 
originary than God and promissory of the coming of God (or, perhaps, in Derrida’s thinking, 
the wholly other) has the advantage of avoiding the binary opposites that onto-theological 
understandings of the sacred—sacred/profane; sacred/common; sacred/secular; sacred/pagan; 
sacred/demonic and so forth—inevitably postulate. 
It is with this idea of locating the sacred in a space that is prior to any dichotomous 
allusions that I turn to Derrida’s essay “Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ 
at the Limits of Reason Alone.” Direct discussion on the sacred or mention of the sacred in 
the work of Derrida is generally sparse. This essay, however, is an exception. It contains over 
thirty occurrences of the word “sacred”
183
 and if one were to include closely associated words 
(such as, “sacrosanct” and “holy”)
184
 then one could double this number. The title contains 
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allusions to three separate works
185
 which should be borne in mind in any analysis: 
1) Hegel’s Glauben und Wissen (that is, Faith and Knowledge);
186
 2) Henri Bergson’s Les 
deux sources de la morale et de la religion (The Two Sources of Morality and Religion);
187
 
and 3) Kant’s Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft—a notable English 
translation being Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.
188
 
It is evident that Derrida diverges somewhat from Kant’s title: “. . . Derrida writes ‘at 
the limits’ [aux limites], and not ‘within the limits’ [dans les limites] . . . .”
189
 Also, the fusion 
of titles in Derrida’s subtitle results in the deletion of Bergson’s “morality” and the addition 
of quotes to the word “religion,” resulting in “The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ . . . .” This 
deletion of “morality” suggests a possible conclusion: Derrida does not subscribe to the 
notion that both morality and religion should be linked to the same “two sources.” It also 
hints at more specific objections, possibly to Bergson’s understanding of Kantian morality as 
heteronymous and duty-based, and to institutional religions generally. The initial point to be 
derived is that if the sacred is located in a religious tradition (and religious traditions do have 
a great deal to say about what is sacred), Derrida would be unable to regard this “sacred” as 
sacred. 
Turning, then, to the sacred in this essay, Derrida asks:  
[C]an a discourse on religion be dissociated from a discourse on salvation: which is to say, on 
the holy, the sacred, the safe and the sound, the unscathed <indemne>,
190
 the immune (sacer, 
sanctus, heilig, holy, and their alleged equivalents in so many languages)? And salvation, is it 
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necessarily redemption, before or after evil, fault or sin? Now where is evil <le mal>? Where 
is evil today, at present? Suppose that there was an exemplary and unprecedented figure of 
evil, even of that radical evil which seems to mark our time as no other. Is it by identifying 
this evil that one will accede to what might be the figure or promise of salvation for our time, 
and thus the singularity of the religious whose return is proclaimed in every newspaper?
191
  
There are several terms, often perceived as representing the essence of “salvation,” that 
Derrida mentions in parallel. The point of religion, in this sense, is to ensure one’s safety, for 
which reason adherents of particular religions search for some or other association with the 
holy and the sacred (that which is undefiled, unsullied, untainted, pure and “safe and sound”). 
The holy and the sacred could be negatively described as the space where evil is not. And yet, 
“our time,” says Derrida, is marked by evil, even “radical evil.” The term is Kant’s, the 
adjective “radical” (German: radikal) referring to the root, source, origin or ground. 
Derrida also refers to radical extirpation
192
 (literally “to uproot the root”). He further 
labels Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason as “a book on radical evil,”
193
 
which leads to the inevitable conclusion that Derrida’s essay has a significant concern with 
radical evil (in view of a third of his title being borrowed from Kant) and its relation to 
religion. Perhaps, Derrida is saying (implying?) that evil at its root is fundamentally religious 
or, maybe, that religion at its root is evil. It is also worth reiterating the deletion of “morality” 
in his appropriation of Bergson’s title. Derrida does say: “The possibility of radical evil
194
 
both destroys and institutes the religious.”
195
 The idea is that “the possibility of radical evil” 
causes a religion (for example) to arise, but also “institutes” the germ of its destruction. 
Religion arises in order to combat the threat (“possibility”) of evil, but that this does not 
immunise this very religion from the evil that it strives to mitigate.
196
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Coupled to this “radical evil” is the idea of a “return of religion,” which is described 
as “machine-like.”
197
 This “machine-like” metaphor is a reference to the “return of religion” 
in our time, and would be applied with great difficulty to earlier eras. The religion that 
returns is not purely in the realm of religious fundamentalism, although this surely is present, 
but also the secular atheism of modernity. Derrida suggests that one is “blind to the 
phenomenon . . . of the ‘return of the religious’ today if one continued to oppose so naively 
Reason and Religion, Critique or Science and Religion, technoscientific Reason and 
Religion.”
198
 These dichotomies do not exclude one another as they appear to presume, but 
are intrinsic to one another. 
Religious fundamentalism is therefore at the same time a supremely rational, hyper-critical 
phenomenon. At the opposite side of the spectrum, reason transforms itself into religion as 
soon as it yields to the tempting thought that it might finally leave religion behind. Thus 




“How then to think—within the limits of reason alone—a religion which . . . would be 




Since religion is complicit in the formation of so many binaries, all of which Derrida 
is concerned to deconstruct, it is necessary to search for the sacred in a “place” that precedes 
polarising dichotomies. Derrida notes a “chain,” with the initial point of departure being the 
German word “heilig,” whose “semantic history seems to resist” the Levinasian dichotomy of 
sacred (pagan) and holy (Judaic purity). Heilig, in this understanding, would precede 
ontotheologies, religions and polarising dichotomies. It gives an appreciation of the sacred (as 
“revealability”) that is anterior to any revelatory event and “hence independent of all 
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 In other words, there is an idea of the sacred (heilig) that is before religion and 
before binaries. This is “another way” that is beyond or before all of these problematic 
dichotomies. 
The point here is that an examination of the actual word “sacred” in Derrida’s works 
tends, if anything, to indicate that which is not sacred to Derrida. This is because whether the 
sacred is examined with regard to its biblical understandings (Old and New Testaments), its 
use in Judaism (even in the work of Levinas), in Western Christianity or even in secular 
modernity, it is always placed in a binary opposition, or at least, implies such an opposition: 
sacred/profane; qodesh/hol; hagios/hierós; la sainteté/le sacré; reason/religion and so forth. 
But notice that each of the second terms of these binaries, from the perspective of those who 
initiate them, is the negative term (the first term being the “true sacred,” as it were). Derrida 
has no interest in prioritising one term over the other. 
Derrida refers to a “third place” which he describes as “a certain desert . . . which 
makes possible, opens, hollows or infinitizes the other” and a “fiduciary ‘link’” that 
“precedes all determinate community, all positive religion, every onto-anthropo-theological 
horizon. It would link pure singularities prior to any social or political determinations prior to 
all intersubjectivity, prior even to the opposition between the sacred (or the holy) and the 
profane.”
202
 Derrida is seeking for a contentless abstraction (hence the notion of a “desert”) 
that “can thereby open the way to everything from which it withdraws.”
203
 At this point, 
Derrida turns—“for pedagogical or rhetorical reasons”
204
—to the messianic and khôra. These 
“two sources, these two fountains or these two tracks that are still invisible in the desert”
205
 
can be aligned with différance and, I would like to suggest, provide a window into what, in a 
certain sense, could be called sacred in Derrida’s thought. The most simple reason for this is 
that they are “prior . . . to the opposition between the sacred (or the holy) and the profane.” 
There is a third place that provides a space for the sacred, and this idea of the sacred is not 
defined in terms of a dichotomy. This idea of the sacred is related to the other, and can be 
approached via the messianic and khôra (at least in the context of Derrida’s essay “Faith and 
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Knowledge”). The messianic is related to an expectation and hope for the coming of the 
other, while khôra provides space for the other. I will return to both of these concepts in more 
detail later, but first I will consider the place of the other in Derrida’s work.  
1.2. The Other 
Jonathan Roffe notes the significance of the other in Derrida’s thought: 
Derrida tries to pursue the eradication of alterity through the history of philosophy in all of its 
multifarious manifestations. The relation to the other, that is, concerns the other person but 
also the other meanings of a text, the other ways of seeing things, other races, other genders, 
another time (such as the future, the messianic), other languages, other traditions, and so 
forth. . . . Derrida’s work, considered in this way, has, since the very earliest texts, been 
travelling down the side-streets of Western thought, well off the monotonous motorway, 
drawn on by the ethical demand to open itself up to the other, to all the others.
206
 
I will examine the notion of the other, or the wholly other, via the phrase tout autre est tout 
autre (transliterated, but not necessarily translated, “every other is wholly other”
207
), and how 
this phrase is defined in chapter four of The Gift of Death, which carries the phrase as its title. 
The reason that this will be helpful in moving toward the sacred in Derrida is because the 
wholly other has been equated with God (in Kierkegaard, for example), which then would 
seem to provide a sacred place for the wholly other (it is deified). While it is true that Derrida 
has significant regard for (maybe even to the point of sacralising) the wholly other, I also 
think that Derrida spends some time showing that the wholly other is not God, at least not a 
defined God.  
When Jan Patočka ties the sacred to magical religions and mysticism, his concern is 
for European responsibility, by which he also means Christian responsibility. In his analysis 
of Patočka, Derrida identifies two “heterogeneous types of secret:”
208
 1) “The secret of 
historicity—that which [historical humanity] must admit to because it concerns [their] very 
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This becoming responsible, that is, this becoming-historical of humankind seems to be 
intimately tied to the properly Christian event of another secret, or more precisely of a 
mystery the mysterium tremendum: the terrifying mystery, the dread, fear, and trembling of 
the Christian in the experience of the sacrificial gift.
211
  
This is amplified and defined: “This trembling seizes one at the moment of becoming 
a person, and the person can only become what it is in being paralyzed [transie], in its very 
singularity, by the gaze of God.”
212
 There is a movement from the external to the internal, 
since God gazes at us internally. This gaze of God is at the same time the holy gaze of God 
(since it is God’s gaze). Derrida ties God’s gaze to the gift of death, which is evidenced in the 
idea of sacrifice (for instance, that of Jesus for humanity).
213
 Derrida observes with regard to 
the mysterium tremendum: 
The gift made to me by God to the extent that he [sic] holds me in his [sic] gaze and in his [sic] hands 
while at the same time remaining inaccessible to me, the terribly dissymmetrical gift of the mysterium 
tremendum, only allows me to respond and only rouses me to the responsibility it gives me by making a 
gift of death [en me donnant le mort], giving the secret of death, a new experience of death.
214 
Later, Derrida adds: “A secret always makes you tremble.”
215
 This trembling is 
related to not knowing—“we tremble from not knowing.”
216
 But there is a doubling of the 
reason for trembling. Firstly, “I tremble before what exceeds my seeing and knowing,”
217
 but 
also, “[o]ne doesn’t know why one trembles.”
218
 Why does fear make us tremble? “This 
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symptomatology is as enigmatic as tears.”
219
 I know that when I weep, I am sad, but why do 
tears come to my eyes when I am sad? “What does the body mean (to say) by trembling or 
crying, presuming one can speak here of the body, of saying or meaning, and of rhetoric?”
220
 
There is here a curious detour related to significations and the way our bodies react or 
“speak” by way of response. Derrida does not pursue this but does note that the “final 
cause . . . can be called God or death.”
221
 The reason we cry or tremble, in an ultimate sense, 
is because we are faced with death or have lost a loved one. Thus “the gift of death” makes us 
tremble, but Derrida also notes the relation of our trembling and weeping to God, since “God 
is the cause of the mysterium tremendum.”
222
 
The notion of “trembling,” derived most obviously from Kierkegaard’s examination 
of Philippians 2:12 (discussed below), is also somewhat suggestive of Rudolf Otto’s The Idea 
of the Holy—translated from the German title Das Heilige, where the word “heilige” could be 
translated either “holy” or “sacred.” Otto connects that which is holy or the “numinous” 
(from the Latin numen meaning divinity) with the mysterium tremendum. The most cursory 
examination of the table of contents of Otto’s book reveals that the tremendum is related to 
ideas of “awefulness,” “overpoweringness” and “urgency;” and the mysterium to that of the 
“wholly other” (which also suggests parallels with Derrida’s tout autre). Otto also examines 
“the element of fascination”—fascinans—which describes the mysterium not only as 
instilling awe, but also as alluring—something that captivates us.
 223
 
For Otto, the mysterium or mystery is not merely something that happens to be a 
mystery to us in the sense of ignorance, something we could in principle know or understand 
if we took the trouble. That would merely be a “problem” that could be solved, not a mystery 
in the sense of the mysterium tremendum. Otto sets “the numinous object in contrast not only 
to everything wonted and familiar . . . but finally to the world itself . . . that which is above 
the whole world-order.”
224
 He contrasts mysticism “with all that is of the nature of this 
world” and “with Being itself and all that ‘is,’” and culminates by calling it “that which is 
                                                          
219
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 56. 
220
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 56. 
221
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 56. 
222
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 56. 
223
 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine 
and its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), v. 
224














 While these descriptions seem to produce a purely negative theology by negating 
a comparison with anything that can be humanly conceived, Otto insists that “Mysticism at 
the same time retains the positive quality of the ‘wholly other’ as a very living factor in its 
over-brimming religious emotion.”
226
 Otto’s “wholly other” has a positive “feeling 
content”—“something of whose special character we can feel, without being able to give it 
clear conceptual expression.”
227
 The “feeling content” points to a wholly subjective 
experience of the other that cannot be shared. It is a secret. This hints at what Derrida appears 
to critique in the notion of the wholly other as God. 
Derrida suggests that what makes us tremble in the face of the mysterium tremendum 
is the dissymmetry between the “gift of infinite love” and “my finitude, responsibility as 
culpability, sin, salvation, repentance, and sacrifice.”
228
 Derrida acknowledges Kierkegaard’s 
“implicit and indirect”
229
 reference to Philippians where Paul admonishes the disciples: 
“Wherefore my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now 
much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling [emphasis 
added].”
230
 Derrida adds the following explication:  
The disciples are asked to work toward their salvation not in the presence (parousia) but in 
the absence (apousia) of the master: without either seeing or knowing without hearing the law 
or reasons for the law. . . . [But if] Paul says “adieu”
231
 and absents himself as he asks [or 
orders, since one doesn’t ask for obedience] them to obey . . . it is because God is himself 
[sic], absent, hidden and silent, separate, secret, at the moment he [sic] has to be obeyed. God 
doesn’t give his [sic] reasons . . . . Otherwise he [sic] wouldn’t be God, we wouldn’t be 
dealing with the Other as God . . . if he [sic] were to speak to us all the time without any 
secrets, he [sic] wouldn’t be the other, we would share a type of homogeneity.
232
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But Derrida doesn’t use the word “sacred” rather he refers to a “secret.” This 
phenomenology, this experience of trembling when under the gaze of God, this dissymmetry 
between the infinite God and the finite self, this fear when confronted by God’s command, 
this unknowing when faced by the wholly other, is something that can only be experienced in 
secret.  
I now return to the phrase tout autre est tout autre, which, on the surface, appears to 
be a tautology; but it is one that Derrida also refers to as a “heterotautology.”
233
 The reason 
for this is that the meanings of the words vary according to their grammatical form. So tout 
(the first one) is an “indefinite pronominal adjective
234
 (some, some-one, some other one) and 
the [second tout is] an adverb of quantity (totally, absolutely, radically, infinitely other).”
235
 
The “first autre becomes a noun [if the first tout is an indefinite pronominal adjective], and 
the second, in all probability, an adjective or attribute.”
236
 Hence, the first tout describes 
which other is meant, while the second describes the nature of that other. Alternatively, it 
could be a tautology: “the two autres are finally repeated in the monotony of a tautology that 
wins out after all [emphasis added] . . . the other is the other, that is always so, the alterity of 
the other is the alterity of the other.”
237
  
I will return to this tautology that “wins out after all” because I believe the 
tautological nature of this phrase, although apparently side-lined, is what eventually provides 
a startling resolution to Derrida’s arguments. Also, it is crucial that one recall that this chapter 
concludes Derrida’s essay (The Gift of Death), which has thus far been dominated by Jan 
Patočka’s critique of historic Christianity, a critique that Derrida by and large appears to have 
endorsed. There is no reason to presume that Derrida has softened in his critique of (historic) 
Christianity in these concluding pages, quite the contrary.  
Tout autre est tout autre presents at least two significantly different understandings. 
The one derives from the idea that the “wholly other” is a term reserved for God (in that God 
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 while the second understanding “attributes this infinite alterity of the 
wholly other to every other . . . each living thing human or not.”
239
 This latter idea is 
preferred by Levinas, who nevertheless would like to distinguish “between the infinite 
alterity of God and the ‘same’ infinite alterity of every human.”
240
 For Derrida, neither 
Levinas nor Kierkegaard (whose exposition of the Abraham/Isaac narrative is of particular 
interest to Derrida) can distinguish adequately between the religious and the ethical.
241
  
If one is to confuse the meaning of the wholly other between meaning God or any 
other, then the borders between the ethical (our relation to one another) and the religious (our 
relation to God) is inevitably blurred. From an ethical point of view, Abraham is rightly 
called a murderer, and if a father today were to sacrifice his son on some mountain, then it is 
clear that “everything is organized to insure this man would be condemned by civilized 
society.”
242
 However, Derrida notes that society has instituted laws and economies that the 
same society that would condemn this man 
puts to death or . . . allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children . . . 
without any moral or legal tribunal ever being considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, 
the sacrifice of the other to avoid being sacrificed oneself. Not only does such a society 
participate in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually organizes it.
243
  
This does not even speak of wars, which are fought between “irreconcilable fellow 
worshipers of the religions of the Book.”
244
 Do the protagonists of these wars, asks Derrida, 
“not fight in order to appropriate the secret as the sign of their covenant with God, and 
impose its order on the other, who becomes for his [sic] part nothing more than a 
murderer?”
245
 The dilemma is the wholly other (God) who demands absolute obedience (in 
secret) to a command that involves the sacrificing of all others.  
And again, Derrida reiterates the nature—“the trembling”—of the formula tout autre 
est tout autre, in the sense of replacing the “wholly other” with God: “Every other (one) is 
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God” or “God is every (bit) other.”
246
 He suggests that, in this sense, tout autre est tout autre 
is a kind of shibboleth “a secret formula such as can be uttered only in a certain way in a 
certain language.”
247
 It “functions as a secret within one’s so-called natural or mother 
tongue.”
248
 All others who don’t understand this tongue, foreigners, are excluded (from the 
secret) and sacrificed in the name of the wholly other (God). 
Derrida now turns to a text referred to by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling: 
Matt. 6:18.
249
 The key phrase is “[the father] sees in secret.”
250
 Derrida notes the 
dissymmetry in that God sees me, but I do not see God: 
God looks at me and I don’t see him [sic], and it is on the basis of this gaze that singles me 
out . . . that my responsibility comes into being. . . . But not in the sense of a (Kantian) 
autonomy . . . rather in the heteronomy of and “it’s my lookout” even when I can’t see 
anything, don’t know anything, and can take no initiative, there where I cannot pre-empt by 
my own initiative whatever is commanding me to make decisions, decisions that will 
nevertheless be mine, and which I alone will have to answer for.
251
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This dissymmetry means that the other sees me, but I don’t see the other in me. This 
notion leads Derrida back to the thinking of Patočka, who “describes the coming of Christian 
subjectivity and the repression of Platonism through recourse to a figure that faces us, one 
might say, with a sacrifice that is inscribed within the dissymmetry of looks that cannot be 
exchanged.”
252
 This is done literally: “Tremendum, for responsibility is now vested not in a 
humanly comprehensible essence of goodness and unity but, rather, in an inscrutable relation 
to the absolute highest being in whose hands we are not externally, internally.”
253
 It is at this 
point that, in the Christian faith, “the Good” ceases to be a philosophical idea, but rather 
“personal Goodness.” The reason for this is that from the perspective of a particular 
Christian, the Mysterium Tremendum (the gaze of the wholly other: God) is experienced 
internally and therefore secretly (nobody else knows). 
Derrida notes that this gaze cannot be exchanged
254
—an idea that simply means that 
because I don’t see the gaze that sees me, I cannot “look” back, and therefore, there is no 
“exchange” of gazes. There is also a deeper significance that has to do with the pure gift that 
cannot be exchanged, one that avoids all economy. This could direct one down a detour 
related to the gift of death, which also escapes economy, because a dead (sacrificed) person 
does not have the ability to repay. Derrida is considering the gift of death in terms of the 
sacrifice (Abraham sacrificing Isaac) that is demanded by the gaze of God. The gaze “situates 
originary culpability and original sin; it is the essence of responsibility” and this 
responsibility “sets in train the search for salvation through sacrifice.”
255
 
Sacrifice is further examined with regard to Patočka and the notion of the “being-
toward-death . . . the apprehension of the gift of death, or death as an offering” and Derrida’s 
idea of the “economy of sacrifice.”
256
 This is more precisely explained with regard to 
Kierkegaard, where the sacrifice of Isaac is “re-Christianized” or “pre-Christianized” via the 
Gospel of Matthew: “For he (God the Father) sees in secret and recognizes distress and 
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counts the tears and forgets nothing”
257
 and “thy father which seeth in secret shall reward 
thee.”
258
 So Abraham sacrifices Isaac without hope, but “in this instant . . . God gives him 
back his son and decides by sovereign decision, by an absolute gift, to reinscribe sacrifice 
within an economy by means of what thenceforth resembles a reward.”
259
 It is via 
renunciation that Abraham is rewarded: 
Abraham renounces all sense and all property—that is where the responsibility of absolute 
duty begins. Abraham is in a relation of nonexchange with God, he is in secret since he 
doesn’t speak to God
260
 and expects neither response nor reward from him [sic]. The response 
and hence responsibility always risk what they cannot avoid appealing to in return, namely 
recompense and retribution. They risk the exchange that they should at the same time expect 
and fail to count on, hope for yet exclude.
261
 
Abraham “gains or wins” in that he has renounced the life of his son (with no hope of 
recompense); in “this instant of absolute renunciation”
262
 God returns the very thing Abraham 
renounces. “It is given back to him because he has renounced calculation.”
263
 Abraham offers 
Isaac (the gift of death) for free (he expects nothing back) and thereby renounces the 
economy of give and take. Hence, Abraham is the knight of faith. 
Derrida now turns to Matthew 6 (derived, as previously noted, from an allusion in 
Fear and Trembling). This he does by focusing on the thrice repeated phrase “then your 
Father who sees what is done in secret will reward you.”
264
 This entire passage is centred on 
justice “and especially what we might call economic justice: alms-giving, wages, debt, laying 
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up of treasures. Now the line demarcating celestial from terrestrial economy is what allows 
one to situate the correct place of the heart.”
265
 In this regard Jesus teaches: 
Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon the earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and 
where thieves break through and steal. But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where 
neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through and steal. For 
where treasure is, there will your heart be also.
266
 
This notion of “celestial capital” as “an economic discourse on the site or placement of the 
heart” is both a “cardiotopology” and an “ophthalmology.”
267
 The celestial treasure is 
invisible to corrupted and corruptible eyes of flesh: “The light of the body is the eye: if 
therefore thine eye be single [more usually translated “healthy”—French: sain], thy whole 
body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness, 
how great is that darkness.”
268
 In this imagery the eye is the “source of visibility . . . it gives 
light from the inside.”
269
 
Derrida notes again that this passage is to do with justice, but it is also placed in an 
economy: “The kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit . . . along with them who 
mourn, the meek . . .” and so on (Derrida gives the whole list of beatitudes from Matthew 5). 
All of these are “promised remuneration, a reward, a token, a good salary, a great reward in 
heaven.” Hence, “real heavenly treasure is constituted . . . on the basis of the price paid to 
those who have been able to raise themselves above the earthly or literal justice of the Scribes 
and Pharisees, the men of letters, of the body and of the earth.” This notion of the literal, the 
strict conformity to a written letter (which can be seen) is set in contrast to the unseen, the 
heart, and those who rise above it (certainly not the Scribes or the Pharisees): Derrida states 
(reflecting the biblical text): “If your justice does not exceed that of the Scribes and the 
Pharisees or the men of letters, as opposed to those of the spirit, you will not enter the 
kingdom of heaven . . . you won’t receive your wages.”
270
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There are two separate characteristics of this logic: Firstly, there is photology
271
 where 
the source of light is the heart: “Ye are the light of the world.”
272
 If the light were an 
empirical reality one could hide things from the light, but since the light comes from within, 
nothing can be hidden, “secrecy is no longer possible.”
273
 However, Derrida also plays with 
the paradox around the French phrase plus de secret, which means, if the s of plus is 
pronounced, “more secrets/secrecy” and, if the s of plus is silent, “no more 
secrets/secrecy.”
274
 Hence, in French, “no more secrecy [plus de secret] means more secrecy 
[plus de secret].”
275
 This is “a distinction that cannot be made literally.”
276
 Derrida once 
again recalls the “economy of sacrifice”: “And again, there is an instability in the 
grammatical play . . . of the formula ‘the economy of sacrifice’: one economizes thanks to 
sacrifice and one economizes sacrifice; it is a sacrifice that economizes or an economy that 
sacrifices.”
277
 This is the kind of slippage of meaning that is typical of Derrida, but the point 
is not trivial. The problem with the internal light, from which nothing is kept secret, is that 
this “light” is totally within the subjective experience of, let me say, the knight of faith, who 
then dispenses this light as the light of God. The notion that this light is the light of God is a 
secret that cannot be disclosed to anybody else—at least not in any verifiable way. It really is 
between the knight of faith and God. 
                                                          
271
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 99. 
272
 Matt. 5:14 (AV), quoted in Derrida, Gift of Death, 99. 
273
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 99-100. 
274
 David Wills in Derrida, Gift of Death, 100n4. 
275
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 100. 
276
 Derrida, Gift of Death, 100. This idea brings an insight of note that is relevant to the creation 
narrative in Genesis 1, which I examine later. God says “Let there be light” on day 1. This is the light of 
interiority, since the sun (exterior light) is created on day 4. But this means that the light (of day 1) is not tied to 
literality—of the letter (of the Scribes)—and is instituted at the institution of earth, before there is any literality. 
It is an invisible light (for if it were visible it would render the creation of the sun redundant), but this very 
invisibility is tied to justice (via Matthew 5)—and all of this goes beyond calculation. But there is a faction in 
the SDA Church that has converted this text into the very epitome of calculation (God created the world in six 
consecutive days of twenty-four hours each). What is more, this calculation is the very nature of the Scribe and 
this is demonstrated by the fact that even though this statement (“6 consecutive days of 24 hours each” or any 
variation thereof) is not even stated in Genesis 1, there is a desire to inscribe it into belief #6 “Creation”. But 
beyond this, the inscription could be used to polarise the community and thereby exclude those who “see” things 
differently.  
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Secondly, this “interior” light institutes a new economy: “It breaks with exchange, 
symmetry, or reciprocity.”
278
 Derrida notes, that Christ “still talking about the eye, about the 
right and left, about breaking up a pair or pairing up”
279
 says, “Ye have heard that it hath been 
said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but 
whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.”
280
 This statement 
does not restore the parity of the pair but “interrupts the parity and the symmetry.”
281
 Instead 
of paying back for the blow on the cheek, one is to “give” the other cheek. This logic “that 
commands us to suspend the reciprocity of vengeance and not to resist evil is . . . the logos 
itself, which is life and truth, namely Christ, who . . . teaches love for one’s enemies.”
282
  
Derrida now makes reference to Carl Schmitt who points out that inimicus (Latin for 
“personal enemy”) is not hostis (Latin for “an enemy of the state”) and ekhthros (Greek for 
“personal enemy”) is not polemios (Greek for “warlike” or “enemy of the state”) and that 
both the Latin and the Greek use the word for personal enemy in the Sermon on the Mount:
283
 
“Love your enemies . . . pray for them which . . . persecute you.”
284
 This indicates that the 
love for enemies indicated by Christ is that for personal enemies “and does not suppose that 
love is owed to a public enemy.”
285
 Hence, “Christ’s teaching would be moral or 
psychological, even metaphysical, but not political . . . .”
286
 The consequence of this is that 
any “war waged against Muslims” for example, falls within the sphere of the political and 
hence is not seen to violate Christ’s command to “love your enemies.”
287
 Derrida challenges 
this narrow interpretation and suggests that Leviticus, firstly, does not incorporate “hate thine 
enemy”—when Christ states, “Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy 
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neighbour, and hate thine enemy.”
288
 Secondly, Leviticus explicitly says: “Thou shalt not 
avenge . . . but shall love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the Lord.”
289
 On top of this, the 
Gospel distinguishes between the neighbour (which could possibly be reduced to those in my 
community) and the non-neighbour “not as private enemy but as foreigner, as member of 
another nation, community, or people.”
290
 
There is an economy that is considered the standard way that people behave, an 
economy that cannot invoke the reward bestowed by God: “But I say unto you, Love your 
enemies, bless them that curse you . . . that ye may be children of your father which is in 
heaven . . . for if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? Do not even the 
publicans the same?”
291
 The symmetry of giving is broken: “If you love only those who love 
to the extent that they love you, if you hold so strictly to this symmetry, mutuality, and 
reciprocity, then you give nothing, no love, and the reserve of your wages will be like a tax 
that is imposed or a debt that is repaid, like the acquittal of a debt.”
292
 Hence, the “infinite 
and dissymmetrical economy of sacrifice is opposed both to that of the Scribes and Pharisees, 
to the old law in general, and to that of heathen ethnic groups or gentiles.”
293
 It goes beyond 
calculation and in the context of the Gospel of Matthew is related to justice, and conforms to 
“unknowing” and hence the secret. In the sense of giving alms, one’s left hand should not be 
aware of what one’s right is doing and it is because of this that “thy Father which seeth in 
secret shall reward thee openly.”
294
 But this is really an alternative economy, a manipulation 
that is accomplished via the promise of a greater reward: “God the Father, who sees in secret, 
will pay back your salary, and on an infinitely greater scale.”
295 
 
God therefore has drawn especially close and, in this sense, can scarcely be called 
transcendent:  
I have within me, thanks to the invisible word as such, a witness that others cannot see at the 
same time other than me and more intimate with me than myself, as soon as I can have a 
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secret relationship with myself and not tell everything, as soon as there is secrecy and secret 
witnessing within me, and for me, then there is what I call God, (there is) what I call God in 
me . . . I call myself God—a phrase that is difficult to distinguish from “God calls me,” for it 
is on such condition that I can call myself or be called in secret. God is in me, he is the 
absolute “me” or “self” . . . .
296
 
This “God in me” is made manifest “when there appears the desire and power to render 
absolutely invisible and to constitute within oneself a witness of that invisibility.”
297
 Derrida 
names this “the history of God . . . as the history of secrecy . . . . Such a history is also an 
economy.”
298
 Derrida hints at what might be termed the metaphysical charade that is 
Christianity even understood at its best. Once one has identified this interiority of the secret, a 
secret that God sees in me, it becomes above reproach. If the call of God that resonates within 
my own soul is that call to which I must be absolutely faithful, and must be absolutely 
responsible to the negation of all others, then whether I acknowledge it or not, God is located 
within me. If God is not external to me in this sense (even though I believe that this God is 
other than me or external to my psyche) then quite evidently I am a God unto myself (though 
this idea is kept from my own psyche). In any case, it enables one to impose one’s own will 
as though it is the will of God. Obviously this is not the intent of Christianity, but on the other 
hand, how is anyone to tell the difference and when one looks at the violent history of 
Christianity, it is difficult not to be cynical. 
Derrida, following Baudelaire’s “critique of Christianity, which is at the same time 
evangelical and heretical,” describes this “young institution” as “that of appearing always as a 
‘homicidal and suicidal literature.’ A (hi)story of men and not of women; a story of ‘fellow 
men’. A history of fraternity and a history of Christianity: ‘Hypocritical reader, my fellow, 
my brother.’”
299
 Baudelaire perceives Christian charity to be a charade since it is performed 
in order to gain an eternal recompense in heaven. 
The charade is allowed to stand, however, simply because it is a secret that cannot be 
unmasked. Since the wholly other is God who encounters the individual internally, the sacred 
other that is identified with this gaze of God (mysterium tremendum) is inseparable from the 
self. The wholly other turns out to not be other at all. Tout autre est tout autre stands in sharp 
objection. The reduction of the wholly other to God (this named entity that is too easily 
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identified with the self) ends up destroying the phrase tout autre est tout autre. This means 
that Derrida’s wholly other is not God. The wholly other is any other. The wholly other, at 
the very least, is really, absolutely, totally and wholly other. The reduction of the wholly 
other to the self is an absolute aberration and denial of the affirmation tout autre est tout 
autre. In every sense, the other is other. The tautology must stand. But also the 
heterotautology must stand, because whatever tout autre est tout autre means in its 
tautological formulation, it is not a repetition of the same. If anything is sacred to Derrida, it 
is the other, hence tout autre est tout autre—no need to grasp French punning to understand 
this most simple of points. 
However, while the self should not give absolute precedence or regard to the other 
(either God or any other other), there must, nevertheless, always remain a regard for the self 
as other. This Derrida explicates with regard to narcissism, something that is generally 
considered a vice: 
Narcissism! There is not narcissism and non-narcissism; there are narcissisms that are more or 
less comprehensive, generous, open, extended. What is called non-narcissism is in general but 
the economy of a much more welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is much more open 
to the experience of the other as other. I believe that without a movement of narcissistic 
reappropriation, the relation to the other would be absolutely destroyed in advance. The 
relation to the other—even if it remains asymmetrical, open, without possible 
reappropriation—must trace a movement of reappropriation in the image of oneself for love to 
be possible, for example.
300
 
But, this also means that the notion of God, as the one who is infinitely other, to whom I owe 
absolute allegiance, does not exist in Derrida’s thinking—or, at least, not as a uniquely 
identifiable being. Hence, the monotheistic religions (Abrahamic/Ibrahimic)—Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam—in any of their orthodox forms (one might say “onto-theological”) 
are problematic at the outset as, indeed, are their understandings of God.  
However, this does not mean that the other has been eclipsed with God, quite the 
contrary. The wholly other (tout autre) is placed in a religious context via the Abraham/Isaac 
narrative, or one might say in a “sacred space.” Although the God of Abraham does not 
escape “unscathed” in Derrida’s analysis, the wholly other (whether one wishes to name 
“God” or not in this space) is always respected, perhaps, even sacred. If Derrida is to suggest 
an affirmation of God, it is a God “by other names,” a wholly other God, not a God of the 
same, and certainly not a God that excludes the other. 
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The difficulty for any piece of writing with an interest in theology is that God, or 
some idea of God, is often placed at the centre or, at least, very close to the centre. Derrida’s 
tout autre est tout autre serves to destabilise any construct that is labelled “God.” In any case, 
the idea of the “other” is decentring by its very nature. With this in mind, I will examine in 
more detail why an inviolable definitive centre is problematic for Derrida via an examination 
of logocentrism and by placing the idea of the detour at the centre. 
1.3. Sacred Centres 
One of the accomplices of destabilising and deconstructing a structure is decentring. 
In terms of any given discourse this decentring can be perceived as particularly problematic. 
The centre is a focal point around which or upon which understanding is generated. Logic 
needs a point of reference, and if there is no stable point of reference then our minds will 
automatically search for one. When preparing a thesis proposal, for example, one of the 
primary tasks is identifying the research question. What is the point of the thesis? This needs 
to be summed up in a few words. There needs to be a logos at the centre that precedes the 
actual writing (and reading) of the thesis. In contrast to this is the idea of the detour. The 
detour is a path that is, according to the preceding logos, not necessary to follow. It is a 
diversion that takes longer and follows routes that can be dispensed with. A thesis cannot be a 
series of disconnected detours with no binding logic. This dissertation is no different. There is 
a centre, a focal point, and in this subsection of the dissertation, the detour is the centre. Its 
relevance and logic is quite evident since the other is always on a detour. Of course, detours 
are substitutable. There is always another detour, just like there is another other. It is for this 
reason that I have taken a further detour through messianism, which is often perceived as 
“waiting for the other” or, possibly, “watching for the wholly other, God, for example.” The 
point I am trying to emphasise is that although there is a centre, essential for the sake of logic 
and cohesion, there are detours which help to amplify the meaning that the centre’s 
organising logic provides.  
The mistake is to presume that the detours could not be at the centre. But, also, it is a 
mistake to presume that anything can be at the centre and that it makes no difference. All of 
the ideas that I have placed at the centre have something about them that decentres, that 
displaces a single, central truth. This is why messianism or logocentrism, for example, should 
not be at the centre. The centres are substitutable for others, but not any others. Messianism 












definition is excluded. In order to clarify a form of the messianic that Derrida can abide, I 
have taken a detour through hospitality, though it is located under the heading “Messianism.” 
This enables me to preserve the particular structure of my dissertation while taking a detour 
through something (hospitality) that possibly should be at the centre. All I am meaning to say 
by this is that, while the centres as I have selected them could be substituted for detours (and 
hospitality is one of these), it is fair to say that not all detours belong at the centre (and this is 
true of messianism). To reiterate, the centres are necessary in order to allow understanding, 
but really, every centre I have chosen is not truly the centre. Their worth is explanatory. 
1.3.1. Logocentrism 
Like any significant figure who writes, Derrida has certain words, terms or quotable 
quotes that recur and tend to form our understanding of the “essence” of his thinking. For 
example, it is hard to imagine an undergraduate excluding the word “deconstruction” when 
writing a short paragraph about Jacques Derrida. Nevertheless it is a word whose use I have 
tried to limit in this dissertation, not because it is irrelevant, but because there are 
substitutions that take place and work just as well, and possibly even better for my 
purposes.
301
 There are detours. This does not mean that the destination is the point—the idea 
being that though we take a detour, “getting there in the end” is what counts—as Derrida 
observes parenthetically with regard to the trace, in the essay “Différance”: “and has anyone 
thought that we have been tracking something down, something other than the tracks 
themselves to be tracked down?”
302
  
Still, this detour does lead me to identify a quotable quote from the same essay, one 
that I have been led to quote myself, and not only here. Anyone who has ever addressed the 
issue of negative theology and the work of Jacques Derrida probably does so, in some way, 
via this quotation: “the detours [emphasis added], locutions, and syntax in which I will often 
have to take recourse will resemble those of negative theology, occasionally even to the point 
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of being indistinguishable from negative theology.”
303
 But what is seldom examined with 
regard to this quotation is the notion of the detour. I will return to this idea via Derrida’s 
essay “Des tours de Babel.” Before examining this extremely convoluted essay, it is 
necessary for me to contrast the idea of the detour with that of logocentrism.  
Derrida describes logocentrism in the opening pages of Of Grammatology in 
association with three quotations that I include without addition or deletion: 




O Samas (sun-god), by your light you scan the totality of lands as if they were cuneiform 
signs (ibid.). 
 
2. These three ways of writing correspond almost exactly to three different stages according to 
which one can consider men gathered into a nation. The depicting of objects is appropriate to 
a savage people; signs of words and of propositions, to a barbaric people; and the alphabet to 
civilized people. J.-J. Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues. 
 
3. Alphabetic script is in itself and for itself the most intelligent. Hegel, Enzyklopädie.
305
 
These quotations appear directly under the heading of the chapter: “Exergue.” This heading is 
retained from the French in Spivak’s translation of De La Grammatologie.
306
 Its etymology is 
Greek—ex (outside) and ergon (work)—carrying the meaning of “outside of the work.” In 
this sense Derrida’s “Exergue” would not belong to the actual text of Of Grammatology (even 
though it quite clearly does), being “outside of the work.” Exergue, in French, can also mean 
“inscription” and in both English and French has the rather specific meaning: “A little space 
around or without the figures of a medal, left for the inscription.”
307
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The three quotations (a few lines above) are a “triple exergue” that highlight what 
Derrida means by logocentrism. This is directly associated with ethnocentrism (which is quite 
evident in the triple exergue) and is briefly described as “the metaphysics of phonetic writing 
(for example, of the alphabet) which was fundamentally . . . nothing but the original and 
powerful ethnocentrism, in the process of imposing itself upon the world . . . .” This 
logocentrism controlled, firstly, “the concept of writing where the phoneticization of writing 
must dissimulate its own history as it is produced.” Speech—“the phoneticization of 
writing”—is prioritised, and writing is considered to be secondary and for the sake of speech. 
Secondly, it controlled the history of metaphysics, by which Derrida is referring to Western 
philosophical discourse—“not only from Plato to Hegel (even including Leibniz) but also 
beyond these apparent limits, from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger”—which has “always 
assigned the origin of truth in general to the logos: the history of truth, of the truth of the 
truth, has always been . . . the debasement of writing, and its repression outside of ‘full’ 
speech.” Thirdly, Derrida includes the “concept of science or the scientificity of science—
what has always been determined as logic,” and logic “has always been a philosophical 
concept, even if the practice of science has constantly challenged its imperialism of the logos, 
by invoking for example, from the beginning and ever increasingly, nonphonetic writing.”
308
 
Phonocentrism—“an inflation, not of the graphic, but of the phonic sign, of the rôle of 
the element of sound in the production of meaning, language as speech”—is “related to 
logocentrism—the belief that the first and last things are the Logos, the Word, the Divine 
Mind, the infinite understanding of God, an infinitely creative subjectivity, and, closer to our 
time, the self-presence of full selfconsciousness.”
309
  
In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined strictly as sense 
(thought or lived) or more loosely as thing. All signifiers, and first and foremost the written 
signifier, are derivative with regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or 
to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the thing itself . . . . The written signifier is 
always technical and representative. It has no constitutive meaning. This derivation is the very 
origin of the notion of the ‘signifier’. . . . This notion remains therefore within the heritage of 
that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of 
voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning.
310
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From this Derrida notes that via the voice, the subject hears itself and, thereby, “affects itself 
and is related to itself in the element of ideality.”
311
 Since the voice is perceived as present 
and has been assigned primacy and centrality in gaining meaning—it is logocentric—it thus 
“supports the determination of the being of the entity as presence.”
312
 Although, Derrida does 
not, alternatively, wish to prioritise writing over speech, writing, nevertheless, is not similarly 
plagued by the notion of presence, but by absence—of the reader when it is written and the 
writer when it is read. Its meaning will always differ and be deferred and not be tied to the 
present. Derrida’s “Exergue” is an ironic gesture towards writing—a small space left for an 
inscription in service to the medal (itself, an ironic gesture towards speech). But in truth the 
medal is only a signifier of a victory of some sort (depending on the particular medal) and 
fails to signify adequately without the written inscription. The irony is that Derrida’s Exergue 
in Of Grammatology is an inscription inscribed on that small space under the heading of the 
book itself—Of Grammatology (the medal)—which actually turns out to not be speech at all, 
but writing. This indicates the dependence not merely of the written text on speech, but also 
of speech on writing. 
Caputo precisely outlines logocentrism in a few sentences: 
Privileging the philosophy of Plato is what Derrida means by “logocentrism,” making the 
logic of the argument, the demonstrably true or false claims, the center, while sending 
everything else off to the periphery as mere rhetoric or ornamentation, letting the logic lead 
the letter. The result of this logocentric hegemony of the “philosophy,” this concentration of 
“theses,” is that the text is “neutralized,” “numbed,” “inhibited,” even though these 
heterogeneous forces continue to stir in their inhibited form. Platonism is not only the first 
“example” in the West of the construction of such a “philosophy,” but also the paradigm that 




Since the voice, which is directly accessible to the mind (in the sense that one can speak to 
oneself without actually vocalising), is prioritised over writing, this means that whenever a 
text is read, there is a thought that is prior which controls the manner in which the text is 
read. “There is a suggestion,” says Spivak, “that this phonocentrism-logocentrism relates to 
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centrism itself—the human desire to posit a ‘central’ presence at beginning and end.”
314
 The 
problem is that once this centre is identified in the mind, everything that is not understood in 
direct relation to this centre is considered to be a detour, even extraneous. Caputo, therefore, 
posits the conclusion: “‘Deconstruction’ will consist in a fine-grained reading of the text, of 
the literality and textuality of the text, slowly scrupulously, seriously, in releasing the still-
stirring forces that ‘philosophy’ and logocentrism strive to contain.”
315
 
I would like to circle back to a point I made earlier with regard to quotable quotes. 
Certain quotations find their way into the public space. They are extracted from the written 
text and become a sort of generalisation that identifies not merely the essence of the text from 
which they are sourced, but even the essence of what the given writer generally thinks. This 
generalization becomes the vocal means by which a philosopher’s thinking (for example) is 
disseminated, and it precedes any actual reading of the philosopher’s works. This 
logocentrism serves to justify the quotable quote, which produced the particular logocentric 
view in the first place. It is beyond the bounds of probability that hundreds of independent 
readers all read Derrida’s “Différance” and decided to quote the same passage as the 
“definitive” one. Secondary sources (and primary sources, for that matter) copy one another 
and they copy one another’s shortcomings. That is not to say that all secondary sources, for 
example, are inaccurate or equivalent, but even nuanced understandings can succumb to 
oversimplifications and imprecise generalizations, by virtue of necessity. One cannot exactly 
quote every word of an article and so every explication will condense what is said and reduce 
arguments to the “essential” components, the essence, as it were. By way of example, I quote 
from an essay by Richard Rorty written in 1991 (before Derrida’s corpus was complete), 
commenting on Derrida with regard to logocentrism: 
“The discourse of philosophy” is to early Derrida as “Being” is to late Heidegger. Both terms 
refer to something we can never simply walk away from, but instead must constantly struggle 
with. As Christians think God inescapable and Heidegger thinks Being inescapable, so 
Derrida thinks “the discourse of philosophy” inescapable. All our attempts to do without it are 
relations to it. It follows us down the nights and down the days. It waits at the end of every 
road that seems to lead away from it. Just as Freud thought that we never cease from erotic 
struggle with images of our parents, no matter how long we live or how little we consciously 
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This quote serves at least two functions. Firstly, it is a perspective on my own task in this 
dissertation. Secondly, I wish to extract the term “early Derrida,” which immediately makes 
one think “late Derrida.” Since Rorty compares early Derrida to late Heidegger the binary 
can hardly be in question. No doubt this distinction in Derrida is well-documented, but it is 
also virtually unverifiable. In order to distinguish early Derrida from late Derrida—categories 
that one may not even realise should necessarily be distinguished from one another—one 
would have to read both early Derrida and late Derrida. This would involve reading at least 
the majority of Derrida’s works. But who is actually going to do that? I ask the question with 
no facetious intent. To successfully identify categories as early and late Derrida is a 
mammoth task. And, if some-one did unpack such a huge volume of very difficult text—this 
is not the time to underestimate how difficult Derrida’s texts can be— ould they do so with 
an eye to verifying Rorty’s point? But more than this, where is the boundary between early 
and late? Clearly, there is a difference between any separate publications of any author 
otherwise there would not be two separate publications. The claim pushes one to a 
logocentric position: If Derrida is read with the prior notion that if he is arguing that the 
“discourse of philosophy” cannot be escaped, it belongs to early Derrida, and if, on the other 
hand, one of his texts suggest that the “discourse on philosophy” can be escaped, then the text 
must belong to late Derrida. Added to this, since Derrida is so difficult to understand anyway, 
one often only considers that one has understood the text when one recognises the presence 
of these logocentric ideas that precede the reading of the text itself. 
The detour is something that is other than logocentrism. It is a side-track that could 
even be viewed as irrelevant. Since I am challenging notions of logocentrism, the detour is 
given relevance, not because it is an alternative logocentric idea, but because it defies the 
very idea of being the central word. In a sense, it can never be comfortable at the centre. This 
is why the detour can be so easily allied with substitution. Whatever one finds on a detour 
could be the centre and this may allow the detour to remain a detour. 
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With regard to the aforementioned quotable quote, Caputo notes that even though “the 
‘detours, locutions, and syntax’ in which Derrida strives to mark off différance will resemble, 
almost to the point of indistinguishability, the twists and turns of negative theology [emphasis 
added], still deconstruction is no negative theology.”
317
 Although Caputo is not quite precise 
enough, in that though the quotation is from “Différance” and Caputo is no doubt correct 
when he compares “the twists and turns of negative theology” with the “detours, locution, 
and syntax” of différance, Derrida is more general, stating that “the detours, locutions and 
syntax in which I will often have to take recourse [emphasis added] will resemble those of 
negative theology.” 
Elsewhere, in “Khôra,” the notion of the detour is mentioned: “We would never claim 
to propose the exact word, the mot juste, for khôra, nor to name it, itself, over and above all 
the turns and detours [emphasis added] of rhetoric, nor finally to approach, itself, for what it 
will have been, outside of any point of view, outside of any anachronic perspective.”
318
 This 
quote comes closer to illustrating why the notion of the detour is instructive in understanding 
Derrida. In order to explain his meaning, Derrida is bound by the constraints of (usually 
written) language, so obviously present (in the form of a book, for example). But he wishes 
to upset notions of presence, stable categories and structures, even or especially, within 
languages. So he searches for other paths, rather than the well-worn ones, detours, if you will. 
These paths become the “centre” around which the discourse, for the time being, revolves. 
Différance could be at the centre, so could khôra, or, even, a detour. 
The difficulty with a detour is that it is often interpreted as a lack of focus, a 
movement into an area that is no longer germane to the perceived point at hand. It is by 
definition not central. Barbara Mella in “Derrida’s Detour” notes the paradox of writing on 
the notion of “detour” while writing specifically on this word with an unequivocal focus: 
I must draw margins around what I write, to differentiate between what is relevant and what is 
not so relevant. Between the inside and the outside. I must confine my writing to the inside, 
enclose it within a perimeter, which forms a circular line, an orbit around the text. I am not 
allowed to go outside, ex-orbit unless through footnotes or parenthesis (discrete strategies to 
overrun or spill over the circumference, taking the text somewhere other, on a detour, but 
always only to come back to the inside of the main topic). But what is the main topic of this 
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text? You must excuse me if I was already digressing, already blurring the borders. So end of 
note: I will get back on track.
319
 
Mella refers to “two similar withholdings: Derrida’s and Spivak’s.” In the first place, Mella 
notes that Spivak quotes a passage from “Différance” in the “Translator’s Preface” to Of 
Grammatology, and in commenting on this passage states: “It emphasises the presence of 
Freud in the articulation of what comes close to becoming Derrida's master-concept—
‘différance’ spelled with an ‘a.’ Let us fasten on three moments in the quotation—‘differing,’ 
‘deferring,’ and ‘detour.’”
320
 Having then claimed to “fasten on these three moments,” Spivak 
“returns to differing and deferring as anticipated, but she never returns to detour.”
321
 
Similarly, “Derrida, only mentions Freud (a Freudian non-slip) in relation to the origin of this 
idea of detour, but no one else.”
322
 Mella then goes on to study the etymology of the word, 
which is interesting in and of itself, resulting in such meanings as “exorbitant,” “ellipsis,” and 
“circle.”
323
 I would like to move in a different direction.  
I am not convinced that Derrida has not written explicitly on the notion of detour. I 
am referring here to his essay “Des tours de Babel.”
 324
 The title itself is a play on words. 
“Des means ‘some’; but it also means ‘of the,’ ‘from the,’ or ‘about the.’ Tours could be 
towers, twists, tricks, turns, or tropes, as in ‘turn’ of phrase. Taken together, des and tours 
have the same sound as detour, the word for detour.”
325
 There are numerous possible English 
translations: “Detours of Babel;” “Around the Towers of Babel;” “About the Turns of Phrase 
of Babel” or, even, “Detours of Confusion.” One can understand why Joseph Graham did not 
translate the title; Des tours defies a single translation and Babel is a proper noun (though 
often perceived as a common noun: “confusion”) and, hence, does not submit to translation. 
My reason, in the first place, for selecting this essay as significant (though surely it 
could have been substituted for another), is that it has Derrida examining a portion of the Old 
Testament (“sacred text”) from the same Scripture that forms my particular case for 
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 Second, the tower of Babel narrative has particular significance 
for the multiplicity of languages in the context of a sacred text—and Derrida makes several 
references to the notion of sacred text in the essay. Third, Derrida, actually points to 
something and names it sacred, not in the sense of some (other) religion, or in the sense of the 
text in Genesis 11, but in relation to his own argument. I will, therefore, treat this text—a 
translated text on translation examining a translated text—as sacred, and follow it as closely 
as I dare, for the sake of, rather than in spite of, any detours. This, I believe, takes us a step 
closer to what may be sacred for Jacques Derrida; yet, because it is a detour, this is only 
accomplished by stepping away. 
The narrative of the tower of Babel speaks of the relation of language to itself, of one 
language to another, of the need for and the impossibility of translation. This relation to 
language (the origin of the “irreducible multiplicity of tongues”) is juxtaposed with an 
architectural construction, that is incomplete, unfinished. There is, Derrida suggests, “the 
translation of a system in deconstruction.”
327
  
With reference to Voltaire, Derrida points out that etymologically Babel means Father 
(Ba) God (Bel).
328
 The point is that Babel is both a proper noun (and, hence, untranslatable) 
and a common noun (“confusion”). Confusion, here, has a double meaning: the confusion of 
tongues and the state of confusion of the architects whose construction is interrupted. The 
meaning of “confusion” is confused. But more than this, the name Babel (Father God) refers 
to a city that is called confusion: “God, the God, would have marked with his patronym a 
community space, that city where people no longer understand one another.”
329
 God is not 
only father, he is the father of language, but this gift of language is poisoned (Gift-gift—
“Poison present”)
330
 via “the multiplicity of idioms, of what in other words are usually called 
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 The striving of this “great Semitic family”
332
 to impose and universalise 
their tongue is confounded. 
Derrida has recourse to two French translations of the narrative (Louis Segond’s and 
André Chouraqui’s). Segond strays from the “literality” of the Hebrew where a more exact 
translation would render “lip” (Chouraqui) rather than “tongue” (Segond), by which is meant 
“language.”
333
 I am somewhat startled by what appears to be carelessness on the part of 
Derrida in this section. Firstly, he makes use of two French translations with an oblique 
reference to the Hebrew text. The word he is concerned to translate is sapâ and can rightly be 
translated “lip” or “language,” but given Derrida’s preoccupation with etymology and the 
origin of words, one would have thought that he would have noted its related and provocative 
meaning: “As the lips were seen to be the outer edge of the mouth, the word sapâ was also 
used in various contexts to represent types of edges and borders.”
334
 The “lip” therefore 
signifies “language” which itself signifies the point that separates one from another, the 
boundary that divides. This is all contained in the Hebrew word itself. This is illustrative of 
what Derrida is outlining with regard to the impossibility of ideal translation. Derrida is 
dealing to a large degree with French translations of the Bible (Segond’s and Chouraqui’s), 
and although meaning is gained in translation, meaning is also lost.  
At this point, Derrida notes the resemblance to translation in the phrase: “And brick 
served them as stone, and tar served as cement.”
335
 He poses the question: “I do not know 
how to interpret this allusion to substitution or the transmutation of materials” and then 
sidesteps the detour in a humorous feint: “But let us leave it and substitute a second 
translation for the first” (by which he means he is shifting to Chouraqui’s translation from 
Segond’s).
336
 Derrida suggests a detour, but then doesn’t follow it. Derrida plays with 
different possible translations and substitutions, and this may be the second allusion (the first 
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allusion being the tower as architecture and the tower as language) to the plural in his title: 
“Des tours de Babel.” Why towers—plural? The Genesis narrative mentions only one tower 
of Babel. Although Derrida doesn’t directly address this apparent anomaly, it seems to me 
that the very notion of translation requires the plural. It is a reference to the multiplicity of 
tongues (obviously), but also to the fact that every translation is also an interpretation. There 
is no one-to-one correspondence between languages. Hence Segond (the first translation) 
translates sapâ as “tongue,” and Chouraqui (the second translation—rendering the towers 
plural) translates it “lip”. Yet, and this points to what I think Derrida is doing, Segond and 
Chouraqui do not actually translate sapâ into “tongue” and “lip” at all, but rather “langue” 
and “lèvre.” I am dealing in translation (English not French) as is Derrida (French not 
Hebrew), since by what irony should he not, where translation is the whole point. But notice 
that a single Hebrew word (sapâ) has now been substituted by four separate words (two in 
French and two in English). These are the towers of Babel and they are not synonymous. But 
on the other hand, they are not unrelated; confused maybe, but not unrelated. To rephrase this 
in terms of the detour: If I read the tower of Babel narrative in Genesis 11 in a single English 
translation, this is one “of the towers” (des tours) of Babel. But this is a detour from the 
Hebrew text, the most originary version available. But Hebrew itself is not the original 
unconfused pre-Babel language. It too is one of the towers, a detour. The only languages 
available are detours. 
God punishes the builders for wanting to ascend to the Most High, but more 
importantly in wanting to thereby “make a name for themselves [an idiom that signifies all 
they are trying to accomplish]” and construct for themselves “a unique and universal 
genealogy.”
337
 God then (jealously) confounds these ambitions, deconstructing the tower, 
confusing the universal language and scattering the genealogical filiations. This God does by 
the imposition of his own name, YHWH (an unpronounceable name, which occurs in 
conjunction with the name “Babel”). This name of God, this idiom triumphs:  
Translation then becomes necessary and impossible, like the effect of a struggle of the 
appropriation of the name, necessary and forbidden in the interval between two absolutely 
proper names. And the proper name of God is divided enough in the tongue, already, to 
signify also, confusedly, ‘confusion’.
338 
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Derrida now makes reference to James Joyce’s Finnegan‘s Wake, a notoriously 
difficult work of convoluted metaphors and portmanteau words, which he unsurprisingly 
names “a Babelian book.”
339
 In this regard, Derrida invokes the enigmatic phrase “and he 
war.”
340
 The meaning is not obvious, but I think can be understood if one realises that God 
confuses the languages, “and he [God]” in this movement goes to “war.” It is the war that 
God declares (institutes) by generating multiple languages. But the war itself cannot be won 
because to “win” would mean a return to the single universal language before God’s 
imposition of confusion. The only way to return to a kind of “pre-Babelian” world is for a 
particular language to eradicate all others, hence the polemic. This polemic is at work in the 
very task of translation. It is a work of exclusion. For example, it is one thing to translate one 
language into another, but what is one to do if there are multiple languages (recalling that 
multiple languages is the post-Babelian condition) in a single text that one wishes to 
translate? “How is the effect of plurality to be ‘rendered’?”
341
 Translation into a particular 
language presumes that one is translating for an audience that is restricted to the translated 
language. So if a text has portions written in, say, French and German, a one-to-one 
translation would just translate each word (whether French or German) into English 
(assuming English is the language of translation), but would be unable to demonstrate that the 
original text had two different languages. Hence, the translation has excluded an “other” 
(German or French). This could be acknowledged in some sort of parenthetical supplement, a 
footnote, for instance, but the translation itself would have to declare war on one or other or 
both of the languages, because of its own singularity. Translation in this sense is a movement 
of exclusion. If everything that is ever said or written could just be translated adequately into 
English (my language) then I would have no need for any other (language). This sort of 
imperialism hints at the nature of the war that is instituted with the multiple languages. There 
is no return to a universal language that is not the most offensive polemic against all other 
languages. 
Babel is both a proper noun and a common noun. As a proper noun it is 
untranslatable, but it also means “confusion,” a meaning that can be translated (a common 
noun). The moment one translates a proper noun, it can no longer be a proper noun. Two 
points are made with regard to “Babel” and its translation: 1) “A proper name, in the proper 
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sense, does not properly belong to language;” and 2) “Anyone whose so-called mother tongue 
was the tongue of Genesis could indeed understand Babel as ‘confusion’; that person then 
effects a confused translation of the proper name by its common equivalent without having 
need for another word.”
342
 Derrida is quite careful here in that he refers to the “so-called 
mother tongue” that is not the original “father tongue” of the narrative, nor, necessarily 
Hebrew (the language of the author as it is relayed to us). Rather, this is a mother tongue, that 
is, one of the confused languages that now is faced with translating the pre-Babelian language 
(“father tongue”) into one of the confused languages, that is, “Babel” into “Babel.” But the 
translation “Babel” (a mother tongue) is confused because it no longer precisely identifies 
Father (Ba) God (Bel)—a pure language where the signified and signifier neatly align—but 
also denotes confusion.  
Derrida now distinguishes three forms of translation derived from Roman Jacobson’s 
“On Linguistic Aspects of Translation:”
343
 1) Intralingual (interprets linguistic signs with 
signs within the same language); 2) Interlingual (interprets linguistic signs by means of some 
other language); and 3) Transmutation (interprets linguistic signs by means of systems of 
non-linguistic signs).
344
 Intralingual and transmutation require explanation and definition to 
be understood, whereas interlingual translation is “translation proper.”
345
 The term is, itself, 
an “intralingual translation,” nevertheless this “proper” translation is the translation that is 
required post-Babel owing to the multiplicity of tongues. This is proper translation and “the 
other translations would be in a position of intralingual and inadequate translation . . . .”
346
 
Hence, this narrative of Babel, “at once archetypical and allegorical, could serve as an 
introduction to all the so-called theoretical problems of translation.”
347
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An article by Walter Benjamin, translated by Maurice de Gandillac, entitled “The 
Task of the Translator”
348
 is now examined. Derrida, not without a sense of irony, 
acknowledges that a reading of this should have led to a reading of “On Language as Such 
and on the Language of Man” also by Benjamin. It is found in the same volume translated by 
de Gandillac, and features explicit reference to Babel, but Derrida avoided the article because 
he found it “overly enigmatic in character.”
349
 In any event, this means that Derrida is dealing 
with a French translation (de Gandillac) of a German text (Benjamin) that deals with 
translation. In my case, then, I am dealing with an English translation of a French text that 
deals with a French translation of a German text. This is to be further exacerbated by the fact 
that Benjamin himself quotes Mallarmé in French!  
Benjamin describes the task of translation as a “debt to render”
350
 and Derrida 
acknowledges this language of “gift and debt.”
351
 The task of the translator is a “restitution of 
meaning” amidst the metaphor of “the transmission of a family seed.”
 352
 Hence, a key theme 
of Benjamin’s text is “the ‘kinship’ of languages”—suggesting “the very possibility of 
historical linguistics.”
353
 Benjamin, writing in German, at one point includes two additional 
languages: Latin (which he footnotes as such), and a quote from Mallarmé, which he leaves 
untranslated in French, “left shining in his text like the medallion of a proper name.”
354
 How 
is de Gandillac to translate French amidst German into French amidst French, without losing 
the tenor of the original? The point is that we assume that the translator is given the meaning 
by the original text (gift),
355
 which s/he now renders (the debt to give back) in the translated 
language, and thus, there is restitution (the meaning of the original is rendered). This 
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restitution in the new translated language is the “maturation of the seed.”
356
 This means that 
the “ground” of translation is that everything in the original text can, in fact, find expression 
in the translated text without a loss of meaning. But this is not the case, and the ground of 




This point needs to be emphasised. Since there is a loss of meaning in translation, 
there is something in the original that is lost, though not without a trace. This idea is part of 
the value of the detour. The detour uncovers these traces. This is because the trace is not the 
evident well-travelled path. It is concealed and hidden, but not gone. It can be found.  
Benjamin uses metaphors of “life” and “family” in relation to language and 
translation.
358
 His preface “circulates without ceasing among the values of seed, life and, 
especially, ‘survival’.”
359
 Three words are related to one another with reference to the task of 
the translator: Übersetzen; Übertragen and Überleben (translating, transferring and 
survival).
360
 The translator (Joseph F. Graham) of “Des tours de Babel” renders the German 
überleben or the French survie as “sur-vival” (the inverted commas are in the text) in order to 
invoke the etymology that is not as evident in the English as it is in both the German and the 
French (“above-life” or “over-life”).
361
 This “sur-vival” of the text “exceeds biological life 
and death”—it is not the survival of the author or the translator (“survival of works not 




The relation is between two texts (not donor and donee in the sense of the author of 
the original and the translator). In this regard, Benjamin makes four points. First, the task of 
the translator does not follow from reception. The debt to translate is presented by the 
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original text and since the relation is between original and translation, it is not the translator 
who is the “indebted receiver.”
363
 
Second, the essential goal of translation “is not to communicate.” And Derrida adds, 
“No more is the goal of the original [to communicate].” Following Benjamin, Derrida states 
that “for a poetic or a sacred text, communication is not the essential” after having already 
pointed out that “the intralinear version [a translation in the same language] of the sacred text 
would be the model or ideal of any possible translation in general.” What I think is meant 
here is that in order to translate into a different language, the translator would ask what the 
original communicates (in other words) before considering how to phrase this in the language 
of translation, which actually distances the translation from the original (since the translation 
is considered “in other words”). This is clearly problematic, since one is concerned with 
translating the original “as the signature of a kind of proper name destined to ensure its 
survival as a work.”
364
 
Third, “[i]f between the translated text and the translating text . . . there is indeed a 
relation of ‘original’ to version, it could not be representative or reproductive. Translation is 
neither image nor copy.”
 365
 The task of the translator is described as a “law” or “demand” 
which is grounded in the “authority of the original” and refers to “translation as form.”
366
 
This form is prescribed by the original. Two questions are asked: 1) Is there a “capable” 
translator? 2) Does the work “require translation?”
367
 Whether there is a capable translator or 
not does not change “the demand or in the structure of the injunction that comes from the 
work.”
368
 The surviving dimension of the work is an a priori and hence the work is called 
“unforgettable” (whether it is remembered or not), and demands translation (whether it is 
translated or not).
369
 In addition, the correspondence between languages that makes 
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translation possible is assured by “a thought of God.”
370
 This curious affirmation by 
Benjamin is quite Babelian. The translation which comes about via the idea of survival is not 
a “faithful representation of the original” it “is itself in the process of transformation.”
371
 It is 
a mutation of the original, a “postmaturation . . . of a seed.”
372
 This is not merely a metaphor 




Fourth (following the three negations of reception, communication and 
representation), Benjamin addresses the question as to “who is committed to translate and 
from where the commitment is derived?”
374
 In response, Derrida suggests, with particular 
attention to the Babel narrative, that “the first debtor is the original.”
375
 On the one hand, 
there are the constructors of the tower who wish to make a name for themselves and “found a 
universal tongue that translates itself by itself.”
376
 On the other, there is also God, who 
likewise appeals to translation, not only because of the confused languages, but also because 
God’s name “should be translated as confusion to be understood . . . .”
377
 So, as a petitioner 
for translation, God is indebted: “[God] has not finished pleading for the translation of his 
[sic] name even as he [sic] forbids it. For Babel is untranslatable.”
378
  
There is a contract that is inherent in the demand to translate: “The signature of this 
singular contract need not be documented or archived writing: it nevertheless takes place as 
trace or trait, and this place takes place even if no empirical or mathematical objectivity 
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pertain to its space.”
379
 The problem of this translation contract is that it must express itself 
absolutely and completely in multiple languages without any variation of meaning. The 
language contract must operate “within a single idiom. Another name, perhaps, for the origin 
of tongues. Not the origin of language but of languages—before language, languages 
plural.”
380
 This then leads one back to the “kinship of languages.” Benjamin notes: “Thus 
translation has ultimately as goal to express the most intimate relation among languages.”
381
 
The metaphor of life or survival (“sur-vival”) is expanded further although Derrida 
prefers “ammetaphora.”
382
 This is a reference to the metaphor of kinship or “love”—“am” 
being a prefix meaning “love” or “like” but is also directly related to the metaphor of a 
broken amphora. The translation does not copy the original but is a “moment in the growth of 
the original.”
383
 This means that the original at its very origin “was not there without fail, full, 
complete, total, identical to itself.”
384
 Although Derrida does not speak of différance at this 
point of the discussion, one can immediately perceive how différance complicates the task of 
translation. The original is written in “a foreign tongue” (in relation to the translated 
language), but this original (foreign) language is not an ideal language that perfectly presents 
“essence” in all its purity. It is, itself, subject to interpretation and différance. How is one to 
translate the différance at play in a language and find the pure truth of the text? Derrida 
follows Benjamin: “To redeem in his own tongue that pure language exiled in the foreign 
tongue, to liberate by transposing this pure language captive in the work, such is the task of 
the translator.”
385
 Another metaphor is now added, that of a tangent touching a circle, so the 
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translation touches the original providing “an infinitely small point of meaning.”
386
 This is 
coupled with the fragment of the amphora: “just as the debris becomes recognizable as 
fragments of the same amphora, original and translations become recognizable as fragments 
of a larger language.”
387
  
With regard to the idea of the “ammetaphora,” it can be further said that “a translation 
weds the original when the two adjoined fragments, as different as they can be, complete 
each other so as to form a larger tongue in the course of sur-vival that changes them both.” 
Derrida names this idea “the translation contract” and likens it to a “hymen or marriage 
contract with the promise to produce a child whose seed will give rise to history and growth.” 
Furthermore, the “promise points towards a kingdom that is at once ‘promised and forbidden, 
where the languages will be reconciled and fulfilled’.” This, says Derrida, is “the most 
Babelian note in an analysis of sacred writing as the model and the limit of all writing . . . . 
The sacred and the being-to-be-translated do not let themselves be thought one without the 
other: They produce each other at the edge of the same limit.” But the “kingdom is never 
reached . . . . There is something untouchable, and in this sense the reconciliation is only 
promised.” The amphora in its completed state represents the pre-Babelian (perfect and ideal) 
language. But the amphora has been broken and each fragment represents one of the confused 
post-Babelian tongues. Thus when two fragments are “wedded together” they move towards 
that undivided kingdom of the ideal tongue. This ideal language is the limit, the ultimate goal 
or source of all translation. It is the very notion of sacred writing, but it cannot be reached: 
“The kingdom is never reached, touched, trodden by the translation.”
388
 
“Of what does the untouchable consist, if there is such a thing?”
389
 Derrida addresses 
this question with regard to Benjamin’s metaphors (ammetaphora): First, in terms of the 
hymen of a virgin, which is “an untouchable remnant” that will “remain intact at the end of 
the operation;”
390
 second, via a metaphor of fruit and skin, the core and the shell, where the 
core is untouchable and beyond reach (without breaking the skin or the shell);
391
 third, there 
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is a cloak that covers the body of the king, where the king’s body is the “tenor” of the original 
language and the cloak is the translation that can never quite match the tenor.
392
 “This body is 
only promised, announced, and dissimulated by translation. The clothes fit but do not cling 
strictly enough to the royal person.”
393
 
Derrida is addressing the question of truth. Truth is not the idea of an accurate 
translation, it is beyond any “Übertragung” and “Übersetzung”
394
 and is rather “the pure 
language in which the meaning and the letter are no longer dissociated.”
395
 The distinction 
between the translation and original is now expressed as it is in legal treatises concerning the 
positive law of translations (which ensure copyright for works and authors). These laws apply 
to translations of the original but also translations of translations which are nevertheless said 
to be “derived” from the original. The translation is distinct from the original only in 
expression since the translator is “not supposed to touch the content” (clearly).
396
 Derrida 
quotes Claude Colombet and Henri Desbois to make the same point: translators make choices 
between different words and expressions and are in this sense creative, but they can “never 
modify the composition [by which is meant content and possibly anything in the form of the 
original that is not ‘to do with the form of linguistic expression, the choice of words in the 
language, and so forth’
397
] of the work translated, for [s/he] is bound to respect that work.”
398
 
The promise of translation is the “reconciliation of languages” that marries “two languages 
like two parts of a greater whole” appealing to “a language of truth.” This language of truth is 
“a language whose truth would be referred only to itself.”
399
  
The “intention” of translation is related to the kinship of languages: “Through each 
language something is intended that is the same and yet that none of the languages can attain 
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What [this cooperation of languages is] aiming at intentionally, individually and together, in 
translation is the language itself as Babelian event . . . it is the being-language of the language, 
tongue or language as such, that unity without any self-identity that makes for that there are 
plural languages and that they are languages.
402
 
According to Derrida’s reading of Benjamin, these languages actually add to one another: 
“Owing to translation, in other words, to this linguistic supplementarity by which one 
language gives to another what it lacks, and gives it harmoniously, this crossing of languages 
assures the growth of languages, even that ‘holy growth of languages’ ‘unto the messianic 
end of history’.”
403
 The notion of the messianic end related to “the holy growth of languages” 
is “present” in the “experience of translation” that brings us into relation with this “language 
of truth” in the sense of its “remoteness.”
404
 “[T]he sacred text” presents itself as “pure 
translatability” where “meaning and literality are no longer discernable as they form the body 
of a unique, irreplaceable, and untransferable event, ‘materially the truth’.”
405
 It is because of 
the “indistinction of meaning and literality (Wortlichkeit)” that “the purely translatable can 
announce itself, give itself, present itself, let itself be translated as untranslatable.”
406
  
Babel then demonstrates “the law imposed by the name of God who in one stroke 
commands and forbids you to translate by showing and hiding from you the limit.” Not only 
this, the narrative itself is “the status and the event of the Babelian text . . . . It comes under 
the law that it recounts and translates in an exemplary way. It lays down the law it speaks 
about, and from abyss to abyss it deconstructs the tower, and every turn, twists and turns of 
every sort,
407
 in a rhythm.”
408
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Derrida describes what occurs in the sacred text as “the event of a pas de sens.” Pas 
de sens presents a pun of sorts revolving around the word pas—meaning “not” or “step”—
hence “step (pas) of (de) meaning (sens)” or “of (de) no (pas) meaning (sens).” This “no 




What I think Derrida is driving at is that there is an event (in this case the construction 
and deconstruction of Babel). This event is literality and a translation should not transfer any 
meaning beyond this, because this is the sacred (truth). “The sacred surrenders itself to 
translation [enforced by the multiplicity of tongues in the confusion of languages], which 
devotes itself to the sacred.”
410
 “The truth of pure language,”
411
 then, is aligned with the 
sacred and is not limited by the exterior signs of language (words, letters, syntax etc.) as we 
perceive “mother tongues” to operate. Rather this pure language melds with the event 
perfectly and is not distanced from the event (made remote) by the confused post-Babelian 
tongues. We may alternatively call it the “father tongue” or “the sacred text.” It seems to be a 
type of idealism towards which the multiplicity of tongues strive in translation—each 
translation providing a pas de sens. Despite this origin, it is impossible to reach back and take 
hold of the pure language in any absolute way. What is more, to try and impose a so-called 
universal language (such as that of the constructors of the tower of Babel) does not assist in 
understanding but results in more confusion. The necessity to translate is compounded and 
multiplied. Derrida’s closing remarks with regard to the translating of the signature as located 
“between the lines”
412
 is pointing towards the limitation of the actual construct of language, 
again, that the words and forms of a language cannot reach: “For to some degree, all the great 
writings, but to the highest point holy Scripture, contain between the lines their virtual 
translation. The interlinear version of the sacred text is the model or ideal of all 
translation.”
413
 Hence, “interlinear” is not only reading between the lines, but the translation 
which exhibits more than one language, that is a multiplicity of tongues. The messianic end 
                                                          
409
 Derrida, “Des tours de Babel,” 224. 
410
 Derrida, “Des tours de Babel,” 224. 
411
 Derrida, “Des tours de Babel,” 224. 
412
 Derrida, “Des tours de Babel,” 225. 
413
















Since the sacred (and/or the sacred text) is beyond the reach of language, every 
detour, every tower, every language, every other must be acknowledged as a pas de sens. As I 
indicated a few pages ago, this is not unlike taking a step closer by stepping away: following 
the detour. The sacred is present in the translated text, but only as a trace. In this idea of the 
sacred text, then, the sacred text does not exist as presence and nor does the sacred. 
This can be more clearly understood if one refers to specific events, literal 
occurrences, actual happenings that become the target for thoughts of the sacred—one might 
say the truth. With regard to this dissertation I am examining the creation narrative in 
Genesis 1 in relation to certain SDA interpretations. The primary interpretation claims that 
Genesis 1 describes what really happened. The sacred is the act of creation, the truth of the 
event. But the event itself does not exist as presence, rather it is signified by a relatively short 
description in Genesis 1. This description is quite removed from the event itself. Even if one 
had the autograph/s of the book of Genesis, it would not be written in the actual sacred text 
(pre-Babelian language) that melds perfectly with the event. The sacred is always several 
steps away, out of reach, untouchable—not because it shouldn’t be touched, but because it 
can’t be touched. Post-Babelian languages remain and while they may appear to provide 
unnecessary detours, they do at least provide a pas de sens. The more that languages are 
multiplied and the more they meet in translation, the closer one draws to the ideal single 
universal language that is united with the event, that is, the sacred. To move towards the 
sacred, one has to step away from the same (my language) towards the other (foreign 
language).  
But there are also “others” of the same language, i.e. intralingual translations. 
Substitution is not merely a movement from one language into another, a French word into an 
English word, for example. Confusion is not merely something that occurs because there are 
different languages, confusion occurs within a single language. Perhaps Derrida would not 
object if this word confusion were substituted for another: différance. Différance is the play 
within language that occurs because there is a trace that resists a single ideal meaning. The 
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idea of confusion, however, is problematic because it seems to suggest that if we could just 
disentangle things sufficiently it would be possible to properly understand, i.e. discover the 
one truth. But there is no single truth, not anymore. There is no pre-Babelian reality available, 
no such determined presence. There is plurality and multiplicity. The truth is that there are 
others, many others.  
I will now examine the notion of deferral in the concept of the messiah and the 
coming of the other. The religious connotations of the messiah suggest a religious connection 
and, perhaps, even a sacred other, which makes it a detour worth following. 
1.3.3. Messianism 
The idea of the messiah proliferates not only in major religions—Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam—but also, as Derrida notes, in “‘philosophical messianisms,’ the 
teleologies and eschatologies of Hegel, Marx, Heidegger”
415
 and m re—one need not stop 
there. The idea of the messiah, this other who is to come who will solve all problems with 
power and justice, has proved a compelling one. Its association with the coming of justice in 
the figure of the other is, perhaps, the primary attraction for Derrida, though Derrida is 
concerned to distinguish the messianic from messianism. 
In the context of “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits 
of Reason Alone,” Derrida immediately identifies the messianic as “messianicity without 
messianism.” This is defined as “the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the 
advent of justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration.” 
The messianic is further described in opposition to messianism: “This messianic dimension 
does not depend upon any messianism, it follows no determinate revelation, it belongs 
properly to no Abrahamic religion . . . .”
416
 
Messianism is, therefore, associated with a determined expectation. The moment that 
one can identify what is to come, who is to come, when they are to come, or how they are to 
come, one is engaging in messianism. In this sense, Derrida dismisses notions of the 
identified messiah in Abrahamic religions: Christianity, Judaism and Islam, along with all 
their derivatives. The element of determination, an ontotheology, or a logocentrism that 
precedes the coming of the other negates the very concept of alterity that the essence of the 
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messiah represents. Since Derrida has located the trace of the messianic in the “desert in the 
desert”
417
 before “the link between men [sic] as such or between men [sic] and the divinity of 
the god . . .”
 418
 it must precede all religions, because in this desert there is no foothold to 
provide any religious dogma. 
The messianic is tied to an “expectation” which has no definitive content: “By 
definition [it] is not and ought not to be certain of anything, either through knowledge, 
consciousness, conscience, foreseeability or any kind of programme as such.” However, 
Derrida ties this messianic expectation to numerous concepts which cast light—albeit 
“nocturnal light”—on exactly how Derrida’s messianic is distinguished from messianism. 
These include notions such as the promise, justice, faith, the other and hope. “An invincible 
desire for justice is linked to this expectation.” The faith spoken of here should be understood 
as “trust” in “relation to the other” and not in the sense of a religion—as one speaks 
colloquially of “the faiths of the world,” for example. “This justice . . . alone allows the hope, 
beyond all ‘messianisms’” and “inscribes itself in advance in the promise, in the act of faith 
or in the appeal to faith that inhabits every act of language and every address to the other.” 
For Derrida, messianicity as a “faith without dogma, which makes its way through the risks 




Derrida further refers to the “universalizable culture of this faith.”
420
 This is related to 
the “messianic structure” which transcends messianisms and all “determinate figures and 
forms of the Messiah.”
421
 The moment the messianic structure ceases to be a universal 
structure it becomes a messianism which privileges a particular tradition over against all 
others; “you are accrediting one tradition among others and a notion of an elected people, of a 
given literal language, a given fundamentalism.”
422
 Derrida succinctly describes the 
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messianic structure: “This universal structure of the promise, of the expectation for the future 
for the coming, and the fact that this expectation of the coming has to do with justice . . . .”
423
  
Since I have been referring to what is anterior in striving to identify where Derrida 
may locate the sacred, a question arises with regard to the messianic. On the one hand, is the 
messianic not the “groundless ground” on which “there have been revelations, a history 
which one calls Judaism or Christianity and so on . . . ?”
424
 Alternatively, do not these 
Abrahamic religions, for example, provide “irreducible events of revelation” from which the 
very notion of the messianic is derived?
425
 Is, as Caputo phrases it, the notion of the 
messianic a priori or a posteriori?
426
 If the messianic is the latter, then that locates the 
messianic within religious traditions. This means that to associate the sacred with the 
messianic at the same time locates the sacred where, for Derrida, it is deconstructible and, 
hence, not “immune, safe and sound, untouchable,” that is, not sacred at all. On the other 
hand, if one considers the messianic a priori, then possibly a Derridean notion of the sacred 
can be approached, since then the messianic ceases to be dependent on any historical 
messianism. 
Derrida, himself, asks: 
Was not Abrahamic messianism but an exemplary prefiguration, the pre-name [prénom] given 
against the background of the possibility that we are attempting to name here? But then why 
keep the name, or at least the adjective (we prefer to say messianic rather than messianism, so 
as to designate a structure of experience rather than a religion), there where no figure of the 




In answer, Derrida suggests that “these questions and these hypotheses [in reference to the 
messianic and messianism] do not exclude each other.”
428
 Since Derrida’s elaboration 
consists of adding the following disclaimer, “At least for us and for the moment,”
429
 there 
remains the suggestion that the distinction between messianism and messianicity or, 
alternatively, the compatibility of the two, is not easily sustainable on either side of the 
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equation. Caputo specifically addresses what Derrida might mean in Specters of Marx when 
he says “the two hypotheses do not exclude each other.”
430
 
I take this as follows. It may well be that, in the order of being (ordo essendi), the messianic is 
the formal condition of possibility of the concrete messianisms, even while, in the order of 
knowing (ordo cognoscendi), of how we actually learn about it, the historical messianisms are 
the only way we have come to learn about the structure of the messianic in general. What is 
first in the order of being is last in the order of knowing.
431
 
This is merely to say that we can only come to know about the messianic via messianism, but 
that the messianic is nevertheless the foundational idea, i.e. a priori. 
Beyond this, Caputo suggests that Derrida “as he has gotten to be an older man” is 
inscribing a kind of Judaism in his work, “if not very Jewish, at least very quasi-Jewish, or 
hyper-Jewish, or meta-Jewish, certainly not Jewish in the conventional sense . . . .”
432
 Caputo 
states that as Derrida advanced in years he became more conscious of the otion of “dying” 
and of his Judaic roots. He became “more autobiographical, more auto-bio-thanato-
graphical.”
433
 Despite the fact that Caputo strives to denude Derrida’s “Judaism” of its 
religiosity, it nevertheless seems to be cloaked in just that (even though the external 
manifestations of the religious—festivals, sacrifices and so forth—are critiqued): 
For whatever parts of Judaism Derrida has deserted (or have deserted him) and let die away, 
he has been engaged all along in reinventing a certain Judaism, let us say, a prophetic 
Judaism, the Judaism that constitutes a prophetic call for justice, but not the Judaism of 
religious ritual and sacrifice or even of specific doctrines. Amos has Yahweh say that He [sic] 
takes no delight in festivals, solemn assemblies, or burnt offerings, but in justice . . . . That is 
the Judaism that Derrida invokes, the alliance to which he has remained faithful, to which he 
calls “come,” which he would let come, let come again—this time as deconstruction.
434
 
Has Derrida, then, revisited Judaism and re-claimed a sort of sacred inheritance, namely, the 
messianic, albeit “re-invented” or “re-inscribed” as the coming of deconstruction or, possibly, 
in other words, the coming of justice? 
In answering this question, I would like to note Derrida’s introduction of the 
messianic (and khôra) in “Faith and Knowledge”: “. . . let us refer—provisionally, I 
emphasise this, and for pedagogical or rhetorical reasons—first to the ‘messianic’, and 
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second to the chora,
435
 as I have tried to do more minutely, more patiently and, I hope, more 
rigorously elsewhere.”
436
 If Derrida’s use of the term “messianic” is “for pedagogical or 
rhetorical reasons” then the point, at least in this context, is not the messianic per se, but that 
which is explicated by the use of the term. I note once again some of the ideas that Derrida 
associates with the messianic: faith, justice, promise, hope, and the coming of the other. The 
(Judaic) notion of the messiah is an inheritance for Derrida, but it is not a sacred one. In the 
first place, it is an idea that Derrida appropriates because it allows him, in a single word 
(concept), to express a relatively complex structure that is descriptive of deconstruction from 
a particular angle. Derrida, from what I can ascertain, is not primarily interested in notions of 
the messiah in Judaism (or any of the Abrahamic religions), quite the contrary.  
In fact, if these messianisms were to become entangled in messianicity, it would result 
in a misunderstanding of Derrida’s messianic. There is distinction between messianicity and 
messianism: “Between the two possibilities I must confess I oscillate and I think some other 
scheme has to be constructed to understand the two at the same time, to do justice to the two 
possibilities.”
437
 He then continues: “That is why—and perhaps this is not a good reason, 
perhaps one day I will give this up—for the time being I keep the word ‘messianic’.”
438
 This 
latter sentence is scarcely descriptive of something “sacred.” The sacred, for Derrida, then, 
cannot be clearly identified with the messianic itself, but rather, if it is there at all, is in that to 
which Derrida alludes via the messianic. With this in mind, I would like to examine an 
associated idea: hospitality. 
Derrida, at one point, names hospitality the “messianic surprise” in that hospitality 
“consists in welcoming the other that does not warn me of his [sic] coming.”
439
 If one awaits 
the coming of the other (the messiah) then one also has to contend with the manner in which 
one waits. If one yearns for the coming of the messiah, then one would at the same time be 
prepared to welcome the messiah on his/her/its arrival. The messianic nature of Derrida’s 
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description of hospitality is self-evident with regard to waiting for the coming of the other 
and the inevitable preparation and anticipation related to this expectation: 
Indeed, on the one hand, hospitality must wait, extend itself toward the other, extend to the 
other the gifts, the site, the shelter, the cover; it must be ready to welcome [accueillir], to host 
shelter, to give shelter and cover; it must prepare itself and adorn itself [se preparer et se 
parer] for the coming of the hôte; it must even develop itself into a culture of hospitality, 
multiply the signs of anticipation, construct and institute what one calls structures of 
welcoming [les structures de l’accueil], a welcoming apparatus [les structures d’acceuil].
440 
But the other hand of this description also reveals the indeterminate nature of the one 
who is coming. This lack of a determination is what distinguishes, as already noted, 
messianicity from messianism: 
But, on the other hand, the opposite is also nevertheless true, simultaneously, and 
irrepressibly true: to be hospitable is to let oneself be overtaken [surprendre], to be ready to 
not be ready, if such is possible, to let oneself be overtaken, to not even let oneself be 
overtaken, to be surprised, in a fashion almost violent, violated and raped [voilée], stolen 
[volée], . . . precisely where one is not ready to receive—and not only not yet ready but not 
ready, unprepared in a mode that is not even that of the ‘not yet’.
441 
The messianic incorporates the danger of “not being ready,” the idea that one can 
never be fully prepared for what is coming, since the messiah (the wholly other) is not related 
to any determined coming. It is not a repetition of the same, something derived from prior 
experience and belief systems. It is dependent on “faith,” that is, borne of a radical 
unknowing. 
Interestingly, the word “sacred” also occurs in relation to hospitality when Derrida 
examines Louis Massignon’s notion of “sacred hospitality.” Certain ideas converge here. 
First, Massignon is drawn by the Islamic command related to hospitality characterised by 
Abraham’s response to the three visitors, biblically found in Genesis 18:2. It is Islam and not 
Christianity (or Judaism) that is “the exemplary heir of the Abrahamic tradition.”
442
 
The European no longer understands that, thanks to the heroic manner in which he has 
practiced the notion of hospitality, Abraham deserved as his inheritance not only the Holy 
Land but also entering in it of all the foreign hôtes who are “blessed” by his hospitality. . . . 
Abraham’s hospitality is the sign announcing the final completion of the gathering of all 
nations, all blessed in Abraham, in this Holy Land that must be monopolized by none. . . . The 
                                                          
440
 Derrida, “Hostipitality,” 360-61. 
441
 Derrida, “Hostipitality,” 361. 
442












Qur’an mentions three times (XI, 72; XV, 51; LI, 24) the passage from Genesis (18:1-33).
443
 
It is from this fundamental text
444
 that Islam has deduced the principle of iqra (dakhalk, 




Second, Massignon’s explication of sacred hospitality is not “a neutral and expert discourse 
of exegetical knowledge”
446
 and his “language of sacred hospitality is inseparable from an 
experience . . . of homosexuality.”
447
 Although Massignon was married with children “his life 
was marked by . . . homosexuality.”
448
 Furthermore, it was amongst Muslim associates and 
friends that he encountered greater acceptance. For example, his most significant homoerotic 
friendship was with Luis de Cuadra, a scholar of Islam: 
De Cuadra had chosen to leave his Catholic upbringing [I note at this point that Massignon 
was a Catholic and despite his passion for Islam, never converted] and embrace Islam, where 
the approach to same-sex eros was in some ways more hospitable and the homes of strangers 
were more open to gay and bisexual men than in the Christianity of his origins.
449
 
Of course, Massignon’s sexual orientation and resultant predisposition to find reasons for a 
more exemplary hospitality in Islam in response to Christian homophobia does not invalidate 
his arguments.  
Derrida examines Massignon’s sacred hospitality with regard to “two motifs of 
substitution and of hostage.”
450
Quoting J. K. Huysman (who was greatly admired by 
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Massignon), Derrida outlines “the doctrine of ‘mystical substitution’” that “will be found 
everywhere in Massignon’s spiritual itinerary.”
451
 
Humanity is governed by two laws that it ignores in its carelessness: the law of solidarity in 
evil, the law of reversibility in the good: solidarity in Adam, reversibility in Our Lord. 
Otherwise put, up to a point, each is responsible for the faults of the others, and must also, up 
to a point expiate them. . . . God first submitted to these laws when he applied them to himself 
in the person of the Son. . . . He wanted for Jesus to give the first example of mystical 
substitution, the substitution [suppléance] of him who owes nothing for him who owes 
everything. . . .
452
  
Anselmian ideas of penal substitution, as well as various later derivatives thereof 
could be recognised in this description. Notably the phrase “solidarity with Adam, 
reversibility of Our Lord” carries the implication that all people have “solidarity with Adam” 
in that they have to die, while this death penalty is “reversed” in Christ—a possible reading 
of, for example, 1 Corinthians 15:22: “For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made 
alive” (NIV). This soteriological reading of Massignon’s substitution, however, misses the 
principal thrust, which is better recognised in the phrase: “. . . each is responsible for the 
faults of others, and must up to a point expiate them . . . .” This subjective component of the 
substitution idea is also evident in the fact that Jesus serves as “the first example of mystical 
substitution.” Each person, following the example of Christ, is responsible to substitute their 
own concerns for those of the other. The issue, in this sense, is one of hospitality, not 
soteriology, and sacred hospitality is something that, although exemplified in Christ, is not 
unique to Christ. 
Massignon’s second motif, that of the hostage, assists in identifying “who they are” 
and “who we are.”  
“We offer as a pledge”—this is what the word hostage means—but as pledge, voluntary 
prisoners, guarded hôtes, in a kind of captivity or spiritual residency, in a foreign milieu that 
we respect, namely, Islam; a milieu that we want to bring back to the truth to which it is itself 
the heir and the trustee. Hostages, we offer ourselves as hostages—this means: we substitute 
ourselves for the other . . . a duty which is not that of converting Muslims . . . but rather of 
awakening, in the Muslim people who are cut off and excluded, the truth of Christ, of the 
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It should be noted that “the word hostage, always emphasized, is applied by Massignon to 
himself.”
454
 Massignon is the guest (hôte) who places himself in the trusted hands of Muslim 
people, representing the religion (Islam) that most closely exemplifies Abrahamic (sacred) 
hospitality, by which he hopes to “awaken” them to the “truth of Christ.”
455
 
Derrida’s interest is obviously not to be aligned with that of Massignon’s in the sense 
of his affinity for Islam or his muted acclamation of the “truth of Christ” in a form of 
Catholicism. While it is true that Massignon’s sacred hospitality finds its exemplars in stories 
of the “divine”—the three angels come to Abraham; the Son of God comes to this earth; 
Mary provides her womb for Jesus—the sacred is to be recognised in the other, the stranger, 
the hôte.  
Derrida further suggests that forgiveness is “hospitality par excellence.”  
Forgiving would be opening for and smiling to the other, whatever [their] fault or [their] 
indignity, whatever the offense or even the threat. Whoever asks for hospitality, asks, in a 
way, for forgiveness and whoever offers hospitality, grants forgiveness—and forgiveness 
must be infinite or it is nothing: it is excuse or exchange.
456
 
Forgiveness, like hospitality, requires at least two—one, and the other; the one who 
asks for forgiveness and the other; the one who grants forgiveness and the other. Like 
hospitality, Derrida explores forgiveness with regard to both its necessity and its 
impossibility. This he expounds with reference to a “Jewish joke”: “Two Jews, longtime 
enemies, meet at the synagogue, on the Day of Atonement [le jour du Grand Pardon—in 
French ‘le Grand Pardon’ means both Yom Kippur and ‘the great forgiveness’].
 457
 One says 
to the other [as a gesture of forgiveness]:
 458
 ‘I wish for you what you wish for me.’ The other 
immediately retorts: ‘Already you’re starting with me?’”
459
 Derrida’s first response to this 
joke is pithy and descriptive of his exposition of forgiveness: 
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An unfathomable story, a story that seems to stop on the verge of itself, a story whose 
development consists in interrupting itself, in paralyzing itself in order to refuse itself all 
avenir; absolute story of the unsolvable, vertiginous depth of the bottomless [san-fond], 
irresistible whirlpool that carries forgiveness, the gift, and the re-giving, the re-dealing of 
forgiveness, to the abyss of impossibility.
460 
This connection between forgiveness and hospitality is more obviously evident with 
regard to Levinas’s understanding of the cities of refuge
461
 (Deuteronomy 19). Here “the 
involuntary murderer is welcomed,”
462
 although it should be noted that while the cities are 
hospitable sites, they are not directly sites of forgiveness. Rather one could say that the 
murderer, at best, awaits forgiveness (or the possibility of forgiveness) and the site grants 
“respite, an excuse, a relative and temporary absolution.”
463
 However, Derrida asserts with 
regard to the cities of refuge that “what is clear . . . is that the hôte or stranger is holy, divine, 
protected by divine blessing.”
464
  
The idea of the holiness of the hôte is descriptive of what is intended by Massignon’s 
sacred hospitality, which has been described as “the experiential discovery of the sacred in 
others and, in response, of holiness in oneself.”
465
 The two sides of hospitality, the host and 
the guest, are evident in the word hôte, which “is both the one who gives, donne, and the one 
who receives, reçoit, hospitality.”
466
 To reduce or translate hôte as either “guest” or “host” is 
to ignore Derrida’s portmanteau: hostipitalité. As Gil Anidjar notes, with hospitality there is 
always the threat of “violence that is constitutive of it”—“the notion of hostis as host or as 
enemy.”
467
 In this regard, though, hospitality should be extended to the other/the hôte/the 
stranger. Of course, any act of violence would automatically unmask the other—their 
intentions, their identity (as criminals, for example)—and they would in the same moment 
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cease to be the other/the hôte/the stranger, i.e. the participants of hospitality (whether guest or 
host).  
With regard to the cities of refuge, the involuntary murderer is granted a home—
hospitality—until his/her “identity” is revealed. The moment the involuntary murderer is 
found to be innocent or guilty (perhaps as a voluntary murderer), the city of refuge ceases to 
be a place that extends hospitality. The innocent can go home without fear of retribution and 
the guilty will be sentenced for their crime. As long as the involuntary murderer is the hôte 
and this will remain while they remain identified with the other and the stranger, the city of 
refuge will remain a city of refuge. 
The other is sacred while the other is other. The moment the other becomes a 
repetition of the same, something that is calculated and understood, a determination that is 
present, in effect, something that identifies itself in opposition to anything that is other, then 
this other ceases to be other. The ideas, words and concepts that Derrida uses—messianicity 
without messianism, justice (that never comes but is demanded today), hospitality (its 
necessity and impossibility), apocalypse without apocalypse, forgiveness (its necessity and 
impossibility) and faith (without religion)—all preserve the alterity of the other and in this 
preservation demonstrate that deconstruction will not touch them. To reiterate, when Derrida 
says tout autre est tout autre, he is, with the emphasis of a tautology, elevating the alterity of 
the other, perhaps, even, to the point of sacralising.  
Since the other is, by virtue of their alterity, not foregrounded, there are at least two 
necessary steps one must take in order to locate them. The first is to undermine the very 
concept of a centre. The second requires a kind of flattening out, or a formlessness that 
undergirds everything. To accomplish this I have recourse to khôra. One needs a point of 
departure that is not really a “point.” Or to approach this from the other side (and with regard 
to the creation narrative), one should not begin by identifying the point or the purpose of 
creation. This is to locate the centre at the outset. For instance, in SDA circles one could 
assert, “the Sabbath is the goal of creation” or possibly, “Adam is the pinnacle of creation.” 
Without critiquing the reasons or the intent of such theological claims, these ideas destroy the 
natural association of play with creation. Creation begins with no reference, literally nothing. 
It is with this in mind, that I turn khôra, which could be called a pre-originary condition—
formless and void—that provides a receptacle for everything that exists. Khôra, then, is a 














Khôra is the “first name prior to all naming.”
468
 This paradoxical definition has the 
intent of finding a “location” for khôra that is prior to not only everything that is, but also 
everything we use to describe everything that is—speech, language, words, concepts, 
discourse. This is why khôra is difficult to explain. It does not belong in the realm of 
explanation. It is, rather, the desertification of all reference that by its total kenosis of 
everything that exists or can be thought to exist, sensible and intelligible, with no inside or 
outside, accepts without judgment anything and everything and, even, nothing. In this sense, 
khôra exemplifies hospitality.  
Derrida speaks of khôra as “the place of bifurcation between two approaches to the 
desert.”
469
 Khôra has an origin in discourse that is Abrahamic and Platonic, via Western 
philosophic tradition, and its association with Christianity and negative theology. This does 
not locate the origin of khôra, but this element of hybridisation is, perhaps, helpful, since it 
provides points of reference for a discourse on khôra.
470
  
Khôra is something other than that which is located in binaries, it is something other 
than “that logic of binarity, of the yes or no.”
471
 Extracting the idea from the Timaeus,
472
 
Derrida refers to “the khôra”
473
 as a “third genus” which is neither “sensible” nor 
“intelligible.” This “third genus” (triton genos) should not be understood as the third in a 
group of three things that belong to the same family, as though it is a third order of “being” 
unlike, but sharing some common familial association with the first two (“sensible” and 
“intelligible). It “is here only a philosophical way of naming an X that is not included in a 
group, a family, a triad, or a trinity.”
474
 In the Timaeus there is an “alternation between the 
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logic of exclusion and that of participation” in that the khôra can designate “neither this nor 
that” or “both this and that.” This Derrida suggests “stems perhaps only from a provisional 
appearance and from the constraints of rhetoric, even from some incapacity for naming.”
475
 
Timaeus suggests that to say that the khôra “participates” in the intelligible in an “aporetic 
way” would not be “lying or saying what is false”
 476
—a negative formulation which need not 
equate to telling the truth. I will use an (inadequate) example to try to point to what might be 
meant by this. In apartheid South Africa there was an attempt to classify racial types in terms 
of “black” and “white.” The colonial meeting between the European and the indigenous 
African peoples caused an immediate hybridisation, not merely biologically, but by virtue of 
the interaction itself. This means that strictly speaking no-one is black and no-one is white—
different people “mutually constitute” one another when they meet. Hence, people are 
“neither this nor that”—neither purely black nor purely white, but rather a hybridisation of 
the two. This hybridisation of black and white then lends itself to the conclusion that people 
are not black or white but are “both this and that,” i.e. both black and white. The double 
negation (neither this nor that) has allowed one to form a positive affirmation. However, this 
proves to be inadequate as well, because the designation presumes categories not in evidence. 
Since nobody is black or white, there is no such thing as black and there is no such thing as 
white, so to describe some-one as both black and white (because of hybridisation) is merely 
to take two non-existent categories and combine them into a category which logically cannot 
exist either. Hence, one lands in the desert, a place (khôra, if you like) that has no reference. 
It is for this reason that the triton genos is not a “third” at all (by virtue of being preceded by 
a binary), nor does it share an alignment with any binary that it is perceived to have deposed.  
Continuing with Derrida’s essay, the khôra is not to be accessed through the 
alternatives of logos or mythos.
477
 It is appropriate at this juncture to consider the way these 
alternatives (logos and mythos) appear to function in SDA readings of Genesis 1. In these 
interpretations there is a prioritising of logos (specifically that the days of creation are literal, 
historical, consecutive and 24 hours in length) over mythos (story) that could be noted as 
questionable with regard to interpretations of stories in general. Genesis 1, strictly speaking, 
is not a theological argument that demands coherence; it is a story (mythos). To refer to 
Genesis 1 as mythos does not speak to its historical validity (or lack thereof); rather it is the 
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nature of the text. Certain strands of Adventism wish to govern this mythos with their own 
particular logos, but one could argue that just as khôra cannot be accessed through the 
alternatives of logos or mythos, neither should mythos (in this case, Genesis 1) be accessed or, 
at least, defined in any ultimate sense, by some or other logos (literal days).  
Derrida notes that khôra “does not proceed from the natural or legitimate logos, but 
rather from a hybrid, bastard, or even corrupted reasoning [logismo notho]” and “comes as ‘in 
a dream’.”
478
 The khôra does not belong, even obscurely, to any dichotomous or dialectical 
logic. It does not belong to any order of being or logic that is situated by creation. This is why 
the khôra cannot arise from the logic of binaries. It is pre-originary:  
At the moment, so to speak, when the demiurge organizes the cosmos, by cutting, introducing, 
and impressing the images of the models “in” the khôra, the latter must already have been 
there, as the “there” itself, outside of time or in any case outside of becoming, in an outside-
time without common measure with the eternity of ideas and becoming of sensible things.
479
 
Derrida asks: “What if this thought calls also for a third genus of discourse? And what 
if, perhaps as in the case of the khôra, this appeal to the third genre was only the moment of a 
detour in order to signal toward a genre beyond genre?”
480
 How “is one to think the necessity 
of that which while giving place to that opposition [mythos and logos] as to so many others, 
seems sometimes to be itself no longer subject to the law of the very thing which it 
situates?”
481
 Rephrasing this, the khôra “gives place” for discourse whether mythos or logos, 
but in so doing displaces both of these making way for a “third genre” that cannot be aligned 
with either mythos or logos. The khôra oscillates not between two poles, but between two 
kinds of oscillation (neither/nor and both/and). Concerned with existent things 
(sensible/intelligible; visible/invisible, form/formless), it is displaced “towards types of 
discourse (mythos/logos) or of relation to what is or is not in general.”
482
 This displacement 
“depends on a sort of metonymy: such a metonymy would displace itself, by displacing the 
names, from types [genres] of being to types [genre] of discourse.”
483
 But it is difficult to 
separate the two since “the discourse, like the relation to that which is in general, is qualified 
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or disqualified by what it relates to.” Hence, “the discourse on the khôra is also a discourse 
on genre/type (genos) and on different types of type.”
484
 To follow this, one needs to 
appreciate that the Timaeus is not merely a narrative of the creation of the world and 
everything that “is,” it is also a commentary on the nature of discourse and how we refer to or 
talk about what is created. The khôra situates language and so cannot be defined by that 
which it situates. It is neither part of creation nor is it the signifiers used to describe the 
signified and since it cannot be signified, it is not related to the genres of either mythos or 
logos. It is a third genre beyond genre.
 485
 





 Derrida notes in this regard that translators refer to “metaphors, images and 
simile.”
488
 The problem is that even though these ideas are “useful” they, themselves, are 
“built upon this distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, which is precisely what 
the thought of the khôra can no longer get along with.”
489
 The problem is one of rhetoric, but 
also of pedagogy, since the significance of the khôra is not merely a pedagogical device—
“those who speak of metaphor” refer to the khôra as just a “didactic metaphor.”
490
 The khôra 
cannot be assigned such a place of residence: “it is necessary to avoid speaking of khôra as 
‘something’ that is or is not, that would be present or absent, intelligible, sensible, or both at 
once, active or passive, Good (epekeina tes ousias) or Evil, God or man, living or 
nonliving.”
491
 It is “more situating than situated, an opposition which must in its turn be 
shielded from some grammatical or ontological alternative between the active and the 
passive.”
492
 The khôra as metaphor is to be avoided, not so that it should be understood as 
“properly a mother, a nurse, a receptacle, a bearer of imprints of gold,”
493
 since it is beyond 
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this type of polarity (metaphorical or proper): “Giving place to oppositions, it would itself not 
submit to any reversal” and this is not because “it would be unalterability itself beyond its 
name but because in carrying beyond the polarity of sense (metaphorical and proper), it 




The dilemma is that all translations “remain caught in networks of interpretations” 
whether the word khôra itself (“place,” “location,” “region,” “country”) or “what tradition 
calls the figures—comparisons, imprints, images and metaphors—proposed by Timaeus 
(‘mother,’ ‘nurse,’ ‘receptacle,’ ‘imprint-bearer’).” These Derrida suggests “are led astray by 
retrospective projections, which can always be suspected of being anachronistic.” In other 
words, the Greek word “khôra” requires translating (obviously), but then one is forced to 
translate it into the language of our context and time, which is exactly where khôra does not 
belong. Derrida notes: “We would never claim to propose the exact word, the mot juste, for 
khôra, nor to name it, itself, over and above all the turns and detours of rhetoric, nor finally to 




Derrida suggests that there is a “structural law” in the Timaeus which has never been 
“approached as such by the whole history of interpretations of the Timaeus.” It is this 
structure that makes tropology and anachronism “inevitable.” It is to do with structure since 
the essence of the khôra lacks meaning: “The khôra is anachronistic; it ‘is’ the anachrony 
within being, or better: the anachrony of being. It anachronizes being.” That is, the khôra is 
not present and is always out of step with any presence, and that which is inscribed on it 
always has its own historical context (the word khôra, for example), which does not rightly 
belong to the khôra at all, but it is located in the Timaeus, it is placed in context within the 
structure of the Timaeus.
496
  
Derrida proposes a hypothesis with regard to this “structural anachronism.” If one 
were to gather together the huge body of literature that constitutes what has been written in 
response to the Timaeus, there is no real possibility of “totalizing it in some ordered 
apprehension,” but “such an order (grouping, unity, totality organized around a telos) has an 
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essential link with the structural anachronism” already mentioned and is “the inevitable effect 
produced by something like the khôra.”
497
  
All the interpretations give form to khôra by “determining” it; “by leaving on it the 
schematic mark of their imprint and by depositing on it the sediment of their contribution.” 
However, khôra is not reached or touched or shaped by these interpretations, nor does khôra 
provide “the support of a stable substratum or substance.” Khôra “is not the subject,” nor can 
“hermeneutic types . . . give form to khôra.” Derrida describes khôra as “amorphous” and 
“virgin, with a virginity that is radically rebellious against anthropomorphism.” The fact that 
Timaeus uses the terms “receptacle” (dekhomenon) and “place” (khôra) should not cause one 
to ascribe to khôra “an essence, the stable being of an eidos,
498
 since khôra is neither of the 
order of the eidos nor of the order of mimemes, that is, of images of the eidos which come to 
imprint themselves in it.” Khôra is not and its “nonbeing” can be conceived “via the 
anthropomorphic schemas of the verb to receive and the verb to give.”
499
 
This receiving can be understood in Plato’s terminology as the receiving of the 
receptacle.
500
 But, this terminology should not lead one to glibly conceive of the khôra as 
some sort of indiscriminate container of that which it receives: 
If the khôra receives everything, it does not do this in the manner of a medium [milieu] or a 
container or even a receptacle, because the receptacle is a figure inscribed in it. It is not an 
intelligible extension, in the Cartesian sense, receptive subject, in the Kantian sense of intuitus 
derivatives, or a pure sensible space as a form of receptivity.
501
 
In any case, the translation “receptacle” is problematic at the outset, especially in the manner 
it may be understood, since it is normally thought of as a container that has an inside and an 
outside, which is exactly the sort of binary that khôra cannot abide.  
Derrida shifts from using “the khôra” to just “khôra.” “The definite article 
presupposes the existence of a thing,”
502
 whereas khôra intends no such designation. It “is 
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neither sensible nor intelligible.”
503
 “There is khôra,” says Derrida, but, “what there is, there 
is not.”
504
 Whatever this “there is” actually is, “it will be risky to see in it the equivalent of an 
es gibt, of the es gibt which remains without a doubt implicated in every negative theology, 
unless it is the es gibt which always summons negative theology in its Christian history.”
505
 
Derrida objects to the es gibt that “announces or recalls too much of the dispensation of God, 
of man, or even that of Being of which certain of Heidegger’s texts speak (es gibt Sein).”
506
 
Khôra is necessarily “indifferent,”
507
 and one must be cautious how one even thinks the 
notion of giving place implied by Plato’s descriptive term “receptacle.” Khôra does not 
“give” as though it is gracious and through this grace bestows some “thing” or some “non-
thing.” “Radically inhuman and atheological, one cannot even say that it gives place or that 
there is [il y a] the khôra.”
508
  
Khôra, as opposed to the khôra, is still a proper name, a word and a feminine name 
which would seem to be an anthropomorphism, but the properties of khôra must resist “those 
of a determinate existence.” Images/analogies/descriptions/significations that associate khôra 




Khôra, then, is an appellation that is used to “avoid confusion” in that it supplies a 
consistent rhetorical device (though it is not merely an empty figure), “not so much to ‘give 
her always the same name’ . . . but to speak of it/her and to call it/her in the same manner. In 
short, faithfully even if this faith is irreducible to every other.” Khôra, then, is distinct from 
all philosphemes, or stands “beyond all given philosophemes” but “will have left a trace in 
language, for example, the word khôra in the Greek language, insofar as it is caught up in the 
network of its usual meanings.” In short, Plato needed a word, and “had no other,” and one 
could add along with the word, “grammatical, rhetorical, logical, and hence also 
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philosophical possibilities,” and not merely in the Greek language, but “in other languages, in 
other bodies, in other negativities as well.” But since this trace, which is present by virtue of 
the fact that the presence (or absence) of everything that is and is not is preceded (though not 
in a historical sense) by khôra or has, by necessity, to presuppose khôra, the trace itself 
cannot lead to a description of khôra in terms of the languages that are inscribed on khôra. 
Derrida describes this trace—whether in word, sentence, syntax, rhetoric, grammar, logic or 
philosopheme—in terms of negation: “However insufficient they may be, they are given, 
already marked by this unheard-of trace, promised to the trace that has promised nothing.”
510
 
Due to the negations which perpetuate the discourse on khôra, Derrida is concerned to 
separate this discourse from that of negative theology: 
The question now becomes the following: what happens between on the one hand, an 
“experience” such as this one, the experience of the khôra that is above all not an experience, 
if what one understands by this word is a certain relation to presence, whether sensible or 
intelligible, or even a relation to the presence of the present in general, and, on the other hand, 
what one calls the via negativa in its Christian moment?
511
 
One needs to appreciate that the “way of negativity” with regard to khôra is not any attempt 
to arrive at a “positive or true meaning, a Good or a God.”
512
 Khôra has no reference point to 
an event, there is no foothold of a promise or a gift, no means of applying negation in order to 
discover what one can say affirmatively, unless one is to say that khôra is wholly other 
which, in this sense, merely preserves its alterity, still “foreign to the order of presence and 
absence.”
513
 Hence, “the barren, radically anhuman and atheological nature of this ‘place’ 
obliges us to speak and to refer to it . . . as to the wholly other that would not even be 
transcendent, absolutely remot , nor immanent or close.”
514
 In the negative theology of 
Dionysius, “the extreme rigor of the negative hyperbole” tends to move “closer still to the 
agathon [the Good] than to the khôra.”
515
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Plato, “in a few pages of the Timaeus,”
516
 which themselves have been reproduced, 
interpreted, translated, read and re-read interminably producing a virtually endless body of 
literature, has indicated, via khôra, this history of production in advance. Derrida suggests 
that the following claim with regard to all interpretations of khôra arise from Plato’s 
description of khôra: “They resemble what I am saying about khôra; and hence what I am 
saying about khôra gives a commentary, in advance, and describes the law of the whole 
history of the hermeneutics and the institutions which will be constructed on this subject, 
over this subject.”
517
 That is to say, Timaeus is talking about that which gives space to 
discourse—khôra—which by necessity precedes discourse and in the same way, these “few 
pages of the Timaeus” precede (and allow for or “give space for”) the (Platonic) discourse on 
khôra.  
The “cosmogony of the Timaeus runs through the cycle of knowledge on all 
things.”
518
 It has an “encyclopaedic end”
519
 which incorporates everything that “is” whether 
sensible or intelligible: “And now at length we may say that our discourse concerning the 
Universe has reached its termination.”
520
 And yet the discourse on khôra occurs halfway 
through the Timaeus, “between the sensible and the intelligible, belonging neither to one nor 
to the other, hence neither to the cosmos as sensible god nor to the intelligible god, an 
apparently empty space—even though it is no doubt not emptiness.”
521
 But Derrida does not 
want to align khôra with the “chasm” between the intelligible and sensible as the chaos from 
which the stability of creation stands in contrast. He does, however, argue that khôra, in its 
location in the Timaeus  
is indeed a chasm in the middle of the book, a sort of abyss ‘in’ which there is an attempt to 
think or say this abyssal chasm which would be khôra, the opening of a place ‘in’ which 
everything would, at the same time, come to take place and be reflected (for these are the 
images which are inscribed there).
522
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The structure of the Timaeus as an explication of khôra, beyond the specific words and 
concepts that are used to describe khôra, is a crucial point of departure (detour) for this 
dissertation, a central decentring theme. 
The structure of the chasm in the middle can be paralleled with the role of Socrates in 
the Timaeus in the sense of various mises en abyme—which he suggests are “formal 
analogies.”
523
 Mise en abyme could be literally translated as “placing in the abyss/chasm” (a 
phrase which immediately has resonances with khôra), but is commonly understood to denote 
a story in a story, or a play in a play.
524
 The figure of Socrates in the Timaeus is not khôra as 
such, but represents a kind of pre-figuring or analogy of khôra in Plato’s text: “Socrates is not 
khôra, but he would look a lot like it/her if it/she were someone or something.”
525
 This 
resemblance of Socrates to khôra is to do with Socrates’ relation to the poets (poietikon 
genus) and imitators (mimetikon ethnos), and the sophists (ton sophiston genos), “those who 
make their trade out of resemblance . . . the genus of those who have no place.”
526
 But, says 
Socrates, “you, to whom I am speaking now, you who are also a genos (19e), and who belong 
to the genre of those who have (a) place, who take place, by nature and by education. You 
are thus both philosophers and politicians.”
527
 Socrates, by pretending to belong to those who 
don’t have a place, those who also pretend to have a place (poets, imitators and sophists), at 
the same time denounces them. Just because Socrates resembles them, does not mean he is 
one of them. But it is only by “belonging to a place and a community, for example, to the 
genos of true citizens, and politicians” that “authorizes the truth of the logos, that is, also its 
political effectivity, its pragmatic and praxical [praxique] efficiency.”
528
 Socrates “gives back 
the word” or “gives back the floor” to those who have a place (one might say, genuine 
citizens): “You alone have place and can say both the place and the nonplace in truth, and 
that is why I am going to give you back the floor. In truth, give it to you or leave it to you.”
529
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Socrates places himself “in a third genus, in a way, neither that of the sophists, poets, 
and other imitators (of whom he speaks), nor that of the philosopher-politicians (to whom he 
speaks, proposing only to listen to them).”
530
 Here the resemblance to khôra takes shape: 
[Socrates’] speech is neither his address nor what it addresses. His speech occurs in a third 
genus and in the neutral space or place without a place where everything is marked but which 
would be “in itself” unmarked. Doesn’t he already resemble what others, later, those very 
ones to whom he gives the word, will call khôra?
531
 
“We are in the preamble,” says Derrida, “our preamble on the preamble of the 
Timaeus. There is no serious philosophy in introductions, only mythology, at most, said 
Hegel.” Clearly Derrida takes issue with Hegel’s position. Thus far, however, in this 
preamble, “it is not yet a question of khôra, at least not of the one that gives place to the 
measure of the cosmos.” But, and this is Derrida’s point, there is an assigning of places given 
place by the preamble that is not the place for “serious philosophy, but mythology” and this 
distribution of “the marked places and the unmarked places” is presented “according to a 
schema analogous to the one which will later order the discourse on khôra.” “Socrates effaces 
himself” and thus “situates himself or institutes himself as a receptive addressee, let us say, as 
a receptacle of all that will henceforth be inscribed. He declares himself to be ready and all 
set for that, disposed to receive everything he’s offered.”
532
 
Derrida is concerned to explain what this “receive” (dekhomai) might mean: 
Dekhomai which will determine the relation of khôra to everything, which is not herself and 
which receives (it/she is pandekhes,
533
 51a), plays on a whole gamut of senses and 
connotations: to receive to accept (a deposit, a salary, a present), to welcome, to gather, or 
even to expect, for example, the gift of hospitality, to be its addressee, as is here the case with 
Socrates, in a scene of gift and counter-gift. . . . We are still in a system of gift and debt. 
When we get on to khôra as pandekhes beyond all anthropomorphy, we shall perhaps glimpse 
a beyond of the debt.
534
  
Since khôra is not actually concerned with “a system of gift and debt” it is clear that 
Socrates resembles khôra but is not synonymous with khôra. For the moment, though, taking 
into account this location in the preamble of the Timaeus, this resemblance is not merely 
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fortuitous. Socrates “answers to his name” and, like khôra, his name (or, more precisely, his 
appellation) must be consistent. Also, it is not certain who or what Socrates actually is: 
“What is place? To what and to whom does it give place? What takes place under these 
names? Who are you, Khôra?”
535
 
The “propositions of the Timaeus all seem ordered by a double motif”: 1) Myth 
derives from play and “will not be taken seriously.” Plato “gets in ahead of Aristotle” and 
“makes use of the opposition play/seriousness (paidia/spoudé), in the name of philosophical 
seriousness;” 2) But, “in the order of becoming” in the absence of a “stable logos,” myth is a 
legitimate alternative; “it is rigor.”
536
 
When one seeks what is probable, “one abandons reasonings on the subject of eternal 
beings; one seeks what is probable on the subject of becoming.”
537
 This allows one to play 
and the Timaeus “multiplies propositions of this type.”
538
  
The mythic discourse plays with the probable image because the sensory world is itself (an) 
image. Sensory becoming is an image, a semblance; myth is an image of this image. The 
demiurge formed the cosmos in the image of the eternal paradigm which he contemplates. 




But how can the discourse on khôra be part of a “probable myth?” Derrida suggests 
that the discourse on khôra, is “an oneiric and bastard reasoning . . . a sort of myth within a 
myth.”
540
 In addition, because it “gives thought” to that which is neither sensible being nor 
intelligible being, “it is neither true nor probable and appears thus to be heterogeneous to 
myth, at least to mytho-logic, to this philosopho-mytheme which orders myth to its 
philosophical telos.”
541
 Hence, although the discourse on khôra—the abyss—manifests in the 
middle of the Timaeus, it is nevertheless foreshadowed or announced in advance in a “muted” 
way by “a series of mythic fictions embedded mutually in each other.”
542
 Catherine Osbourne 
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in “Space, Time, Shape, and Direction: Creative Discourse in the Timaeus” is of assistance 
with regard to this notion of Timaeus’s “probable” or “likely” story. It is not to do with the 
truth or falsity of the account that refers to the likelihood of the (creation) event itself. 
Timaeus is indicating “the status of his own account: an account that interprets a subject . . . . 
It is ‘likely’, then, in a rather special sense, in which the term conveys the degree to which it 
is likened to, or exemplifies, the original rather than the probability regarding whether it 
might be true or false.”
543
 This enables one to appreciate the significance of the series of 
mythic fictions that occur in Socrates’ conversation in the preamble and why Derrida unpacks 
them so carefully. 
These mythic fictions (which are concerned to identify the origins of Athens—an 
allusion to the creation event to follow), these tales upon tales, are summarised by Derrida 
into seven distinct fictions (F), “the first three instances of textual fiction are mutually 
included in one another; each content given form in the receptacle of another: F1, the 
Timaeus itself, a unit(y) that is already difficult to cut up; F2, the conversation the evening 
before (The Republic, Politeia? This debate is well known); and F3, its present résumé, the 
description of the ideal politeia.”
544
 Socrates now “demands that one pass to life, to 
movement and to reality, in order to speak at last of philosophy and politics” because, he, 
Socrates, along with the poets, imitators and sophists, is incapable since he has no place.
545
 
Hence, young Critias (F4) steps up and recounts “a tale which he had already told the night 
before, on the road, according to old oral traditions.”
546
 During this tale-telling, “young 
Critias recounts another tale (F5), which old Critias, his ancestor, had himself told of a 
conversation which he (said he) had with Solon.”
547
 In this conversation Solon in turn relates 
a conversation (F6) “which he (said he) had with an Egyptian priest and in the course of 
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Derrida then notes that in “fiction F1—itself written, let us never forget that—there is 
thus developed a theory or a procession of writing referred, in writing, to an origin older than 
itself (F7).”
549
 Between F3 and F4 there is a movement in which the reader is led to 
understand that one is “passing at last into reality.”
550
 In fact, Socrates “applauds when 
Critias announces to him that he is getting ready to recount what his grandfather told him 
Solon had told him on the subject of what an Egyptian priest had confided to him about ‘the 
marvellous exploits accomplished by this city’ (20e), one of these exploits being ‘the greatest 
of all’ (panton de hen megiston).”
551
 And since this event is the “greatest of all” it must also 
have “been real.”
552
 But Solon is “presented as a poet of genius” and “if political urgency had 
left him the leisure to devote himself to his genius, he would have surpassed Hesiod or 
Homer (21a-b).”
553
 But this locates Solon (apparently a citizen) as one among the poets, 
imitators and sophists, which is exactly what disqualifies him to comment on reality. He is 
amongst those pretenders (or at least resembles them) who have no place and so “the mythic 
saying resembles a discourse without a legitimate father.”
554
 In striving to arrive at the real in 
the story-telling from F1 to F7, rather than getting closer, “from one telling to the next, the 
author gets farther and farther away.”
555
 
Derrida notes that due to the illegitimacy of khôra (it/she has no father) it cannot 
belong to an oppositional couple. This means that the engendering of khôra as receptacle 
(associated with the nurse/mother) produces an “orphan or bastard” child that is a “third 
gender/genus.” Khôra “does not belong to the ‘race of women’ (genos gynaikon).”
556
 This 
notion of receptacle means that while khôra may “give place” she/it is not originary in the 
way a mother precedes and is the origin of her child (a boy or a girl). There is no such 
engendering and no such connection between khôra and that which she/it receives.  
She/it eludes all anthropo-theological schemes, all history, all revelation, and all truth. 
Preoriginary, before and outside of all generation, she no longer even has the meaning of a 
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past, of a present that is past. Before signifies no temporal anteriority. The relation of 
independence, the nonrelation, looks more like the relation of the interval of the spacing to 
what is lodged in it to be received in it.
557
 
The discourse on khôra—like “the whole rhythm of the Timaeus”—is concerned with 
“backward steps” (retours en arrière).
558
 This discourse does not belong to the “assured 
discourse of philosophy” since it is “preoriginary” and rather requires “an impure 
philosophical discourse, threatened, bastard, hybrid.”
559
 Since khôra gives place to 
philosophy, philosophy, itself, “cannot speak philosophically of that which looks like its 
‘mother,’ its ‘nurse,’ its ‘receptacle,’ or its ‘imprint-bearer.’”
560
 What is more, these figures 
“are not even true figures.”
561
  
Khôra is concerned with necessity not truth:  
The bold stroke consists here in going back behind and below the origin, or also the birth, 
toward a necessity which is neither generative nor engendered and which carries philosophy, 
“precedes” (prior to the time that passes or eternal time before history) and “receives” the 
effect, here the image of oppositions (intelligible and sensible): philosophy. This necessity 




Khôra “is” something like 
[the] “fiduciary ‘link’ that would precede all determinate community, all positive religion, 
every onto-anthropo-theological horizon. It would link pure singularities prior to any social or 
political determination, prior to all intersubjectivity, prior even to the opposition between the 
sacred (or the holy) and the profane.”
563
  
It is relevant to recall that this term “fiduciary link” carries an allusion to the etymology of 
religion—ligare meaning to bind, link or join—that is to be held in trust and is accomplished 
not by dogma, but by faith. It forms an irreducible connection to religion and in the sense of 
its irreducibility it remains inviolate, unscathed and uncontaminated. Rei Terada in “Scruples, 
or, Faith in Derrida” suggests that since khôra “remains unassimilable,” it is thereby “linked 
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 Charles P Bigger in Between Chora and the Good while preferring a 
reading of “chora that embraces God” rather than “the atheistic version favoured by Derrida 
and Caputo” acknowledges that “Derrida’s reduction of language to chora can help recover a 
space for sacred scripture, liturgy and prayer.”
565
 While I am not sure that it is quite accurate 
to call Derrida’s understanding of khôra as something to which language is reduced, the idea 
that khôra opens a space for the sacred and associated religious ideas certainly appears to 
cohere with Caputo’s reading of Derrida. 
Furthermore, Derrida supplies “two words” or “two names” for the “two sources” of 
religion: “messianic” and “khôra.”
566
 I have already examined the messianic and its relation 
to the other, but one might also add that khôra, not only epitomises the other in that it is 
completely unlike any other (sensible or intelligible), it also permits, welcomes and is 
hospitable to (for want of better terms) all others and without khôra the other (every other) 
would not exist. In order to think khôra it is necessary to precede the beginning, before the 
cosmos, before birth, before philosophy, “just as the origin of the Athenians must be recalled 
to them from beyond their own memory.”
567
  
I now turn to a different creation narrative, Genesis 1:1-2:4a. Interestingly, the 
structure of this narrative can also be understood as being “centred around” khôra, the space 
that defies logocentrism and allows for the play of différance. 
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3. SDA Uses of the Creation Narrative 
The SDA Church, in general, has a particular interest in the creation narrative in 
Genesis 1 owing to its allegiance to the Sabbath. Since the command to observe the Sabbath 
every seventh day as outlined in Exodus 20:8-11 (embedded in that part of Scripture 
commonly known as the Ten Commandments) is aligned with the “days” of creation in 
Genesis 1 (“For in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all that is in 
them, but he rested on the seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and made 
it holy”
568
), there is a general understanding among SDAs that the “week” in Genesis 1 
should be understood as being literal, consecutive 24-hour days. Any other interpretation, 
according to this prevalent view, is considered to render the Sabbath void and thereby remove 
one of the primary identifiers of the SDA Church. However, since there are many SDAs who 
do not hold to the idea that the week in Genesis 1 is necessarily a literal historical week, it is 
debatable whether or not the Sabbath stands or falls according to this interpretation. There is, 
as I will continually assert, heterogeneity of thought in the SDA Church, something that has 
been present from its inception. 
There is nevertheless an agenda item at the forthcoming SDA General Conference 
Session in 2015 to formalise this idea by amending fundamental belief #6 on “Creation” to 
include the idea that God created in six literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour days. This, in 
itself, would not matter if all SDAs were united on the issue. However, there are those in 
church employ at SDA educational institutions, particularly in biology departments, where 
the long ages of evolution do not easily allow for this interpretation of Genesis 1. It is one 
thing to affirm certain interpretive conclusions in some or other theology class, quite another 
if one is asserting scientific method as the source of one’s conclusions. There is little doubt 
that the intended change to fundamental belief #6 is to limit the possibility of other 
interpretations of Genesis 1. Since this interpretation is also associated with a short 
chronology of Earth’s history (6000 to 10000 years), it is quite clearly not compatible with 
the theory of evolution. Even any suggestion of theistic evolution requires a different reading 
of Genesis 1. This would put the particular employee out of step with SDA beliefs and raise 
the question as to whether they should be permitted to continue as a Church employee.  
I will, therefore, examine Genesis 1 assuming the a priori notion of six literal, 
historical, consecutive 24-hour days, to show that despite this precise and narrow limitation, 
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there are nevertheless detours and there is still room for the play of différance. Before this, it 
is necessary to examine the SDA idea of “the fundamental belief” and how it tends to operate 
in the Church. I will show that even the idea of something “fundamental” is not immune to 
the play of différance and that despite the apparent rigid formulation of the fundamental 
beliefs there is, historically, a resistance to any sort of a binding creed within the SDA 
Church. 
In the central part of this chapter, I will play with the notion of substituting the centre 
for another. I will remove the central premise of six literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour 
days and replace it with the idea in Genesis 1:2 that the earth was “without form and void.” 
This is not an arbitrarily selected centre, but is one that has an uncanny resemblance to khôra, 
a resemblance to which Derrida alludes in Sauf le Nom. Although not specifically spelled out 
by Derrida, Caputo claims that the parallel is self-evident: “When he says khôra, he is not 
simply drawing upon the Timaeus, which is the manifest reference, but there is also, for 
anyone with the ears to hear, an allusion being made to the opening verses of Genesis.”
569
  
My intent in following other detours of the text in a play of substitutions is in order to 
read the text carefully, to be faithful to the text, and to recognise the other in the text. 
Furthermore, by placing something so analogous to khôra—“without form and void” 
(Genesis 1:2)—at the centre, the entire text as a creation narrative is exposed to the play of 
différance which is totally in keeping with a creative spirit. 
3.1. A Hermeneutical Framework 
It is my intent in this section to show the différance operating within the SDA notion 
of the fundamental belief. Since the very idea of something fundamental resists anything 
different, I will have recourse to historic Adventism, from 1844 and onwards. The reason for 
this is partly because I am concerned with origins—with regard to finding the sacred in 
Derrida (khôra and the Timaeus, for example) as well as searching for difference in 
apparently established SDA understandings of the creation narrative in Genesis 1—but also 
because différance includes the element of deferral. By returning to the origins of the SDA 
Church, I will show that the meaning of “fundamental” or “fundamental belief” in early 
Adventism was a meaning that was devoid of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism—by which I 
mean a movement driven by inviolable, exclusive, unbending principles intolerant of 
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anything other—is a (deferred) idea that is striving to make itself present and actually alter 
the shape of Adventism. This is something that the Church founders never intended. I am, 
therefore, arguing that différance (acknowledging that this is Derrida’s term) was at the 
centre of early Adventism and that current trends in Adventism (concerned with establishing 
creeds and norms that dictate SDA beliefs) are a fundamental denial of these roots. The move 
to more clearly identify Adventism by narrowing its beliefs is the destruction of radical 
Adventism and may lead to the expulsion and resignation of those who differ, even though 
they are more closely aligned with the spirit of historic Adventism. Nevertheless, this 
différance at the origin of the Church still persists in present day Adventism. 
3.1.1. Centring the Discourse 
Inasmuch as the structure of this dissertation is central to its meaning, it is relevant to 
examine the explanatory force and the limitations of this edifice. Of course, any dissertation 
must have structure, at the very least, to ensure that the logic and coherence of the arguments 
are perceived as logical and coherent. Nevertheless, within the structure there is considerable 
room to manoeuvre—what could be called play. But this play is not permitted to move 
arbitrarily and indiscriminately. There is a centre to the structure: 
The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure—one 
cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure—but above all to make sure that the 
organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. 
By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of the structure permits 
the play of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking 
any center represents the unthinkable itself.
570
 
Derrida does acknowledge, however, that in the history of Western philosophy there 
was a “breach” in this understanding of structure or “the structurality of structure.”
571
 Derrida 
distinguishes between what might be termed “classical thought” and what he calls an “event,” 
or “rupture” in the “history of the concept of structure.”
572
 This “event” is a “decentering” of 
“the structurality of structure” and refers to “the totality of an era, our own.”
573
 Its most 
radical formulation though precedes our day and in this regard, Derrida cites “the 
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Nietzschean critique of metaphysics,” “the Freudian critique of self-presence,” and “the 
Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics.”
574
 
In any event, the play, therefore, is limited by the centre: “the center closes off the 
play which it opens up and makes possible.”
575
 In a sense, the centre could be regarded as 
sacred since it is that “part” of the structure that cannot be violated. To remove the centre is 
to destroy the structure: 
As center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer 
possible. At the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements (which may of 
course be structures enclosed within a structure) is forbidden. . . . Thus it has always been 
thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within the 
structure which while governing the structure, escapes structurality.
576
  
Hence, Derrida observes that there is a contradiction in the coherence of the centred structure. 
The reason for this is that since the centre is not the same as the totality of the structure and 
does not belong to the totality of the structure (it is unique) “the totality has its center 
elsewhere. The center is not the center.”
577
 Although the concept of the centre of a structure 
is totally logical and coherent (how can a structure not have a centre around or upon which it 
is organised) it “is contradictorily coherent.” 
578
 
First, it should be noted that these ideas find a definite connection to Derrida’s pivotal 
thought on différance which I will examine in detail in the following section. This is hinted at 
when Derrida comments laconically: “And as always, coherence as contradiction expresses a 
force of a desire.”
579
 Translator Allan Bass elaborates: 
The reference, in a restricted sense, is to the Freudian theory of neurotic symptoms and dream 
interpretation . . . . In a general sense the reference is to Derrida’s thesis that logic and 
coherence themselves can only be understood contradictorily, since they presuppose the 
suppression of différance, “writing” in the sense of the general economy.
580 
Second, any idea that a structure is “centred on” a particular concept (and concept is 
perhaps not the best word here) is also claiming that the fundamental integrity of the structure 
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depends upon this, to use Derrida’s terms, “fundamental ground,” “fundamental immobility,” 
or “reassuring certitude,” all of which are “beyond the reach of play.”
581
 The “entire history 
of the concept of structure” (prior to the event or rupture already mentioned above), on the 
basis of the centre which cannot be repeated, substituted or replaced, has actually “through a 
series of substitutions” given the centre different forms or names.
582
 “The history of 
metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. 
Its matrix . . . is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word.”
583
 In fact 
Derrida claims that “all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or the center have 
always designated an invariable presence—eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, 




Derrida now examines within the human sciences (the chapter heading is “Structure, 
Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”), ethnology, since ethnology, strictly 
speaking, only became noted as a science when European culture was decentred, “driven 
from its locus, and forced to stop considering itself as the culture of reference.”
585
 This leads 
to Derrida scrutinising the opposition between nature and culture via the work of Claude 
Lévi-Strauss. Traditionally, one can say that “that which is universal and spontaneous, and 
not dependent on any particular culture or any determinative norm, belongs to nature.”
586
 
Also traditionally, “that which depends upon a system of norms regulating society and 
therefore is capable of varying from one social structure to another, belongs to culture.”
587
 
Lévi-Strauss, however, encounters a scandal—the incest prohibition
588
—which 
cannot abide the nature/culture opposition: “The incest prohibition is universal; in this sense 
one could call it natural. But it is also a prohibition, a system of norms and interdicts; in this 
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sense one could call it cultural.”
589
 But the scandal only exists as a consequence of “a system 
of concepts,” namely, the nature/culture opposition.
590
 Once incest prohibition is no longer 
conceived as being part of the difference between nature and culture, it ceases to upset the 
opposition. “[I]t is something which escapes these concepts and certainly precedes them—
probably as the condition of their possibility.”
591
 
Derrida concludes that the nature/culture opposition, though “too cursorily 
examined . . . already shows that language bears within itself the necessity of its own 
critique.”
592
 Lévi-Strauss moves towards resolving this by “conserving these old concepts 
within the domain of empirical discovery while here and there denouncing their limits, 
treating them as tools that can still be used.”
593
 Lévi-Strauss has a twofold intention. On the 
one hand, oppositions such as nature/culture have methodological worth; while on the other 




Bricolage is “the necessity of borrowing one’s concepts from the text of a heritage 
which is more or less coherent or ruined.”
595
 The bricoleur is some-one who uses the 
instruments present in language and since they are flawed, can change and adapt them, 
acknowledging their heterogeneous nature. “There is therefore a critique of language in the 
form of bricolage.”
596
 Opposed to the bricoleur is the engineer who “would be the absolute 
origin of [his/her] own discourse” and “should be the one to construct the totality of [his/her] 
language, syntax, and lexicon. In this sense the engineer is a myth.”
597
 Hence bricolage, 
while “an intellectual activity is also a mythopoetical activity.” With regard to Lévi-Strauss’s 
“mythological,” Derrida notes: “It is here that we rediscover the mythopoetical virtue of 
bricolage. In effect, what appears most fascinating in this critical search for a new status of 
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discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a center, to a subject, to a privileged 
reference, to an origin, or an absolute archia.”
598
  
Hence, with regard to myth, there is no such thing as a “key myth” that can be 
regarded as the point of reference or template for other myths. Also, there “is no unity or 
absolute source of the myth.”
599
 The source of myth cannot be pinned down and defined in 
terms of existence or presence, hence: 
The discourse on the acentric structure that myth itself is, cannot itself have an absolute 
subject or an absolute center. It must avoid the violence that consists in centering a language 
which describes an acentric structure if it is not to shortchange the form and the movement of 
myth. Therefore it is necessary to forego scientific or philosophical discourse, to renounce the 
episteme which it absolutely requires, which is the absolute requirement that we go back to 
the source, to the center, to the founding basis, to the principle, and so on.
600
 
The form of myth should not follow that of epistemic discourse, but rather should “have the 
form of that of which it speaks.”
601
 Lévi-Strauss even claims to pattern his own work on 
myths: “And in seeking to imitate the spontaneous movement of mythological thought, this 
essay . . . has had to conform to the requirements of that thought and to respect its rhythm. It 
follows that this book on myth is itself a kind of myth.”
602
 
Having followed and outlined Lévi-Strauss’s argument (without apparently agreeing 
or disagreeing), Derrida now asks: “If the mythological is mythomorphic, are all discourses 
on myth equivalent? Shall we have to abandon any epistemological requirement which 
permits us to distinguish between several qualities of discourse on myth?”
603
 These questions, 
Derrida suggests, are not only unanswerable, but are also questions that Lévi-Strauss does not 
answer. The difficulty is the relation of the philosopheme on the one hand and the mytheme 
on the other. Empiricism, so closely aligned with much of science (and Derrida is here 
referring to the social sciences, for example, language), cannot arrive at the final statement of 
meaning on myth because of “the limit of totalisation.”
604
 There is always more data, another 
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 Structuralism, Derrida notes, “justifiably claims to be the critique of 
empiricism” and yet “structural schemata are always proposed as hypotheses resulting from a 
finite quantity of information and which are subjected to the proof of experience.”
606
 
Unsurprisingly, then, and supporting Derrida’s observation, Lévi-Strauss when commenting 
on the acquisition of language (“a question of language on language”) says:
607
 
Experience proves that a linguist can work out the grammar of a given language from a 
remarkably small number of sentences. . . . And even a partial grammar or an outline 
grammar is a precious acquisition when we are dealing with unknown languages. Syntax does 
not become evident only after a (theoretically limitless) series of events has been recorded and 
examined, because it is itself the body of rules governing their production.
608
 
However, Lévi-Strauss continues: “Should fresh data come to hand, they will be used to 
check or modify the formulation of certain grammatical laws, so that some are abandoned 
and replaced by new ones.”
609
 Since total knowledge is impossible “one then refers to the 
empirical endeavour of either a subject or a finite richness which it can never master.” 
610
 
Derrida, moving in a different direction, suggests that this “nontotalization” can be 
viewed “from the standpoint of the concept of play.”
611
 The dilemma of totalisation is now 
problematic “not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or 
finite discourse, but because the nature of the field—that is, language and finite language—
excludes totalisation.”
 612
 There is no centre: 
This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it 
is finite, that is to say, because instead of using an inexhaustible field, as in the classical 
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hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which 
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. . . . One could say . . . that this movement of 




Following Lévi-Strauss, Derrida’s moves towards resolution: “One cannot determine the 
center and exhaust totalization because the sign which replaces the center, which supplements 
it, taking the center’s place in its absence—this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a 
supplement.”
614
 Empiricism falls short in that there is always more data that could have been 
considered. The supplement also refers to the fact of a “something more” but is distinguished 
from that of empiricism. The supplement is a “movement of signification” that “adds 
something”
615
 but “this addition is a floating one because it comes to perform a vicarious 
function, to supplement a lack on the part of the signified”
616
 or, to state this in other words: 
“The overabundance of the signifier, its supplementary character, is thus the result of a 
finitude, that is to say, the result of a lack which must be supplemented.”
617
 
Play itself is in tension with history. In the work of Lévi-Strauss, “the respect for the 
internal originality of the structure, compels a neutralisation of time and history.”
618
 The birth 
of a new structure, for example, always requires a “rupture with its past, its origin and its 
cause” as “the very condition of its structural specificity.”
619
 When considering the transition 
from one structure to another, there is no acknowledged process or recognition of past 
conditions that led to the new structure. This is accomplished by “putting history between 
brackets. In this ‘structuralist’ moment, the concepts of chance and discontinuity are 
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 Derrida notes Lévi-Strauss’s dependence on these concepts “as concerns 
that structure of structures, language:”
621
  
Whatever may have been the moment and the circumstance of its appearance on the scale of 
animal life, language could only have been born in one fell swoop. Things could not have set 
about acquiring signification progressively . . . a transition came about from a stage where 
nothing had a meaning to another where everything possessed it.
622
 
Play is also in tension with presence in that it “is the disruption of presence.”
623
 
The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a 
system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is always the play of absence and 
presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative 
of presence and absence. Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of the 
possibility of play and not the other way around.
624
 
Despite the fact that Lévi-Strauss foregrounds this notion of “play of repetition and 
repetition of play,” Derrida notes that one nevertheless perceives in his work “an ethic of 
presence, an ethic of nostalgia for origins, an ethic of archaic and natural innocence, of a 
purity of presence and self-presence in speech . . . .” On the one hand, Lévi-Strauss presents a 
thinking of play that is “turned toward the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin . . . 
the saddened, negative, nostalgic, [and] guilty.” On the other hand, Derrida notes “the 
Nietzschean affirmation.” This “is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the 
innocence of becoming, the affirmation of the world of signs without fault, without truth, and 
without origin which is offered to an active interpretation.”
625
  
“There are thus two interpretat ons of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play.”
626
 
The first seeks for (or “dreams of”) “full presence, the reassuring foundation and the end of 
play” and, the second, an affirmation that “plays without security” giving itself to “absolute 
chance . . . to the seminal adventure of the trace.”
627
 For Derrida, it is not a question of 
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choosing between the two, though they are irreconcilable, but rather “to try to conceive of the 
common ground” as well as the différance of their “irreducible difference.”
628
 
With reference to this dissertation and its relation to bricolage and myth, there is an 
apparent dissociation. I have selected numerous centres around which I have endeavoured to 
structure a hermeneutical method. But bricolage “is a mythopoetical activity” which has a 
“stated abandonment of all reference to a center.”
629
 Hence, even though my selected 
centres—negative theology, the other, detours, khôra and différance—have the intent of 
decentring, they still serve to provide a stable reference that cannot exhaust or give the final 
word on a text. Each of these centres is part of the play that is substituted in the field that has 
no centre. Because there is no centre and they are artificially placed as the centre, they 
represent a “movement of supplementarity.” To reiterate: 
This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it 
is finite, that is to say, because instead of using an inexhaustible field, as in the classical 
hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which 
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. . . . One could say . . . that this movement of 




Nevertheless, the substitutions that are placed at the centre are to a certain extent 
arbitrary or, to use the word Derrida uses, play. They do provide structure and meaning. 
They lead to an-other meaning, an-other understanding, an-other inclusion, but there is still 
more to be said. But could this open-ended substitution that implies that there is “more” not 
potentially be the “more” of tyranny, oppression and persecution? The answer to this is only 
in the affirmative if all centres are equal, which they are not. A centre can obviously be a 
pretext for tyranny and exclusion. The example I have selected for examination in this 
dissertation is the SDA interpretation of the days of Genesis 1 as literal, historical, 
consecutive 24-hour days. If this centre is allowed to stand, it will indeed negatively impact 
on the lives of many SDAs, particularly those in church employ (and, hence, lends itself to a 
form of tyranny). It is for this reason that I have repeatedly argued that the centre must de-
centre and turn away from its own rightness, its own certainty. Hence, the centres I have 
selected are not absolutely arbitrary. All centres are not equivalent and there are many 
substitutions that function not as the final truth of the matter, but as a means to protect from 
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tyranny. The “more” in this sense, is a reference to the other that has been excluded and 
strives to include. Rather than permitting tyranny, the “more” works to prevent it. 
Hence, my dissertation would not collapse into incoherence if I were to substitute the 
section entitled “Detours” with another entitled “Supplementarity” or if I were to substitute 
the section entitled “Différance” with another entitled “Deconstruction.” The dissertation 
could have been different, but then could not all dissertations ever written have been 
different? Is this not part of the creativity and play that is a work in any discourse? The fact 
that the centre is considered to be the focal point that cannot be played with is what the play 
of substitution challenges. There is a structure and there is a centre, but this centre is not 
really the centre. It is not really part of the structure, even though it has to be there, otherwise 
there would be no structure, no coherence. The centre is a detour that itself is subject to 
différance. The centre is not sacred. There is no centre. In other words, différance is the 
antithesis of logocentrism. It is for this reason that I have selected différance as a focal point. 
By its very nature it displaces the centre and suggests something other. Also, différance is 
related to khôra. If khôra is the space that allows for an infinite play of substitutions, then 
différance is the play. 
3.1.2. Différance 




If différance is what deconstruction is all about, in a nutshell, then ‘khôra is its surname.’ To 
deploy a famous Platonic image: the story of khôra works like an ‘allegory’ of différance, 
each addressing a common, kindred non-essence, impropriety, and namelessness. . . . 
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Différance, like khôra is a great receptacle upon which every constituted trace or mark is 
imprinted, ‘older,’ prior, preoriginary.
632
 
Différance, then, can been seen as the logical partner to khôra, not because they are 
syonymous, but because they allow for one another. They suggest one another. Khôra, as I 
have already tried to make clear, allows for everything. But différance is not to be thought of 
as a thing. Like khôra it is “‘older,’ prior, preoriginary.” 
Derrida begins his comments on différance by referencing the letter a as the letter 
within the word that distinguishes it from the word difference.
633
 Perhaps it is fortuitous that 
this is the first letter, the beginning of the alphabet, in that so much of what is said and what I 
will say further refers to origins and beginnings (Genesis 1, for example). But not only this, 
différance itself, though not, strictly speaking, a beginning or the origin of language, has 
something that could be called pre-originary. It signifies or marks or, to quote Derrida, is 
insinuated “here and there into a writing of the word difference” and is done so “in the course 
of a writing on writing, and also a writing within writing . . . .” And one could bypass the 
“mute irony” of this spelling mistake and “act as if it made no difference.”
634
 Of course, when 
something is deliberately misspelled, it can scarcely be named a mistake and so Derrida 
refers to his discourse on différance not as “an apology” for “this silent lapse in spelling” but 
rather “a kind of insistent intensification of its play.”
 635
 This play is immediately evidenced 
with Derrida’s use of words such as “mute,” “silent” and “inaudible,” all of which emphasise 
the failure of speech to express this difference in différance: 
Now it happens, I would say in effect, that this graphic difference (a instead of e), this marked 
difference between two apparently vocal notations, between two vowels, remains purely 
graphic: it is read, or it is written, but it cannot be heard.
636
 It cannot be apprehended in speech 
and we will see why it also bypasses the order of apprehension in general.
637 
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Derrida suggests that the letter a is a “tacit monument” or a pyramid—similar in shape in its 
capital form—borrowing from “Hegel’s Encyclopedia in which the body of the sign is compared to 
the Egyptian pyramid.”
638
 Translator Allan Bass explicates Derrida’s meaning as “referring 
elliptically and playfully to the following ideas:”
639
 
Derrida first plays on the “silence” of the a in différance as being like a silent tomb, like a 
pyramid, like the pyramid to which Hegel compares the body of the sign. “Tomb” in Greek is 
oikesis, which is akin to the Greek oikos—house—from which the word “economy” derives 
(oikos—house—and nemein—to manage). Thus Derrida speaks of the “economy of death” as 
the “familial residence of the tomb of the proper.” Further, and more elliptically still, Derrida 




There is reference here to at least three ideas that converge in Derrida’s description of 
différance. The first is “the delineation of a site” (a tomb); the second is the related notion of 
“the economy of death” and the third is the “stone” that announces “the death of the 
tyrant.”
641
 Derrida for the moment is concerned to emphasise that he is reading a written text 
trying to convey a distinction to his audience which is only evident on the page and cannot be 
heard.
642
 Thus “there is no phonetic writing” or, at least, “no purely phonetic writing,” since 
“the difference which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in and of itself 
inaudible, in every sense of the word.”
643
 Différance serves as the exemplar of this very idea 
(I note again that, in English, it is helpful to presume that différance is pronounced in the 
same manner as the English word “difference”).  
Différance belongs neither to the sensible (since the “difference marked in the 
‘differ( )nce’ between the e and the a eludes both vision and hearing”) nor the intelligible 
(since it is not “affiliated with the objectivity of theorein or understanding”).
644
 Différance 
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therefore “resists the opposition, one of the founding oppositions of philosophy, between the 
sensible and the intelligible.”
645
 In this sense, différance shows itself to be not unlike khôra in 
that “what Plato in the Timaeus designates by the name khôra . . . is neither ‘sensible’ nor 
‘intelligible’” but “belongs to a third genus (triton genos).”
646
 Similarly, Caputo observes that 
différance “never gets as far as being or entity or presence, which is why it is emblematized 
by insubstantial quasi-beings like ashes and ghosts which flutter between existence and 
nonexistence, or with humble khôra, say, rather than the prestigious Platonic sun.”
647
 Of 
course, at the time of the address “Différance” (1968), Derrida’s principal essay on khôra was 
yet to come (1993).  
The a of différance “cannot be exposed,” because in order to do so it would need to 
“become present.”
648
 Hence, statements that begin “différance is” should be written with the 
“is” crossed out (under erasure).
649
 It is in relation to this need to avoid offering différance 
“to the present” that Derrida observes that “the detours, locutions and syntax in which I have 
to take recourse will resemble those of negative theology, occasionally even to the point of 
being indistinguishable from negative theology.”
650
 Nevertheless this writing that “delineates 
that différance is not” differs from the purpose of negative theologies which “recall that God 
is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, 
inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being.”
651
 
Différance is “irreducible to any ontological or theological—ontotheological—
reappropriation” nor can one discover “an absolute point of departure.”
652
 There is “nowhere  
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to begin to trace the sheaf
653
 or the graphics of différance.”
654
 
In the delineation of différance everything is strategic and adventurous. Strategic because no 
transcendent truth present outside of the field of writing can govern theologically the totality 
of the field. Adventurous because this strategy is not a simple strategy in the sense that 
strategy orients tactics according to a final goal, a telos or theme of domination, a mastery and 
ultimate reappropriation of the development of a field.
655
 
This strategy is one “without finality” using “blind tactics” and “there is a certain wandering” 
employing “the concept of play.”
656
 The “tracing of différance” is therefore unlike “the lines 




To “take us to within sight of what is at stake,” Derrida engages in “a simple and 
approximate semantic analysis.” The Latin verb differre (French: différer) has two meanings: 
to differ and to defer.
658
 Derrida then suggests that differre (Latin) is not “a simple translation 
of the Greek diapherein” which now links Derrida’s discourse on différance to “the less 
originally philosophical [Latin] than the other [Greek].” The reason for this, according to 
Derrida, is that the Greek diapherein “does not comport one of the two motifs of the Latin 
differre, to wit, the action of putting off until later . . . .” The Latin differre contains the 
nuances of not only to differ (diapherein) but also to defer. The idea of “to defer” is 
encapsulated in the word temporization: “Différer in this sense is to temporize, to take 
recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of a 
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detour that suspend the accomplishment of fulfilment of ‘desire’ or ‘will,’ and equally effects 
this suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers its own effect.”
659
  
“The other sense of différer is the more common and identifiable one,”
660
 namely, to 
differ. In French, however, there are two words—différents and différends—pronounced the 
same as one another, meaning what is usually understood by the English word “difference.” 
However, “les different are different things; les différends are differences of opinion, grounds 
for dispute [a polemical meaning].”
661
 Hence: 
Now the word différence (with an e) can never refer either to différer as temporization or to 
différends as polemos. Thus the word différance (with an a) is to compensate—
economically—this loss of meaning, for différance can refer simultaneously to the entire 
configuration of its meanings. . . . In its polysemia this word, of course, must defer
662
 to the 
discourse in which it occurs, its interpretive context; but in a way it defers itself . . . the a 
immediately deriving from the present participle (différant), thereby bringing us close to the 
very action of the verb différer, before it has even produced an effect constituted as something 
different or as différence (with an e).
663
  
There is also something “undecidable” in différance with regard to its verbal structure. 
Although it “brings us close to the infinitive and active kernel of différer, différance (with an 
a) neutralizes what the infinitive denotes as simply active.”
664
 Obviously referring to French 
grammatical forms, Derrida observes that “in the usage in our language the ending -ance 
remains undecided between the active and the passive.”
665
 
When something is not present then “the sign represents the present in its absence. It 
takes the place of the present.” It is the “detour” that signifies and “the sign, in this sense, is 
deferred presence.” The sign is “secondary” since it is derived from the thing itself and 
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In order to unpack this semiology, Derrida references Saussure who “first of all is the 
thinker who put the arbitrary character of the sign and the differential character of the sign 
at the foundation of general semiology, particularly linguistics.”
667
 These two, arbitrary and 
differential, according to Saussure, “are two correlative characteristics.”
668
 
Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only 
differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between 
which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive 
terms . . . language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but 
only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic 
substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it.
669
 
The point for Derrida is to differentiate différance from the “signified concepts” that refer to 
other concepts “by means of the systematic play of differences.”
670
 This “play” of differences 
that Saussure speaks of, différance (says Derrida), “is thus no longer simply a concept, but 
rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general.”
671 
Saussure suggests that these differences occur within the system of language and are effects 
of language itself: “these differences play: in language, in speech too, and in the exchange 
between language and speech.”
672
 But différance “produces . . . these differences, these 
effects of difference.”
673
 Différance is not a presence, a substance or thing, or even, as 
Derrida repeatedly states “a concept or a word” and, therefore, neither is it an origin that 
precedes these differences. “Différance is the non-full, non-simple, structure and 
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differentiating origin of differences. Thus the name ‘origin’ no longer suits it.”
674
 Différance 
makes space for differences, but it is no more the origin of these differences than khôra is the 
origin of all that is inscribed on her. The problem is that if this play of differences is not 
“caused” by différance then one “would have to speak of an effect without a cause which 
very quickly would lead to speaking of no effect at all.”
675
  
The dilemma is that différance seems to be an unfortunate effect of language, in that 
languages are not constituted with the intent of deferring and differing from what they mean 
to say although they end up doing this. However, intent is not the issue but rather that 
languages—outside of any meaning of the text (the words or concepts used) and beyond the 
context that may inform a particular narrative—differ with themselves.
676
 There is what 
Derrida calls “archi-writing, archi-trace or différance” or “spacing” or “supplement.”
677
 Any 
signification refers to what is not present, to something, in other words, that is not itself. But 
there is nevertheless the “mark of the past element” (that is no longer present) as well as a 
relation to “the future element” (which the iterable nature of words necessitate).
678
 But “this 
trace” is “related no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and 
constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not; what 
absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present.” There is “an interval”
679
 
that must separate the signification from the present “in order for the present to be itself.”
680
 
Derrida’s use of “archi” as in archi-writing and archi-trace is helpful. “Archi” refers to 
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something earlier, something before that rules or informs how that which comes later 
operates. Différance precedes language and institutes the trace from which language cannot 
escape since it is built into the very matrix of language and governs how it operates, even 
though an agent may intend to say or write something different. It is this “archi-writing, 
archi-trace, or différance”
681
 that institutes this spacing that differs with the present. 
Derrida reiterates that differentiation is not sufficient to describe différance since the 
notion of deferral is largely absent. Thus, half-way through his essay, Derrida arrives at the 
key questions that one may have thought would have occurred in the opening paragraphs: 
Differences, thus, are “produced”—deferred—by différance. But what defers or who defers? 
In other words, what is différance? With this question we reach another level and another 
resource of our problematic. 
What differs? Who differs? What is différance?
682
 
The reason that the questions could not hitherto be addressed is because of the need to 
disengage any description of différance from the syntax that structure the questions—“what 
is?” “who is?” “who is it that?” These refer to a “present being” which itself “eventually 
would come to defer or to differ.”
683
 
Derrida challenges the prioritising of speech noted by Saussure: “Language is 
necessary in order for speech to be intelligible and to produce all of its effects; but the latter is 
necessary in order for language to be established; historically, the fact of speech always 
comes first.”
 684
 But, Derrida argues, if “the opposition of speech to language is rigorous, 
then, différance would be not only the play of differences within language but also the 
relation of speech to language, the detour through which I must pass in order to 
speak . . . .”
685
 The problem is that a subject can only become “a speaking subject” or “a 
signifying subject . . . by inscribing itself in the system of differences” and “the speaking or 
signifying subject could not be present to itself, as speaking or signifying, without the play of 
linguistic or semiological différance.”
686
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This raises the question as to whether or not an “intuitive consciousness” is possible 
prior to speech or signs. But consciousness is only manifested as “self-presence.” Derrida, 
therefore, notes that the “privilege granted to consciousness . . . signifies the privilege granted 
to the present” and “this privilege is the ether of metaphysics,
687
 the element of our thought 





 the “value of presence” via Heidegger who has demonstrated it to 
be “the ontotheological determination of Being.”
690
 This implies that presence and 
consciousness are not directly connected to one another and Derrida, rather, uses the phrase 
“consciousness as meaning in self presence.”
691
 The word “meaning” is from the French 
vouloir-dire “which has a strong sense of willing (voluntas) to say, putting this attempt to 
mean in conjunction with speech.”
692
 This “gesture of Heidegger” causes Derrida “to posit 
presence—and specifically consciousness, the being beside itself of consciousness—no 
longer as the absolutely central form of Being but as a ‘determination’ and as an ‘effect’.”
693
  
Derrida refers to both Nietzsche and Freud who both “put consciousness into question 
in its assured certainty of itself . . . on the basis of the motif of différance.”
694
 Derrida notes 
that, for Nietzsche, “the great principal activity is unconscious” and “consciousness is the 
                                                          
687
 The term “metaphysics,” often made congruent with “metaphysics of presence,” is sometimes 
viewed as Derrida’s enemy, as though the eradication of all metaphysical claims would resolve the failings of 
Western philosophy. In defending Derrida’s apparent “attack” on metaphysics, Christopher Norris points out 
that much of Derrida’s own writing is a form of metaphysical thinking: “Here I shall take ‘metaphysics’—
conventionally enough—to denote the particular branch of philosophy that raises certain distinctive issues 
concerning the conditions of possibility for thought, knowledge, and experience in general. That is to say, 
metaphysics has always involved some version of the claim (most explicitly advanced by Kant) to deduce those 
conditions from a rigorous enquiry into a priori structures and modalities of human understanding. No doubt it 
is the case that Derrida has come up with some complicating arguments which may be seen to challenge 
received ideas of what counts as an instance of a priori truth, of a form of transcendental deduction from first 
principles that would serve to secure or to validate any such claims. Nevertheless his thinking belongs very 
much to the same tradition of enquiry, whatever the problems that come to light when he examines the various 
forms it has taken down through the history of Western post-Hellenic thought.” Norris, 16.  
688
 Derrida, “Différance,” 16. 
689
 The French “solliciter like the English solicit derives from an Old Latin expression meaning to 
shake the whole, to make something tremble in its entirety.” Alan Bass in Derrida, “Différance,” 16n18. 
690
 Derrida, “Différance,” 16. 
691
 Derrida, “Différance,” 16. 
692
 Alan Bass in Derrida, “Différance,” 16n19. 
693
 Derrida, “Différance,” 16. 
694












effect of forces whose essence, byways, and modalities are not proper to it.”
695
 But “force 
itself is never present” and “there would be no force in general without the difference 
between forces.”
696
 These forces may be opposed but are never equal “even if they are 
granted an opposition of meaning.”
697
 Nietzsche’s thought incorporates “a critique of 
philosophy as an active indifference to difference.”
698
  
Thus one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and 
on which discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates 
that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other different and 
deferred in the economy of the same.
699
 
“Thus, différance is the name we might give to the ‘active,’ moving discord of different 
forces, and of differences of forces, that Nietzsche sets up against the entire system of 
metaphysical grammar, whenever this system governs culture, philosophy, and science.”
700
 
This “energetics or economics of force” (diaphoristics) which “questions the primacy 
of presence as consciousness, is also the major motif of Freud’s thought.”
701
 Derrida notes 
that the notions of differ and defer are “tied together in Freud’s thought.”
702
 First, with 
reference to Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (1885), “in which Freud attempted to 
cast his psychological thinking in a neurological framework,”
703
 Derrida suggests:  
The concepts of trace (Spur), of breaching (Bahnung) [breaching is the preferred translation 
since both the German Bahnung and the French rayage carry the notion of “breaking open” 
not contained in the alternative English translation “facilitation”]
704
 . . . are inseparable from 
différance. The origin of memory, and of the psyche as (conscious or unconscious) memory in 
general, can be described only by taking into account the difference between breaches. Freud 
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 there is no breach without difference and no difference without trace.
706
 
Second, “the production of unconscious traces and in the processes of inscription 
(Niederschrift) can also be interpreted as moments of différance, in the sense of putting in 
reserve.”
707
 This idea is explained via Freud’s idea of deferred pleasure for the sake of self-
preservation when the self is faced with reality. The notion of pleasure is not abandoned, but 
deferred, since it is perceived to differ with a person’s present reality. 
Derrida expands on this idea with reference to Hegel and his notion of Aufhebung—
translated by Derrida as la relève
708
—relating it to “the economic character of différance.”
709
 
This economy can, once again, be understood in terms of deferred pleasure. A person will 
defer pleasure in the present moment for a future gain, aware that this deferral will be worth it 
in the long run. But just because pleasure in the present is deferred does not mean it will 
necessarily show up:  
A certain alterity—to which Freud gives the metaphysical name of the unconscious—is 
definitively exempt from every process of presentation by means of which we would call 
upon it to show itself in person. In this context, and beneath this guise, the unconscious is not, 
as we know, a hidden, virtual, or potential self-presence. It differs from, and defers itself.
710
 
There is no guarantee that what is unconscious need ever become conscious. There is no way 
to read “unconscious” traces, since they are not conscious, but also traces are not things 
retained in our memories that though obscured in the present necessarily appear in the future: 
The alterity of the “unconscious” makes us concerned not with horizons of modified—past or 
future—presents, but with a “past” that has never been present, and never will be, whose 
future to come will never be a production or a reproduction in the form of presence. . . . One 
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cannot think the trace—and therefore, différance—on the basis of the present, or of the 
presence of the present.
711
 
The notion of “a past that has never been present” is used, according to Derrida, by Levinas 
“to qualify the trace and enigma of absolute alterity: the Other.” In fact, says Derrida, from 
this perspective “the thought of différance implies the entire critique of classical ontology 
undertaken by Levinas” and one could include others (Freud and Nietzsche are mentioned) 
who use notions of the trace “as the delimitation of the ontology of presence.”
712
 
Since, then, différance serves to destabilise “beings and beingness” and the 
“domination of beings” one could also say that “différance is not.”
713
 It dominates or rules 




In relation to Being and beings, Derrida does concede: “In a certai  aspect of itself, 
différance is certainly but the historical and epochal unfolding of Being or of the ontological 
difference.”
715
 In understanding this relation of Being to différance, Douglas McGaughey’s 
description in Strangers and Pilgrims is helpful: 
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Being in Being and Time means possibility.
716
 “Possibility” is neither an object over against 
Dasein nor is it a material substance uniting all that “is.” Being (or “isness”) is not taken by 
Heidegger in any sense to mean “substance.” Possibility can only occur as process. It always 
involves a totality of self and the world. Therefore, Being for Heidegger is not a “thing” or a 




Derrida, however, does not wish to totally equate différance with the notion of ontological 
difference, since he wishes to distance it from “the historical and the epochal.”  
Since Being has never had a “meaning,” has never been thought or said as such, except by 
dissimulating itself in beings, then différance, in a certain and very strange way, (is) “older” 
than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being. When it has this age it can be called 
the play of the trace. The play of a trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of Being, but 
whose play transports and encloses the meaning of Being: the play of the trace, of the 
différance, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not belong. There is no maintaining 
and no depth to this bottomless chessboard on which Being is put into play.
718
 
If one thinks khôra at this point, it is possible to discern what Derrida means when he 
calls différance “older” than ontological difference. Since “ontological difference, is but an 
epoch of diapherien [Greek for “difference,” and is a reference to “the Heraclitean play of the 
hen diapheron heautoi”]
719
 and “the concept of epochality [belongs] to what is within history 
as the history of Being,” différance, itself, is “the play of the trace” that “is not.”
720
 It is 
“older”—the quotation marks cautioning us not to think historically at this point—because it 
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is prior to the notion of ontological difference, in the same sense that khôra is prior to 
everything that is. Nevertheless, différance is not khôra but perhaps différance is the “pre-
requisite for” or “nature of” anything (and everything) that is inscribed on khôra. Hence, one 
can speak of “the trace (of that) which can never be presented, the trace which itself can 
never be presented: that is appear and manifest itself, as such, in its phenomenon.”
721
  
Derrida notes that Heidegger wishes to “mark . . . the difference between Being and 
beings, the forgotten of metaphysics” which “has disappeared without leaving a trace.”
722
 The 
point is that since “the very trace of difference has been submerged” and “différance (is) 
(itself) other than absences and presence, if it traces, then when it is a matter of forgetting of 
the difference (between Being and beings), we would have to speak of the disappearance of 
the trace of the trace.”
723
 In other words, since ontological difference is reduced to a trace, 
différance (which “appears” as a trace and is in certain way anterior to ontological difference) 
is a trace of this trace. 
“There is no essence of différance.”
724
 This implies that not only is différance “not a 
‘species’ of the genus ontological difference”
725
 but also “there is neither a Being nor truth of 
the play of writing such as it engages difference.”
726
 As such, différance remains unnameable. 
Like khôra, to speak of it we have a word—différance—but this is an un-word, not, strictly 
speaking, a neologism (“new word”). When Derrida introduces différance he is not trying to 
bring a new word to the (French) language, as though the language itself is guilty of an 




But we “already” know that if it is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our 
language has not yet found or received this name, or because we should have to seek it in 
another language, outside the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name 
for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of “différance,” which is 
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not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity; and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of 
differing and deferring substitutions.
728
 
And tempting as it may be to align this unnameable with the sacred and possibly even God, 
no such presence can be attributed to it: “This unnameable is not an ineffable Being which no 
name could approach: God, for example.”
729
  
Instead, différance is associated with play, a concept that tradition would generally 
regard as anathema with regard to anything sacred. To play with the sacred is to violate it. 
Hence, to “name” différance as a genus of the sacred, is a contradiction in terms, which itself 
is quite in keeping with différance: 
This unnameable is the play which makes possible nominal effects, the relatively unitary and 
atomic structures that are called names, the chains of substitutions in which, for example, the 
nominal effect différance is itself enmeshed, carried off, reinscribed, just as a false entry or a 
false exit is still part of the game, a function of the system.
730
 
Différance understood as a play of differences cannot get along with anything stable, 
anything that cannot allow for difference. The sacred needs a stable point of reference to have 
meaning, something that is not affected by the vicissitudes of context, establishing a presence 
that rises above space and time. Différance is at odds with this view of the sacred and it is 
unlikely that différance and the idea of a fundamental belief can be companions either. 
The fundamental beliefs, in a sense, are the principal identifiers of Seventh-day 
Adventism. They represent a stable and inviolable centre that serves to distinguish those 
within from all those without. One could even say that the fundamental beliefs are a sacred 
word on the nature of Adventism. And yet, since they are words—language—they are subject 
to différance. Although the word fundamental seems a stable descriptor, this is merely a 
facade, particularly, as I will endeavour to show, in the context of historic Adventism. 
3.1.3. Fundamentals 
The “case study” and “analogy,” the “history” and “myth,” the “truth” and “tradition” 
at issue is that of the SDA Church and its relation to fundamental belief #6: “Creation.” This 
is a contribution to a far bigger discourse which also should not be identified by pairs 
representing binary opposites—deconstruction or religion, différance or God, and, perhaps, 
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khôra or Genesis 1:2—the first of each of these pairs supposedly representing the position of 
this dissertation, which could not be further from the truth (always remembering that not 
finding a place further from the truth does not at the same time find a place closer to the truth: 
khôra, for example). As I have been trying to demonstrate, there is another way (triton 
genos). 
The dilemma is the very idea of the fundamental. The very notion of something 
fundamental is difficult to reconcile with the thought of Jacques Derrida. What is 
fundamental to différance? It is a question that one can ask, but not seriously, not without a 
sense of play. One could glibly respond that différance both differs and defers and these are 
fundamental components of différance, which is true up to a point, but only when one 
simultaneously forgets not only that to actually be fundamental is to subscribe to an endless 
repetition of the same (hence not différance at all), but also that différance, itself, is not “a 
word or a concept” and so escapes definition.  
There is a contradiction when fundamental beliefs come into contact with différance. 
To submit fundamentals to différance
731
 means that they are not fundamental at all or, at 
least, that one is open to the possibility that they might not be fundamental. And anyone who 
has constructed a set of norms that are labelled fundamental would scarcely at the same 
moment be open to the notion that these norms themselves be open to being other than what 
they are. Différance, however, has no such restriction, by which I mean more than that 
différance allows for multiplicity and the advent of something other. Since différance could 
also differ with itself, it could defer itself and, for the moment, at least, be a fundamental 
belief. This movement is necessary, if that which is fundamental is ever going to meet with 
différance. This will happen not because of the hospitality of the fundamental that would 
freely admit différance into its presence, but rather because différance is an unperceived trace 
that cannot be totally eradicated. Différance could be a fundamental belief, if it differed with 
itself and deferred itself. If it did this, it would be both différance and a fundamental belief, 
which is actually not a contradiction at all, since différance is a movement within language 
which itself is the material constructing a fundamental belief. This would be a play of 
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substitutions: to define Seventh-day Adventism with the fundamental beliefs at the centre is 
one thing, but to assume that the fundamental beliefs are, in fact, better described as 
différance is something else altogether. And yet, as I will show, historic Adventism is 
grounded on just such a fundamental. At the centre (there was) différance. 
Something fundamental is usually understood to be the basis or the essential 
component of that to which it refers. The fundamentals of Seventh-day Adventism, one 
would presume, are the very things that define Seventh-day Adventism—remove the 
fundamentals and you no longer have a Seventh-day Adventist. Is this what is meant by the 
term “fundamental belief” in an SDA context? The content of the belief itself (fundamental 
belief #6) I will examine in the next section, but for now I would like to examine possible 
meanings of the descriptor fundamental. 
The Seventh-day Adventist Church Manual begins with the following words: “In 
fulfilment of the divine plan the Advent Movement began its prophetic journey toward the 
kingdom in the year 1844.”
732
 There was hence a period of around nineteen years before the 
actual organisation of the General Conference of the SDA Church in 1863. The Church 
Manual informs us that “the Movement’s pioneers walked at first uncertainly. They were sure 
of the doctrines they held [emphasis added], but unsure as to the form of organization, if any, 
that they should adopt.”
733
 This statement possibly implies that from its very inception the 
doctrines of the SDA Church were “sure” and that they have remained unchanged during the 
intervening decades. However, in truth, there has been considerable development of the SDA 
fundamental beliefs over the intervening decades. The proposed change to fundamental belief 
#6 “Creation” in 2015, which is my direct concern, serves as an adequate enough illustration 
of this development. In fact, changes to the beliefs at a General Conference in Session are not 
uncommon. 
For the moment I use the word “development” as describing this “movement” over 
other words that may suggest more fundamental changes to the SDA belief system: 
metamorphosis, reformation or, possibly, evolution. The preamble to the twenty-eight 
fundamental beliefs themselves is instructive: 
Seventh-day Adventists accept the Bible as their only creed and hold certain fundamental 
beliefs to be the teaching of the Holy Scriptures. These beliefs, as set forth here, constitute the 
church’s understanding and expression of the teaching of Scripture. Revision of these 
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statements may be expected at a General Conference session when the church is led by the 
Holy Spirit to a fuller understanding of Bible truth or finds better language in which to 
express the teachings of God’s Holy Word.
734
 
There is something almost playful about this statement. First, the idea that SDAs 
“accept the Bible as their only creed” is offset by the notion of what one might term a 
supplement and a detour: the fundamental beliefs. Second, one is bemused by the use of this 
word “creed” which means “a formal summary of Christian beliefs” or “a set of beliefs or 
principles.”
735
 The Bible is identified as the SDA creed, although the Bible is clearly not a 
creed, but rather a text from which a creed could be derived. Are not the fundamental beliefs 
stated as a creed—“a formal summary of Christian beliefs” and “a set of beliefs?” And yet it 
is claimed that they are not a creed but a set of fundamental beliefs. The point would appear 
to be that the Bible is the creed (the beliefs of the SDA Church), which cannot be distilled to 
a shorter form (there is no further “summary” possible), but from this creed (the Bible) one 
can identify a list of beliefs that are fundamental, that is, the ground or the centre upon which 
all the other beliefs are to be organised: one might say a logocentric declaration, by which the 
other beliefs (the “rest” of the Bible) are to be understood. But to reduce the fundamental 
beliefs to a logocentric declaration is to overlook the f ct that these beliefs are never a final 
word: “Revision of these statements may be expected at a General Conference session. . . .” 
In a certain sense they are definitive, but in another they are not. 
From this another question arises. If the creed of the SDA Church is the Bible, what 
force or authority do the fundamental beliefs have? For instance, could one claim to “believe 
in” the Bible only—sola Scriptura—and not agree with the fundamental beliefs and yet 
remain an SDA? The answer is implied in The Church Manual under the heading: “Reasons 
for Which Members Shall Be Disciplined.”
736
 In fact, this is listed as the first reason (in a list 
of eleven): “Denial of faith in the fundamentals of the gospel and in the cardinal doctrines of 
the church or teaching doctrines contrary to the same.”
737
 Although there is a confusion of 
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terminology in that the term “fundamental beliefs” is not mentioned, it is fair to say that what 
could be meant by either or both of the statements “fundamentals of the gospel” and “the 
cardinal doctrines of the church” is the fundamental beliefs. Hence, a denial of the 
fundamental beliefs (or any one of them) is a valid reason to expel a member from the SDA 
Church. In the context of the SDA Church, in theory, at least, the authority of the 
fundamental beliefs is absolute (they determine whether or not one is a Seventh-day 
Adventist), not, and this must be emphasised, the Bible (accepting, of course, that SDA 
interpreters would consider the beliefs to be based on the Bible). But, this understanding is 
only an implication because, if this were the case, one would not expect the The Church 
Manual to arbitrarily change the terminology from “fundamental beliefs” to “fundamentals of 
the gospel” and “the cardinal doctrines of the church.” This confusion of terminology seems 
to suggest something “other,” something unmentioned.  
This leads to the paradoxical affirmation in the preamble to the fundamental beliefs: 
“Revision of these statements may be expected at a General Conference session when the 
church is led by the Holy Spirit to a fuller understanding of Bible truth or finds better 
language in which to express the teachings of God’s Holy Word.” But if these beliefs are 
fundamental, the very ground, the bedrock upon which the edifice known as Seventh-day 
Adventism is built, how can they be subject to revision “at a General Conference session” 
(which happens every five years)? 
In 1872 the Adventist press at Battle Creek, Michigan, published a “synopsis of our faith” in 
25 propositions. This document, slightly revised and expanded to 28 sections,
738
 appeared in 
the denominational yearbook in 1889. This was not continued in subsequent issues . . . . In 
response to an appeal from church leaders in Africa . . . a committee of four, including the 
president of the General Conference, prepared a statement encompassing “the principal 
features” of belief as they “may be summarized.” This statement of 22 fundamental beliefs, 
first printed in the 1931 Yearbook, stood until the 1980 General Conference session replaced 
it with a similar but more comprehensive, summarization in 27 paragraphs, published under 
the title “Fundamental Beliefs of Seventh-day Adventists.”
739
 
The very idea of a revision of fundamental beliefs is somewhat of a contradiction in terms, 
even if one defers responsibility of this revision to God: “Revision of these statements may 
be expected at a General Conference session when the church is led by the Holy Spirit 
[emphasis added] to a fuller understanding of Bible truth . . . .” The basic inference being that 
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what was fundamental is no longer fundamental, which means that what was fundamental 
actually wasn’t fundamental at all. 
Historically SDAs have been opposed to identifying themselves with a creed, which 
explains why the preamble to the fundamentals contains the claim that “Seventh-day 
Adventists accept the Bible as their only creed.” The first SDA General Conference 
president, James White, asserted in agreement with other church founders: “The Bible is our 
creed. We reject everything in the form of a human creed. We take the Bible and the gifts of 
the Spirit; embracing the faith that thus the Lord will teach us from time to time. And in this 
we take a position against the formation of a creed.”
740
 Despite this claim, though, James 
White nevertheless “introduced the idea of a ‘church covenant’” which was basically a 
sentence-long description that connected SDAs with the notion of keeping “the 
commandments and the faith of Jesus.” Objectors were appeased with the assurance that a 
covenant is not a creed.
741
 Quoting Walter Scragg, Fritz Guy explains the early Adventist 
fears with regard to the formation of a creed: 
The early [Adventist] church leaders came out of bodies that they felt had calcified their 
beliefs in . . . creedal statements, and [had] fought to defend those statements rather than 
embark on fresh searches for biblical understanding and truth. The Reformation remained 
incomplete because it was held back by creeds. They also feared that such statements might 
become a rival to the freedom of the Spirit that they saw operating in their midst, both in the 
work of Ellen G. White, and in their various study conferences at which they sought to find 
answers to perplexing Bible questions.
742
 
Fritz Guy, himself, concludes with something that is no doubt accurate with regard to the 
crisis that surrounds the proposed revision of fundamental belief #6: “As soon as we produce 
a statement of belief, some people will stop thinking, stop asking questions, and stop 
growing. And some people will use the statement to judge others, and to try to exclude from 
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The 1872 list of twenty-five “fundamental principles” was “published as an unsigned 
pamphlet” with a preamble including the following disclaimer: “In presenting to the public 
this synopsis of our faith, we wish to have it distinctly understood that we have no articles of 
faith, creed or discipline [emphasis added], aside from the Bible.”
744
 I would argue that 
although these ideas still persist, there is currently a disruption to these negations. The 
fundamental principles are now fundamental beliefs, thereby explicitly claiming to be a 
statement of faith. They are hence by definition a creed (even though the Bible is the “only 
creed” of SDAs). They are also used as a basis for church discipline (even though the 
fundamental beliefs are not explicitly mentioned in this regard). This means that, although the 
premise or foundation for what are now the fundamental beliefs was more or less in place 
from the Church’s inception, the fundamental beliefs and the way they currently function in 
the Church is alien to historic Adventism. The preamble to this 1872 list of fundamental 
principles continues in an unequivocal vein deflecting any misunderstanding: “We do not put 
forth this as having any authority with our people, nor is it designed to secure uniformity 
among them, as a system of faith [emphasis added], but it is a brief statement of what is, and 
has been, with great unanimity, held by them.”
745
 In 1882 “W. H. Littlejohn wrote and 
published a suggested church manual” but “the 1883 General Conference session rejected the 
proposed manual as unnecessary and potentially dangerous because it would likely lead to 
uniformity in matters of ‘practice’ and might also stiffen the understanding of ‘faith.’”
746
 
W. J. Hackett, vice President of the General Conference, as late as 1977, found 
resistance when he suggested that a list of fundamental beliefs be prepared since 
“administrators, church leaders, controlling boards and leaders at all levels of the church will 
find it easier to evaluate persons already serving the church, and those hereafter appointed, as 
to their commitment to what is considered basic Adventism.”
747
 While the 1980 General 
Conference session decided to incorporate the twenty-seven fundamental beliefs in The 
Church Manual, the preamble had the intention of distinguishing these fundamentals from 
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the force of a creed. Rolf Pöhler concludes that “it can be said, while the early Adventists 
emphasized the purely descriptive and informative nature of their statements of faith, by now 




Interesting, but not particularly helpful, is the manner in which members are accepted 
into SDA membership. This is done via baptism accompanied by assent to what is termed the 
“Baptismal Covenant” which is given the following description: 
A summary of doctrinal beliefs, prepared especially for the instruction of candidates for 
baptism, together with Baptismal Vow and Certificate of Baptism have been adopted by the 
denomination as a baptismal covenant. . . . Each candidate should be thoroughly familiar with 
the teachings contained in this outline and with the duties enjoined upon believers and by 
practise demonstrate a willing acceptance of all the doctrines taught by Seventh-day 
Adventists . . . .
749
 
The “summary of doctrinal beliefs” consists of thirteen short statements that certainly contain 
far less information than the twenty-eight fundamental beliefs. However, the eleventh point 
serves to fill in the gaps: “11. Do you know and understand the fundamental Bible principles 
as taught by the Seventh-day Adventist Church? Do you purpose, by the grace of God, to 
fulfill His [sic] will by ordering your life in harmony with these principles?”
750
 
However, if one is to ask the nature of historic Adventism, then it is quite clear that 
the message is “no articles of faith, creed or discipline, aside from the Bible.” The role of 
fundamentals is descriptive and, one might add, only generally descriptive or approximately 
descriptive. A fundamental belief that serves to exclude people who do not conform to its 
description is out of step with historic Adventism. At the centre was the Bible, the Bible with 
no creed as a supplement. And if a set of fundamental beliefs were to be placed at the centre 
in order produce some sort of clarity, this set of beliefs would encounter something more 
fundamental to Adventism—no fundamentals in Adventism. To be true to historic 
Adventism, fundamental beliefs should always be seen as a supplement open to the play of 
substitutions that should never in and of themselves be sacralised. To phrase this in Derrida’s 
language, if there is a centre in historic Adventism it (is) différance. That is fundamental. 
Before turning to the idea that Genesis 1 should be understood in terms of literal, 
historical, consecutive 24-hour days, I would like to suggest another centre. This centre is 
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like khôra. It has no evident substance and is not part of the created order, but is rather the 
receptacle or place upon which creation is inscribed. I am referring to Genesis 1:2 (“the earth 
was without form and void”). In a way, this is the logical centre of Genesis 1, although an 
unstable one. It is on this centre that God’s play of creation happens. For my purposes, 
therefore, it is also the logical centre on which the play of discourse can flourish, a play that 
displaces itself and allows for other centres which in turn are displaced. In short, if Genesis 
1:2 is like khôra, its other name is (to use Derrida’s non-word) différance. 
3.2. Without Form and Void 
There is a reference to “something” that is analogous to Plato’s khôra in Genesis 1. 
Genesis 1:2 presents an evident break in continuity between verses one and three. The first 
verse refers to the creative acts of God: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the 
earth;”
751
 the second verse presents “the earth” as inert and “the Spirit of God” as “hovering” 
(not creating): “Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the 
deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters;”
752
 verse three and on (concluding 
at 2:4a) again presents creative acts of God commencing with “And God said, ‘Let there be 
light’” (1:3a)—the creation of what might be termed the “sensible” or physical world (in an 
SDA understanding), culminating in the inactivity of the seventh day of rest (Genesis 1:3-
2:4a). 
In the first place, I acknowledge the location of Genesis 1:2, in the flow of the 
narrative, as being placed betw en “creations.” There is a creation of “the heavens and the 
earth” in Genesis 1:1 and then “another” creation in Genesis 1:3-2:4. This is not unlike the 
structure of the Timaeus where Plato locates his discussion on khôra in between the creation 
of the sensible world and the creation of the intelligible world: khôra in the Timaeus is 
located between “creations.” More importantly, the phrasing of Genesis 1:2 is almost 
absurdly comparable to khôra. It contains at least three terms that are evocative of Plato’s 
khôra: “formless” (tohu); “empty” (bohu); and “the deep” (tehom). It is a parallel that John 
Caputo suggests is intended by Derrida, although it is not a point that Derrida expands on: 
. . . Derrida's reinscription of khora into deconstruction is, as often happens, not a purely 
Greek operation but a Jewgreek one, and how the khoral picture of things that emerges in 
deconstruction has, accordingly, an oddly biblical flavour. When he says khora, he is not 
                                                          
751
 Gen. 1:1 (NIV). 
752












simply drawing upon the Timaeus, which is the manifest reference, but there is also, for 
anyone with the ears to hear, an allusion being made to the opening verses of Genesis. My 
contention is that there is a desert scene—a biblical desert, but then a desert within the 
desert—that presides over everything in deconstruction, and provides the setting for his 
prayers and tears. My contention is that everything in deconstruction is marked by a memory 
of the primal scene of creation, whether or not Derrida remembers.
753
 
My concern here is not to ascertain whether or not “deconstruction is marked by a 
memory of the primal scene of creation” by “an allusion . . . to the opening verses of 
Genesis.” Any such connections merely serve as a fortuitous detour. My direct concern is to 
suggest a “decentring centre” in a reading of Genesis 1 that itself is not definitive but a play 
of différance.  
The phrase “without form and void” (AV)—tohu wabohu—is found elsewhere in 
Scripture (e.g. Isa. 34:11 and Jer. 4:23), but each of these occurrences “seem to be borrowed 
from this text.”
754
 Such derivations return one to Genesis 1:2 to discover its meaning. 
However, “tohu alone is frequently employed as synonymous with nonexistence, or 
nothingness,”
755
 e.g. “All nations before him [sic] are as nothing; and they are counted to him 
[sic] less than nothing, and vanity [tohu];”
756
 “Then I said, I have laboured in vain, I have 
spent my strength for nought [tohu], and in vain: yet surely my judgment is with the LORD, 
and my work with my God;”
757
 and, more relevantly, “He stretcheth out the north over the 
empty place [tohu], and hangeth the earth upon nothing.”
758
 Strong’s Exhaustive 
Concordance of the Bible is relatively vocal in its description of tohu: “From an unused root 
meaning to lie waste; a desolation (of surface), that is, desert; figuratively a worthless thing; 
adverbially in vain: - confusion, empty place, without form, nothing, (thing of) nought, vain, 
vanity, waste, wilderness.”
759
 Tohu, interestingly “has no certain cognates in other 
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 and is “from an unused root,” supplying an almost gratifying lack of reference 
when placed alongside khôra.  
Bohu has a meaning that “is uncertain”
761
 and always occurs in conjunction with tohu. 
The phrase “tohu wabohu has been variously understood as a hendiadys,” meaning “a 
formless waste” or “absolutely nothing whatever” or, possibly, “void and vacancy”
762
 The 
Septuagint renders aoratos kai akataskeuastos for tohu wabohu meaning literally “invisible 
and unformed.” Possibly, the “invisibility” of the earth is merely an attempt by the translators 
to reflect the notion of “darkness upon the face of the deep” since darkness prevents seeing. 
Certainly, the Greek rendition lacks the alliterative force of tohu wabohu as indeed do the 
English translations.  
The word for deep—tehom—is a partner to tohu in Old Testament Hebrew word 
study books, in the sense of alphabetical order, i.e. tehom follows tohu in the dictionary.
763
 It 
is unlikely that this is purely coincidence and may suggest that related meanings of tohu and 
tehom be preferred. “A number of times” in the Old Testament, one might even say, usually, 
tehom “is used merely for a large body of water.”
764
 In Genesis 1:2 the word “deep” is 
favoured by a majority of translations.
765
 The Good News Bible removes ambiguity by 
suggesting “the raging ocean.” Similar is “a roaring ocean” in the Contemporary English 
Version. Of slightly more interest is the New English Bible translating tehom as abyss. Both 




—carry this meaning. 
The Septuagint concurs, using abyssou: “Originally an adjective for an implied ‘earth,’ 
abyssos is used in Greek for the depths of original time, the primal ocean, and the world of 
the dead. In the LXX it denotes the original flood, then the realm of the dead (e.g. Ps. 
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 The New Testament uses the word without recourse to the associated connotation 
of an ocean of water: “In the NT it is a prison for antichrist (Rev. 11:7), demons (Lk. 8:31), 
scorpions (Rev. 9:3ff.), and spirits (Rev. 9:1; 20:1, 3). It is a well-like abyss from which 
smoke ascends (Rev. 9:1). Satan will be shut up there for a thousand-year period (Rev. 20:1, 
3). In Rom. 10:7 it simply denotes the realm of the dead.”
769
 
Having just described “the earth” as an amorphous nothingness (tohu wabohu), it is 
improbable that the earth is now an actual body of water—that is not nothing after all. The 
parallelism of Genesis 1:2b and 1:2c does not easily succumb to a “literal” reading:  
 
Genesis 1:2b   Genesis 1:2c 
A. And darkness was  A. and the Spirit of God moved 
B. upon the face  B. upon the face 
C. of the deep   C. of the waters 
 
On its own, the clause “and darkness was upon the face of the deep” carries no 
essential meaning of anything substantive that would contradict the nothingness of tohu 
wabohu. The second phrase “upon the face” represents an evident personification not to be 
taken literally in either occurrence. The fact that it is “the Spirit of God” that moves “upon 
the face of the waters” is intriguing in that it stands in stark contrast to the usage in verse 1 as 
well as verse 3ff. It is God (Elohim) who creates (verse 1 and 3ff.) but it is the Spirit (ruach) 
of God (Elohim) that “moves” (rachaph) in verse 2. The Authorised Version’s use of the verb 
“to move” is, perhaps, inconsistent considering the rest of the verse. Rachaph can mean, 
“brood” or “relax” or “hover.”
770
 God creates, but the Spirit of God is inactive in a state of 
“relaxation.” Although Christian commentators have frequently wished to infer evidence of 
the Trinitarian notion of God in the verse, and no doubt this is an appealing idea, this 
inference is a completely independent theological thought that should not interfere with the 
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point being made. In addition, the very idea of spirit (ruach) implies a lack of anything 
substantial and its alignment with rachaph implies an inert lack of substance.  
The final phrase is “of the waters” which the parallelism could imply as a literal 
descriptor of “the deep.” To do this, however, is to contradict the momentum of the verse. In 
fact, there is something curiously paradoxical about the verse which becomes evident if one 
places the first clause alongside the third clause in a chiasm:  
 
A. And the earth (‘erets) 
B. was without form and void . . . 
B`. and the Spirit of God moved  
A`. upon the face of the waters (mayim). 
 
Clearly, the earth and the waters are distinguished from one another in the creative 
activity of God: “And God said, Let the waters [mayim] under the heaven be gathered 
together unto one place, and let the dry land appear: and it was so. And God called the dry 
land Earth [‘erets]; and the gathering together of the waters [mayim] called he [sic] Seas: and 
God saw that it was good.”
771
 One could presume, therefore, that mayim in verse 2 is 
metaphorical, implying an amorphous nothingness or, alternatively, it is something quite 
distinct from the earth where the Spirit of God waits to commence with God’s creative 
activity. To restate this idea: The earth was without form and void and the Spirit of God was 
not there. The Spirit of God was elsewhere, relaxing upon the face of the waters (we might 
say, colloquially, that God was “on holiday”).  
But this idea, though quite quaint, is not possible in relation to the emptiness that is 
khôra, because khôra does not allow for any “elsewhere.” There is no outside, no beyond or 
other that is separated from khôra. The very notion of khôra is that whatever is said or written 
or done is inscribed on khôra. This means that what is antithetical to khôra only appears as 
such, because there is no such thing as being antithetical to khôra, rather one is dealing with 
an inscription on khôra. The inactivity of the Spirit of God hovering on the face of the waters 
is an inscription on the nothingness, whether one wishes to name this place “’erets” or 
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“khôra” or “tehom.” I include this point (and perhaps I have argued in a similar fashion 
elsewhere) for the sake of explication, but quite obviously this blatant imposition of khôra 
onto the meaning of Genesis 1:2 is problematic (certainly in an SDA understanding). My 
argument, in general, though is that the centre “without form and void” is an intrinsically 
decentring idea (like khora), but does not really require recourse to (Derrida’s explication of) 
khôra in order to function as a decentring centre (triton genos).  
To reiterate, then, within the flow of Genesis 1:1-2:4a, Genesis 1:2 is analogous to 
khôra. Beyond this, though, is the fact that verse 2, itself, presents a structure that is similarly 
analogous to khôra. This is evident when one observes, as noted above, that “the deep” (an 
abyss of nothingness) could follow a parallel thought with verse 2a which describes “the 
earth as without form and void.” Alternatively, “the deep” (a raging ocean) could follow a 
parallel thought with verse 2c which describes the “Spirit of God as hovering over the 
waters.” 2a and 2c both suggest a presence—earth (‘erets) and waters (mayim)—which more 
particularly belong to the created order and not khôra, whereas the more incorporeal 
description in 2b (“and darkness was on the face of the deep”) is the chasm that lies between 
the two. Hence, Genesis 1:2 within itself is analogous to Plato’s structure of khôra in the 
Timaeus. 
Andrews University biblical scholar Richard Davidson
772
 outlines, with reference to 
these verses, what he calls the “passive gap theory” and the “no gap theory.” Both views “are 
subheadings of biblical cosmogony in Gen 1 that may be termed the initial ‘unformed-
unfilled’ view.”  
According to this . . . view (and common to both the “no gap” and “passive gap” theories), 
Gen 1:1 declares that God created “the heavens and earth” out of nothing
773
 at the time of 
their absolute begi ning. Verse 2 clarifies that when (at least) the earth was first created, it 
was in a state of tohû “unformed” and bohû “unfilled.” Verse 3ff. then describes the divine 
process of forming the unformed and filling the unfilled.
774
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With regard to this “forming and filling” of the earth, Davidson affirms that this 
“creative activity of God is accomplished in six successive literal twenty-four hour days” and 
that by the end of this creation week “what God began in v. 1 is now completed.”
775
 The “no 
gap theory” would imply that Genesis 1:1-2 is an integral part of the first day of creation 
(concluding in verse 5) whereas the “passive gap theory,” preferred by Davidson, suggests 
that “the ‘raw materials’ of the earth in their unformed-unfilled state were created before—
perhaps long before—the seven days of creation week.”
776
 Davidson likens God to a “potter 
or architect” who “first gathers his [sic] materials, and then at some point later begins shaping 
the pot on the potter’s wheel or constructing the building.”
777
 In Genesis 1:1 God creates 
what Davidson calls (always enclosed in inverted commas) the “raw materials” and at some 
point later, named “the appropriate creative moment,” God “began to form and fill the earth 
in the six literal days of creation week.”
778
 The gap between these two creation events is 
indeterminate since “the text of Gen 1:1 does not indicate how long before creation week the 




Davidson’s peer at Andrew’s University, systematic theologian Fernando Canale, 
agrees with Davidson’s summation (and specifically references Davidson’s article) iterating 
that the repetitive sentence, first appearing in verse 3, “and God said” is a “literary device” 
that clearly signifies the starting point of the six day creative activity of God. In this way, 
“the text distinguishes clearly between the creation of heaven and earth at the beginning and 
the creation of life on earth, perhaps billions of years later.”
780
 
Davidson takes the juxtaposition of the words “heaven” and “earth” to indicate the 
creation of the universe in its totality. The phrase “the heavens and the earth” (a merism)
781
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found in Genesis 1:1 is reiterated with the same meaning: “Thus the heavens and the earth 
and all their host were finished”
782
 and “[t]his is the history of the heavens and the earth when 
they were created.”
783
 Davidson deduces that since these latter verses fall at the end of the 
narrative of the six day creation of the earth that “the creation of the whole universe is finally 
completed when the creation week of this earth is finished!”
784
 Davidson suggests that the 
creation of the “earth,” in particular, spanning Genesis 1:3 to Genesis 2:4a is a distinct 
creative act that is chronologically after the creation of the universe in Genesis 1:1 (by 
possibly billions of years). This distinction is evident since “there is wide recognition among 
Genesis commentators that when used together as a pair in the Hebrew Bible, the dyad of 
terms ‘the heavens and the earth’ constitute a merism for the totality of all creation, i.e. the 
entire universe, and that such is the case also in Gen. 1:1.”
785
 However, during the actual 
“days” of creation (Genesis 1:3ff.) one finds, unlike Genesis 1:1, that when “the heavens” 
and “the earth” are named “they do not have the article.”
786
 In addition and “more 
importantly, in Gen. 1:1 one encounters a dyad of terms (‘the heavens and the earth’), 
whereas later in Gen. 1 one finds a triad: ‘heavens,’ ‘earth,’ and ‘sea’ (vv. 8, 10).”
787
 For 
Davidson, this triad serves to distinguish the specific creation of this earth (1:3ff.) and the 
universe (1:1). 
Davidson, therefore, has three movements in the creation of the universe: 1) The 
creation of the universe ex nihilo including the raw materials that constitute the earth 
(verse 1); 2) The “raw materials” of the earth “passively” awaiting formation for possibly 
billions of years (verse 2); 3) The “filling” and “forming” of the earth (verse 3ff.). The 
creation week, for Davidson, represents the “finishing touch” to the creation of the entire 
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Davidson acknowledges an evident incoherence in his construction: The earth (which 
is part of the universe) cannot be created after (billions of years) the universe is created 
(Genesis 1:1) even though it signifies its completion (Genesis 2:1): 
It has been widely suggested that the term “the heavens and earth” always refers to a 
completed and organized universe in Scripture, and thus cannot include the creation of an 
“unformed and unfilled” earth (so, e.g. Waltke, Genesis, 60). But several recent studies have 
shown that the essential meaning of “the heavens and the earth” is not completion and 
organization, but totality. See, e.g., Wenham, 12-15; Rooker, 319-320. Thus, while the term 
“heavens and earth’ may indeed refer to an organized, finished universe elsewhere in 
Scripture, this need not control the unique nuance here in Gen 1:1. Matthew, 142, clarifies: 
“Although the phrase ‘heavens and earth’ surely points to a finished universe where it is 
found elsewhere in the Old Testament, we cannot disregard the fundamental difference 
between those passages and the context presented in Genesis 1 before us, namely, that the 
expression may be used uniquely here since it concerns the exceptional event of creation 
itself. To insist on its meaning as a finished universe is to enslave the expression to its uses 
elsewhere and ignore the contextual requirements of Genesis 1. ‘Heavens and earth’ here 
indicates the totality of the universe, not foremostly an organised, completed universe.”
789
 
The argument defending this inconsistent interpretation of “the heavens and the earth” 
is: first, that the term represents “totality” and “not completion and organization.” This means 
that the universe was created in its totality in Genesis 1:1 and yet awaited further 
“organization” for its “completion.” But this also means that all ex nihilo creation was 
completed before Genesis 1:3 and that the so-called “creative” acts of God described in the 
six days of creation were really a rearranging and manufacturing operation involving various 
pre-existing raw materials. In other words, one has to contend with the fact that for all of the 
“Let there be” utterances of God, one is not referring to creation ex nihilo at all—an 
interpretation that would not find favour with too many conservative Seventh-day 
Adventists.
790
 Even Canale suggests: “We should not attempt to understand creation in 
analogy to human creativity. Human creativity is the process of organizing a pre-existent 
material reality using various combinations of already existent design patterns.”
791
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Canale acknowledges a creation of the universe unspecified 
eons ago (Genesis 1:1), it would seem that the bulk of God’s creative acts—in terms of the 
length of the narrative (Genesis 1:3-2:1)—are profoundly analogous to “human creativity.” 
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Furthermore, the extent of this rearranging and organising cannot be specifically 
determined outside of the notion of what is meant by “the earth was formless and empty” 
(Genesis 1:2a). Davidson would have “the earth” in this context mean the Earth as that planet 
which orbits the sun in our solar system. But there are no internal indicators to assist in this 
designation since the very notion of a “planet” is scarcely a self-evident presence in 
Genesis 1. Was this organization of the “formless and empty” a reference to that part of the 
earth that was known and understood by the Hebrews, what we would term the Ancient Near 
East? Was it, perhaps, an even smaller area—Eden—which seems to have had a utopian 
(organised?) inside, where Adam and Eve were first located (Genesis 2:8) and a less desirable 
(unorganised?) outside, to where they were banished (Genesis 3:23-24)? Or, perhaps, one 
might expand the size of this newly organised domain to a bigger continent, or the whole 
planet, or, possibly, the solar system, or the galaxy, or the universe?  
Second, Davidson suggests that the unique interpretation of the phrase “heaven and 
earth” is one that is demanded by a unique context. I note in passing the recurring Hebrew 
word “yom” (day) also located in this “unique context.” 
The reasons that Davidson requires that the universe already be in place before the 
creation of this earth are, at least, twofold. First, the SDA Church has as one of its 
fundamental beliefs (#8), “The Great Controversy:” 
All humanity is now involved in a Great Controversy between Christ and Satan regarding the 
character of God, His law, and His sovereignty over the universe. This conflict originated in 
heaven when a created being, endowed with freedom of choice, in self-exaltation became 
Satan, God’s adversary, and led into rebellion a portion of the angels. He introduced the 
spirit of rebellion into this world when he led Adam and Eve into sin [emphasis added]. This 
human sin resulted in the distortion of the image of God in humanity, the disordering of the 
created world, and its eventual devastation at the time of the worldwide flood. Observed by 
the whole creation, this world became the arena of the universal conflict, out of which the 
God of love will ultimately be vindicated. To assist His people in this controversy, Christ 




The Great Controversy precedes the creation of this world meaning that the universe must 
already have been in existence before the “days” of Genesis 1. Davidson only obliquely 
references the notion of a pre-existing universe in relation to the Great Controversy theme. 
After suggesting that the creation of planet earth has a “special significance attached to it by 
God,” he adds that this idea is further illuminated “by all the onlooking ‘sons of God’ and 
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‘morning stars’ (unfallen inhabitants of the universe, Job 38:7).”
793
 Canale is more explicit in 
connecting the logic of the passive gap theory to the Great Controversy:  
The existence of the angelic host serving God before the creation of the world gives time for 
Lucifer’s rebellion against God’s design of creation in Christ [meaning the plan for the 
creation of planet earth] to develop, mature, and spread to other angelic beings (2 Peter 2:4; 
Jude 1:6). Thus he [sic] became Satan the murderer and the Father of lies in Genesis 3:1.
794 
The second reason is in order to find some sort of accord with the “billions of years” 
that modern science suggests for the age of the universe (this, notwithstanding the fact that 
there is no similar accord with regard to the age of the earth or, at least, life on the earth). It is 
not that either Davidson or Canale specifically suggest this as a motivation (after all they are 
claiming to operate under a principle of sola scriptura), but it is hard to draw any other 
conclusion from their parenthetical statements suggesting that the passive gap could be 
“millions” or, even, “billions” of years in duration.
795
 However, one should give Davidson 
due credit as he is not unequivocal in his stance, stating that he only has a “preference” for 
the passive gap theory: “Despite my preference for the passive gap over the no gap theory, I 
acknowledge a possible openness of Gen 1:1-2 that allows for either option.” He then goes on 
to acknowledge that one can, via the passive gap theory, allow for a far longer chronology 




Both the passive gap and no gap theories, however, are tied to the notion of the 
progression of historical days of 24 hours each. But, as with khôra, it seems to me that 
Genesis 1:2 cannot be tied to any sense of time. History is measured by events that unfold 
over time. If there are no events—absolutely no activity, no change, no objective or external 
means to measure a change—then there can be no history, no entry can be made in a text 
book, no inscription to describe a “happening.” Perhaps, one may wish to argue that a 
watching God could perhaps record the duration of this nothingness, but this is not explicitly 
stated or necessarily implied. God in the shape of the “Spirit of God” has been placed within 
the system as being in a state of inactivity. The nothingness awaits inscription and in the 
context of Genesis 1:2, this inscription is the creation of the heavens and the earth, but within 
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Genesis 1:2 the Spirit hovering upon the face of the waters is an inscription upon the 
nothingness, as indeed is “the darkness upon the face of the deep.” There is no objective 
place outside of the void. In this sense it is infinite in extent, though, of course, it fills neither 
space nor time.  
For Canale, “the God of Scripture is not timeless but infinitely and analogously 
temporal, He [sic] creates and saves acting directly from within the sequence of natural and 
human historical events.”
797
 Hence every story in the Bible “forms part not only of the history 
of God, but also of the history of our planet.”
798
 Canale rejects the various views of 
“Christian theologians” who “have come to believe that God’s act of creation did not take 
place in history” and have postulated alternatives such as “myth [Bultmann], saga [Barth] or 
literary framework [Gibson].”
799
 Canale holds that one cannot relinquish the historical nature 
of creation without at the same time abandoning “the biblical history of redemption and along 




Canale, hence, presents an interpretive framework (historical) that tends to exclude 
others (myth, saga and literary framework). This he does by implying that any other position 
is simultaneously arguing that the creation narrative has no relation to reality. Briefly 
examining Karl Barth’s notion of saga is illuminating.
801
 Barth treads a line between myth 
and history that never totally affirms or rejects either. Barth’s argument stems from the very 
idea of the creation of everything that is: “If we take this idea seriously, it must be at once 
clear that we are not confronted by a realm which in any sense may be accessible to human 
view or even to human thought.” Hence Barth can acknowledge natural science which “may 
tell us the tale of the millions of years in which the cosmic process has gone,” but on the 
other hand cannot comment with regard to the “sheer beginning, with which the concept of 
creation and the Creator has to do.” For the same reason creation myths are excluded since 
“at best a myth may be a parallel to exact science; that is, a myth has to do with viewing what 
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has always existed and will exist.” Myths are proclaimed in order to confront the problems 
that are common to humanity. “Myth considers the world as it were from its frontier, but 
always the world which already exists. There is no creation myth because creation as such is 
simply not accessible to myth.” But in the same way, creation is not accessible to history: 
“The Bible speaks in Genesis 1 and 2 of events which lie outside of historical knowledge.” 
Since the biblical creation story is neither myth nor history, Barth finds a third way which he 
names “saga.” But saga is neither a wholesale rejection of myth nor that of history. With 
regard to myth “we can say that certain mythical elements are to be found there.” With regard 
to history, while it may “lie outside of our historical knowledge” it “is related to history. In 
fact, the wonderful thing about the biblical creation narratives is that they stand in strict 




What Canale appears to mean by historical is that “it really happened.” But clearly 
any theologian who is going to postulate that the origin of creation is God, is not going to 
argue whether it actually happened or not. The presence of creation itself serves as evidence 
enough. The point for Barth is that, strictly speaking, the event of creation cannot be properly 
designated as history since it “lies outside of historical knowledge.” He does not mean to say 
that there was no creation event. In this regard, one need just briefly note the limitations of 
Genesis 1 when regarded as a historical record. While it is true that history may be identified 
with events within a stream of time and Genesis 1 contains both of these elements, there is 
nevertheless an internal paradox. How is one to record that a day (of twenty-four hours) has 
elapsed, when the very concept of a day does not yet exist? How is one to designate the 
passage of time by evening and morning, when there is no such thing as evening and 
morning? It scarcely needs mentioning that to measure these things, one requires an intact 
solar system, something that did not exist until the fourth day (Genesis 1:14-19)—the 
implication being, quite obviously, that only by the fifth day could one begin to speak of the 
passage of time in this manner. So while traditional SDA views of the creation week may 
insist on a literal reading of Genesis 1, these views also have to contend with the fact that 
much of what is said is questionable from a literal and historical perspective. For example, 
when the text informs us that “there was evening and there was morning” for the first, second 
and third days, we simultaneously know that this cannot literally be the case. Paradoxes of 
this nature are simply a consequence of defining an event anterior to history as historical. 
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Genesis 1:2 presents us with the barren desert within the desert, upon which not only 
the creative actions of God are inscribed as well as the content of this creation (the heavens 
and the earth), but also the very discourse itself that strives to unpack what is understood and 
misunderstood, what is possible and impossible, what is true and false, what is probable and 
improbable. The only thing that is excluded is the notion of exclusion that would suggest that 
what is inscribed and implied by the heavens and the earth is not the universe in its totality.  
3.3. Playing with Genesis 1 
All that really remains in this dissertation is to allow the play of différance to happen, 
to allow the other to emerge. Even in the narrowest of definitions différance cannot be 
avoided. The effort within certain significant factions in Seventh-day Adventism is to reduce 
the interpretations of Genesis 1 to a single possible truth. This endeavour has the goal of 
sacralising the idea of the “days” in Genesis 1 as being literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour 
days, and through this sacred affirmation, settling on a single distinct interpretation that 
cannot be gainsaid. However, ideas of khôra and différance cannot be escaped and it is here 
that the other is preserved. Despite all efforts to arrive at a single truth that excludes all 
others, these efforts cannot ultimately be sustained. I will endeavour to show how obvious 
différance really is and how fragile claims to a single ultimate truth really are. There is 
nothing clever in what remains in this dissertation. It is just play, and in and of itself it would 
be fun, were it not for the fact that those who strive to crystallise the SDA beliefs around a 
single truth do so in order to exclude all those who do not agree. This is not, therefore, just a 
game with words and interpretations, it is about the lives of real people and about affirming 
the validity of their faith (as an alternative), even though their faith differs. A goal of this 
dissertation is, therefore, to affirm along with the Church founders (and, indeed, sustained in 
the heterogeneous nature of the Church today) that Seventh-day Adventism should not be 
governed by a single, unforgiving, unbending, inviolable, logocentric affirmation about 
“days.” Within the Church, there is room for something different; there is space for the other. 
3.3.1. Seventh-day Adventism: Fundamental Belief #6 
Fundamental belief #6 (Creation) as outlined in the 17
th
 edition of the Seventh-day 












God is Creator of all things, and has revealed in Scripture the authentic account of His 
creative activity. In six days the Lord made “the heaven and the earth” and all living things 
upon the earth, and rested on the seventh day of that first week. Thus He established the 
Sabbath as a perpetual memorial of His completed creative work. The first man and woman 
were made in the image of God as the crowning work of Creation, given dominion over the 
world, and charged with responsibility to care for it. When the world was finished it was 
“very good,” declaring the glory of God.
803
 
It is quite evident that the belief in its current form does not allow for the passive gap 
theory postulated as a “preference” by Richard Davidson, and acknowledged as a biblically 
valid possibility by Fernando Canale. The second sentence states that “in six days the Lord 
made ‘the heaven and the earth.’” This clearly conflates the creation of heaven and earth 
(Genesis 1:1) and the creation outlined in Genesis 1:3-2:1 into a single creative event, since 
the creation of “the heaven and the earth” (Genesis 1:1) are now explicitly included in the 
creation week. It is worth noting that neither Canale nor Davidson have been taken to task for 
exhibiting their bias in favour of a preference that is at odds with the fundamental beliefs of 
the SDA Church as they are currently outlined.
804
 There is room to move in SDA theological 
circles. 
As I have noted, this fundamental belief was officially examined: “Because of the 
pervasive and growing influence of the theory of evolution, the General Conference 
Executive Committee [of the Seventh-day Adventist Church] (2001 Annual Council) 
authorized a three-year series of Faith and Science conferences.”
805
 This series of Faith and 
Science conferences occurred during the period 2002-2004 and produced a report entitled 
“An Affirmation of Creation.” This document is to be found as an Official Statement on the 
official website of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists 
(http://www.adventist.org/). The website includes, in order of primacy, Fundamental Beliefs, 
Official Statements and Guidelines. With regard to fundamental belief #6, the Faith and 
Science conferences concluded: 
Concern has been expressed regarding what some see as ambiguity in the phrase “In six days” 
found in the church’s statement of belief on creation. It is felt that the intended meaning (that 
the six-day creation described in Genesis was accomplished in a literal and historical week) is 
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unmentioned. This situation allows for uncertainty about what the church actually believes. 
Further, it provides room for other explanations of creation to be accommodated in the text. 
There is a desire for the voice of the church to be heard in bringing added clarity to what is 
really meant in Fundamental Belief #6.
806
 
This statement is curious since the writers of “An Affirmation of Creation” wish to 
add “clarity to what is really meant [emphasis added] in Fundamental Belief #6” and that 
“the intended meaning (that the six day creation described in Genesis was accomplished in a 
literal and historical week) is unmentioned.” While it is no doubt true that the “six days” of 
fundamental belief #6, as it is currently formulated, could mean “a literal and historical 
week,” the apparent dilemma is that it also allows for other possible meanings. But the 
wording of fundamental belief #6 is supposed to be derived from Scripture. The preamble to 
the 28 fundamental beliefs notes this much: 
Seventh-day Adventists accept the Bible as their only creed and hold certain fundamental 
beliefs to be the teaching of the Holy Scriptures. These beliefs, as set forth here, constitute the 
church’s understanding and expression of the teaching of Scripture. Revision of these 
statements may be expected at a General Conference session when the church is led by the 
Holy Spirit to a fuller understanding of Bible truth or finds better language in which to 
express the teachings of God’s Holy Word.
807
 
Although the authors of “An Affirmation of Creation” seem to hold that the intention 
of Genesis 1 is to describe “a literal and historical week,” it should also be stressed that 
Genesis 1 does not explicitly state this. In fact, fundamental belief #6 roughly uses the 
wording of Genesis 1 and if the fundamental belief “provides room for other explanations of 
creation to be accommodated in the text” then so does Genesis 1. While it is possible that the 
Adventists who formulated fundamental belief #6 may well have really meant “that the six 
day creation described in Genesis was accomplished in a literal and historical week,” it is also 
fair to say that they followed the Bible wording in order to minimise the interpretive nature of 
their task. 
On 13 October 2004, the General Conference Executive Committee voted “an 
affirmation” of “An Affirmation of Creation” as an additional official statement which 
reiterated in précis exactly the same points. It included the following explicit ratification:  
We strongly endorse the document's affirmation of our historic, biblical position of belief in a 
literal, recent, six-day Creation. . . . We reaffirm the Seventh-day Adventist understanding of 
the historicity of Genesis 1-11: that the seven days of the Creation account were literal 24-
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hour days forming a week identical in time to what we now experience as a week; and that the 
Flood was global in nature.
808
 
The Sabbath (by which is meant Saturday) is a core belief of the SDA Church. In an 
SDA context, the Sabbath is sacred. It is not possible to reject the Sabbath and remain an 
SDA. It is not merely embodied as a specific belief among the SDA fundamental beliefs,
809
 
but also serves as one of the principal identifying characteristics of the Church. This belief is 
frequently understood to be derived from the creation narrative as it is explicated in 
Genesis 1:1-2:3. Since the Sabbath occurs every seventh day and, according to Exodus 20:8-
11, is derived from the “seven day” creation narrative of Genesis 1, this is taken to mean that 
creation must have been a “literal” seven day process as well, that is, seven consecutive 24 
hour days. 
This idea has been questioned (though, perhaps, not directly) by a certain sector of the 
SDA Church, most evidently by biology teachers and the like, who cannot reconcile the 
evidence of evolutionary theory with this literal reading of the creation narrative together 
with the associated short chronology of earth history (between 6000 and 10000 years). This 
dilemma has caused a kind of shoring up by the more conservative and traditional SDA 
believers (up to the highest level of Church leadership) as they attempt to buttress the so-
called “traditional” SDA understanding against the supposed onslaught of theistic evolution. 
On 7 July 2010 the General Conference of the SDA Church released a statement that 
affirmed that the SDA Church believes “that the biblical events recorded in Genesis 1-11, 
including the special creation of human beings, are historical and recent, that the seven days 
of creation were literal 24-hours forming a literal week, and that the Flood was global in 
nature.”
810
 The General Conference Report of the Session then continues:  
The day began with a discussion on an item that was not in the original GC agenda, but with 
the change of regime
811
 it was added. It was on the issue of Creation and Fundamental Belief 
6 that was voted in1980 in Indianapolis. There was a motion to reaffirm the more extensive 
2004 Statement [“An Affirmation of Creation” quoted above] and to initiate the process of 
integrating both Statements. The fact is that the 6th Fundamental Belief does not include a 
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recent, 24-hour literal day Creation, and the 2004 Statement does. Ted Wilson spoke at length 
to this. So the proposal was to begin a 5-year process to change Fundamental Belief 6 . . . . 
Both motions on Creation passed overwhelmingly and the delegates affirmed the strong 2004 
Statement and voted to begin the 5 year process to change Fundamental Belief 6 to express 
less ambiguity as to the literal creation event.
812
 
Ted Wilson (the current General Conference President of the SDA Church) was the prime 
instigator of this motion: 
In his first major initiative since becoming president, Wilson urged delegates to endorse a 
response to the 2004 Annual Council affirmation “that the seven days of the Creation account 
were literal 24-hour days forming a week identical in time to what we now experience as a 
week; and that the Flood was global in nature.”
813
 
Because of the “ambiguity as to the literal creation event” in fundamental belief #6 it 
has been possible (within certain limits it must be acknowledged) for SDAs and SDA 
academics to subscribe to a form of theistic evolution and remain in SDA employ. The goal 
of rewording belief #6 is to remove this possibility, thereby excluding (and possibly firing) 
those who cannot subscribe to the proposed narrowing of the belief. In essence, then, since 
belief #6 “does not include a recent, 24-hour literal day Creation” the belief needs to be 
rewritten to include this. This will be a “five year process to change Fundamental Belief 6” 
and amounts to a process of making sacred. The change indicates a sacralising (in the sense 
that these ideas are incorporated in the fundamental beliefs) of at least two things: 1) the 
recent (around 6000 to 10 000 years ago) creation of the Earth,
814
 and 2) that the days of 
Genesis 1 represent a week of seven literal, consecutive 24 hour days. In effect, what is 
unfolding is the making sacred of a certain hermeneutical method that is used to establish the 
Sabbath. Genesis 1-11 is seen to describe historical events in a literal manner. Thus, not only 
is Genesis 1-11 a sacred text (obviously as part of the Bible which forms the sacred text for 
the SDA Church), but the hermeneutical method that will draw the desired conclusions is also 
to be considered sacred. 
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It is not as though the move to change fundamental belief #6 has been unopposed. 
Ben Clausen, a staff member (“pursuing research in the area of nuclear physics”) of the 
Geoscience Research Institute (GRI)—“an official institute of the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church”
815
 having as a major component of its purview, the conflict “between the theory of 
evolution with its billions of years for the progressive development of life and the biblical 
account of the creation of life by God in six literal days a few thousand years ago”—stated 
reservations regarding the proposed changes. Clausen observed that “it is impossible [to 
teach] . . . scientifically rigorous exposure to [an] affirmation of our historic belief in a literal, 
recent six-day creation. . . . There are no available models.”
816 
 
The principal reason that no leeway in interpretation can be permitted in either 
fundamental belief #6 or, indeed, Genesis 1 is because of the primacy of the Sabbath in SDA 




3.3.2. The Profane Other 
The need to insist that Genesis 1 expresses literal days has resulted in much exegetical 
analysis amongst certain SDA scholars: “The Hebrew word translated day in Genesis 1 is 
yom. When yom is accompanied by a definite number, it always means a literal 24-hour day 
(e.g. Gen.7:11; Ex. 16:1).”
818
  
Gerhard Hasel in “The ‘Days’ of Creation in Genesis 1: Literal ‘Days’ or Figurative 
‘Periods/Epochs’ of Time?” concludes quite a technical analysis of Genesis 1 “with 10 
considerations that support the concept of a literal creation week with seven consecutive 24-
hour days.”
819
 Hasel’s argument is presented as a reaction to what he names “broad 
concordists” who in his view “attempt to interpret the ‘days’ of the Genesis creation account 
in nonliteral ways, in order to harmonize the long ages called for by the evolutionary theory 
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 Hasel insists “that Genesis 1 is a factual account of 
the origin of the livable world. The biblical record is accurate, authentic and historical.”
822
 
There are two different claims that Hasel makes with regard to the nature of Genesis 1. The 
first is that it should be read literally, while the second claims that it is a historical record. In 
order to bolster these claims, Hasel strives to debunk any alternative “literary genre 
categories.” In this regard, Hasel gives the following précis of some “major representative 
examples.” 
Karl Barth, the father of neo-orthodox theology, regards Genesis1, 2 as “saga” and of course, 
nonhistorical. S. H. Hooke, the leader of the myth–and-ritual school, says that the Genesis 
creation account is a “cultic liturgy.” Gordon Wenham, a neo-evangelical scholar, believes it 
to be a “hymn.” Walter Brueggemann, a liberal concordist, suggests that it is a “poem.” Claus 
Westermann, a form critic, calls it a “narrative.” Gerhard von Rad, a tradition critic, 




Hasel uses a series of (apparently) prejudicial labels—neo-orthodox, myth-and-ritual 
school, neo-evangelical, liberal concordist and tradition critic—in order, it seems, to dismiss 
each of these positions, since none are examined with regard to their actual content. This 
diversity of views, Hasel concludes, highlight that “there is no consensus on the literary 
nature of Genesis 1” which therefore should make “the careful interpreter” cautious to “avoid 
jumping on the bandwagon of literary genre identification in an attempt to redefine the literal 
intent of Genesis 1.”
824
 It should be noted that while Hasel claims that there is “no 
consensus,” these different approaches to Genesis 1 are not necessarily mutually exclusive as 
Hasel seems to imply. Furthermore, it is quite evident that distinctions between 
interpretations rest not so much on each particular analysis of Genesis 1 as the theological 
reasoning that undergirds them. If one takes several advocates from differing theological 
schools of thought it would be somewhat surprising if they did find consensus. There is also a 
barely veiled arrogance in Hasel’s inference that all who engage in this type of hermeneutical 
analysis are “not careful interpreters.” More than this, though, it is important not to miss 
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Hasel’s principal point which admits that “interpreters following the ‘literary genre’ . . . 
interpret the ‘days’ of creation in a literal and grammatical way.”
825
 The problem is not that 
they don’t read the text literally, but rather that they reject the texts historicity: 
The “literary genre” approach restricts the meaning of Genesis 1 to a thought form that does 
not demand a factual, historical reading of what took place . . . . [It] thus prevents [Genesis] 
from informing modern readers on how, in what manner, and in what time God created the 
word. Instead, it simply wishes to affirm minimalistically that God is Creator. And that 
affirmation is meant to be a theological, non-scientific statement, with no impact on how the 
world and universe came into being and developed subsequently.
826
 
Hasel then spends the bulk of his article arguing that the Hebrew word for “day”—
yom—in the context of Genesis 1 “can mean only a literal ‘day’ of 24 hours.”
827
 His 
arguments revolve around a grammatical analysis of the manner in which the word appears in 
Genesis 1 and its implied meaning based on similar usages in the remainder of the Bible. The 
problem that Hasel faces is that establishing that Genesis 1 refers to literal 24 hour days does 
not establish its historicity. Hasel sets up his essay as an argument against what has been 
termed the day-age theory which attempts to correlate “the ‘creation days’ with geological 
epochs.”
828
 But this is scarcely a view that is particularly prevalent and in itself is little more 
than a variation on biblical literalism. Since in the mind of God “a thousand years is like a 
day” (Psalm 90:4 cf. 2 Peter 3:8), a “day” from a biblical perspective can be interpreted as an 
indefinable period of time. But Hasel is concerned to arrive at a single conclusion, which is 
that all other interpretations are invalid and for this reason spends a couple of pages 
discrediting the validity of paralleling the “days” in Psalm 90:4 and 2 Peter 3:8 with the 
“days” in Genesis 1.
829
 Nevertheless, Hasel is rigorous in his analysis and his contribution to 
the discourse revolving around the interpretation of Genesis 1 (particularly in an SDA 
context) is one that should not be summarily dismissed. 
Hasel is just one example of SDA apologetics on this issue. Questions on Doctrine, 
for example, as early as 1957, stated: “All Seventh-day Adventists, as creationists, believe in 
the Genesis record of a fiat creation (Gen. 1:1 to 2:2) with the seventh day as God’s recorded 
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and attested rest day, and the Sabbath given as the perpetual memorial of that creation.”
830
 
There is a perceived attack on this belief that stems from the theory of evolution rather than 
theological or exegetical reasoning. So even though SDA apologists, such as Hasel, will 
attack all other interpretations of Genesis 1, these “other” interpretations are, in general, 
considered to be compromises to the might of the scientific community. 
Fernando Canale, for example, argues that in order for a Christian to believe in both 
God and evolution, it is necessary to postulate that God exists outside of time (in order to rid 
the creation narrative of meaning literal days since time is inconsequential to a timeless god). 
Canale argues that while Christians, in general, may feel comfortable doing this, SDAs do not 
have this liberty. This is because the entire SDA belief system is founded on the notion of a 
historical God. It is not merely the creation story and the Sabbath that is affected by this, but 
also other beliefs. Canale explicitly mentions the Great Controversy—fundamental belief 
#8—but it is relatively simple to follow his logic in this regard as other distinctives of 
Adventism clearly fall into this category, although it is not necessary to unpack these here. 
For Canale, any sort of compromise in the direction of evolutionary theory threatens the very 
existence of the SDA Church: 
Harmonizing Scripture to evolution, then, requires the harmonization of the Adventist 
theological method to the always-changing dictates of human science and tradition. In turn, 
methodological changes will require a reformulation of the entire corpus of Adventist doctrine 
and, eventually, the reformulation of all 27 fundamental beliefs [this work was published in 
2005, the same year that a 28
th
 fundamental belief was added]. Before seeking harmonization 
between the creation and evolution metanarratives, then, Adventists should seriously think 
whether they are willing to give up the very reason for their existence as a church.
831
 
To bolster his argument, Canale adds an endnote referencing Ellen White, who is accorded 
prophetic status in the SDA Church: 
But God will have a people upon the earth to maintain the Bible, and the Bible only, as the 
standard of all doctrines and the basis for all reforms. The opinion of learned men [sic], the 
deductions of science, the creeds or decisions of ecclesiastical councils, as numerous and 
discordant as are the churches which they represent, the voice of the majority—not one nor all 
of these should be regarded as evidence for or against any point of religious faith. Before 
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With this understanding, the disagreement that many SDA creationists have with the 
theory of evolution is not something that is open to any debate or negotiation; it is raised to 
the level of a component of the conflict between Christ and Satan (fundamental belief #8 The 
Great Controversy). Norman Gulley, a highly regarded SDA academic, states categorically: 
“Seventh-day Adventists believe that Satan lies behind the various forms of evolutionary 
theory [emphasis added] locked in the naturalistic worldview.”
833
 Seventh-day Adventists 
Believe connects belief in the theory of evolution to the fall of humanity in Genesis 3:  
Ever since Creation Satan has confused many by weakening confidence in the scriptural 
accounts of the origins of the human race and man’s [sic] fall. One could call evolution the 
‘natural’ view of humanity, a view based on the assumptions that life began by chance and 




The antagonism between SDA theology and modern science is even more explicitly 
formulated in apocalyptic terms. At the heart of SDA proclamations of the Gospel is 
fundamental belief #13 “The Remnant and its Mission:” 
The universal church is composed of all who truly believe in Christ, but in the last days, a 
time of widespread apostasy, a remnant has been called out to keep the commandments of 
God and the faith of Jesus. This remnant announces the arrival of the judgment hour, 
proclaims salvation through Christ, and heralds the approach of His second advent. This 
proclamation is symbolized by the three angels of Revelation 14 [emphasis added]; it 
coincides with the work of judgment in heaven and results in a work of repentance and reform 
on earth. Every believer is called to have a personal part in this worldwide witness.
835
 
Although, somewhat concealed in the midst of the 28 fundamental beliefs, “the three 
angels’ messages” are considered a crucial distinctive component of the SDA mission. This is 
explicitly stated on the official SDA website: “The mission of the Seventh-day Adventist 
Church . . . is to proclaim to all people the everlasting gospel in the context of the Three 
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Angels’ messages of Revelation 14:6-12.”
836
 It is via the message of the first of these three 
angels (Revelation 14:7), that the creation/evolution conflict becomes a part of SDA 
apocalypticism. John T. Baldwin notes that the Sabbath commandment as outlined in 
Exodus 20:8-11 references the creation narrative in Genesis 1 in the same manner as 





Diagram showing how Revelation 14:7 implies a six-day creation cosmogony/worldview. 
Exodus 20:11 (Old Testament) Revelation 14:7 (New Testament) 
“For in six days the Lord (1) made the (2) 
heavens and the (3) earth, the (4) seas and all 
that is in them.” 
“Worship him who [in six days] (1) made the 
(2) heavens and the (3) earth and (4) sea and 
springs of waters.” 
 
For Baldwin, the indicated “four verbal parallels” clearly verify that although “in six 
days” is not present in Revelation 14:7, it is implied: “The above exegetical analyses indicate 
that Revelation 14:7 is a divinely intended first-century confirmation of the six-day creation 
worldview.”
838
 This, then, as previously noted, locates the issue of creation in the 
“apocalyptic end-time sweep of Revelation 12-14.”
839
 This, for Baldwin, indicates that 
evolutionary theory is to be equated with “the dragon” (Revelation 12:9) and “the two beasts 
of chapter 13” who seek “to enforce a global system of false worship.”
840
 The three angels, 
however, “passionately summon everyone to worship the only true God. This indicates the 
end-time relevance of the first message of Revelation 14.”
841
  
Baldwin takes his point even further to the issue of hermeneutics claiming that an 
“implication of the cosmology of verse 7 is its capacity to illustrate how God desires that we 
interpret the Bible. The passage encourages us to return to a distinctive biblical hermeneutic.” 
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Baldwin suggests that Revelation 14:7 “reminds us that we need to interpret the Bible 
literally and historically when called for by the text.”
842
 
In addition, because it was Jesus who appeared in the visions (Rev. 1:1, 10, 12, 17, 18), it 
means that in Revelation 14:7 none other than the resurrected Lord Himself interprets 
Genesis 1 literally, thus illustrating Christ’s preferred post-Resurrection method of Bible 
hermeneutics. He offers it as a model for us today. We too would do well to understand the 
Bible literally when common sense tells that is what a passage intends, just as Jesus does here. 
Because the book of Revelation speaks to us in the last days and uses this type of 
hermeneutics, it strongly suggests that it is one divinely intended for the end-time.
843
 
This appeal for literal and historical interpretations as the hermeneutic preferred by 
Jesus on the basis of apocalyptic literature (which even SDAs admit is largely a book of 
symbols requiring interpretation)
844
 and “common sense” demonstrates how fundamentally 
incompatible any other hermeneutic is perceived to be by this strand of SDA thought. Not 
only is the specific literal and historical interpretation of Genesis 1 (six consecutive 24-hour 
days) sacred, but also the hermeneutic that arrives at this conclusion is sacred—it is the 
hermeneutic employed by Jesus. Added to this is the fact that all other interpretations of 
Genesis 1 along with their associated hermeneutics are the work of Satan. Every other is 
profane. The logic of Baldwin’s arguments may be uniquely his, but his conclusions are 
nevertheless consistent with mainstream SDA apocalypticism. In its commentary on 
Revelation 14:7, the Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary notes: 
The appeal to worship God as Creator has become especially timely in the years following the 
initial preaching of the first angel’s message, because of the rapid spread of evolution. 
Furthermore, the call to worship the God of heaven as Creator of all things implies that due 
heed be given to the sign of God’s creative works—the Sabbath of the Lord (see on Ex. 20:8-
11). If the Sabbath had be n kept as God intended, it would have served as a great safeguard 
against infidelity and e olution.
845
 
It is quite clear, then, that any interpretation of Genesis 1 must employ this “sacred” 
hermeneutic. It is absolutely pointless to argue that any other hermeneutic is a possibility, 
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because all other hermeneutics are profane, that is, of the devil. Coupled to this, the essence 
of the interpretation that needs to be addressed is the notion of six consecutive 24-hour days.  
The parameters must be narrowed even further. Not only am I operating within a 
historical and literal hermeneutical framework, I am also provided with the necessary 
interpretation within the framework, namely, that the days of Genesis 1 are consecutive 24-
hour days. It is only within a discourse that maintains these two fundamentals—the 
hermeneutic and the resultant interpretation—as a priori principles that the conversation can 
continue. To step anywhere else is to become the profane other. 
If one insists that the week of Genesis 1 is identical (that is literally and historically) 
to a week that one experiences today, and is not merely analogous to a week of seven days, 
then one is immediately confronted with a paradox. Since the very notion of a day requires 
that the earth rotates on its axis as it revolves around the sun, it must immediately be admitted 
that the first “day” that has the possibility of being literally and historically identical to the 
manner in which a current day is measured and experienced, is the fifth day of Genesis 1. 
This is simply because the sun was created on the fourth day:  
And God said, “Let there be light in the expanse of the sky to separate the day from the night, 
and let them serve as signs to mark seasons and days and years, and let them be lights in the 
expanse of the sky to give light on the earth.” And it was so. God made two great lights—the 
greater light to govern the day and the lesser light to govern the night. [God] also made the 
stars. God set them in the expanse of the sky to give light on the earth, to govern the day and 
the night, and to separate light from darkness. And God saw that it was good. And there was 
evening, and there was morning—the fourth day.
846
 
It should be noted, that no SDA interpreter of any significance claims that these “two 
great lights” do not refer to the sun and the moon. If one compares the above with the 
description of the first day, both a literal and a historical interpretation are questionable: 
“And God said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light. God saw that the light was good, and 
[God] separated the light from the darkness. God called the light ‘day’, and the darkness 
[God] called ‘night’. And there was evening, and there was morning—the first day.”
847
 Since 
there is no sun on the first day, the designation of “evening and morning” to this day is 
something of a curiosity. What does it mean? It is not a literal and historical record of events 
as they occurred on earth. This is because a literal reading of the text precludes this 
possibility. One could argue that the first day is analogous to a day as we experience it, but 
our sacred hermeneutic does not allow us that leeway, as much as we may now wish to break 
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faith with what has been named sacred. The hermeneutic and the interpretation (literal and 
historical) do not allow for the notion of “analogous.” It tells us that there actually was 
evening and morning (literally) and that this marked the passage of the first (historical) day. 
But Genesis 1:14 points out that the great lights which “mark [emphasis added] seasons and 
days and years” only appeared on the fourth day. Quite clearly, if one is to read Genesis 1 
literally and historically, there was not evening and morning (on earth) for the first three days 
of creation week, when quite clearly the text says that there was. Also, it is only on earth that 
days are 24 hours in length (approximately). One may wish to argue that God acted as a 
“metaphorical light-bulb”
848
 hovering over the earth, thereby creating the illusion of evening 
and morning, but to descend into such whimsical speculation is scarcely a compelling basis 
for doctrinal proclamations.  
The creation week of Genesis 1 is without precedent, but the notion that it sets the 
precedent for the nature of all ensuing weeks introduces a paradox with no obvious resolution 
in a literal/historical hermeneutical framework. In this regard, I am referring purely to its 
chronology—by which, in part at least, is what is meant by its historicity. The claim is that 
the length of time of creation week is literally the same length of time for every week since, 
from Sabbath to Sabbath. The reason that we can have certainty that our weeks are the same 
length as creation week is that each day is marked out via the setting and rising sun, evening 
and morning. But the dilemma is that the only week that does not conform to this marking of 
time is the week that sets that precedent. Each day of creation week was not marked by a 
setting and rising sun, evening and morning. Creation week is unique, a singular exception, in 
the manner that its chronology is measured. It is true that each day, from the first day to the 
sixth, is accompanied by the defining phrase: “And there was evening and there was 
morning . . .” (Genesis 1:5, 8, 13, 19, 23, 31). It is reasonable to presume a consistent 
meaning for each of these verses. So the designation “there was evening and there was 
morning” has the same meaning whether, for example, it is applied to the first day (where 
there was no sun) or the sixth day (by which stage the sun had been created). But since this 
description clearly cannot literally apply to the sun for the first day (although it could be 
meant analogously), then this meaning must equally apply to the sixth day (it cannot be 
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meant literally—even though the sun had been created—since its meaning is already 
established). The point is an obvious one, in terms of the timing of creation week, if we are to 
read it literally and historically, the only thing we can say for certain is that it is unlike the 
timing of all subsequent weeks. 
If certain SDAs wish to insist that what is meant by “evening and morning” is the 
same as a day that may be said to exist after the fourth day, then a crack appears in the sacred 
literal and historical hermeneutic that has been championed as inviolable. The profane other, 
in the guise of analogy, steps through the crack to solve the self-generated hermeneutical 
conundrum. If one is to absolutely insist that the only legitimate hermeneutic for reading 
Genesis 1 is literal and historical, and thereby exclude all other interpretations, something 
almost incongruous happens. The very hermeneutic that is sacralised as the one-and-only, 
excludes not only all other interpretations, it excludes itself. There is no space; there is no 
khôra for any interpretation; not even the interpretation that searches for “literal-historical-
six-24-hour-consecutive-days.” 
What is meant by this? Khôra, as described by Derrida, admits all interpretations and 
all hermeneutics, one might say, indiscriminately. This does not speak to the validity of these 
interpretations; it merely admits them into the discourse. A particular interpretation may be 
dismissed and rejected as incoherent, illogical, and fanciful, but this very dismissal and 
rejection exists as part of the discourse only in tandem with that which it strives to negate. All 
of this is inscribed on khôra. The moment a hermeneutic or interpretation is sacralised as the 
only legitimate one; it is simultaneously trying to step outside of khôra, to escape its clutches 
as it were. But this is impossible. This type of thinking could be described as, possibly, hiding 
in one of the folds of khôra,
849
 concealing itself in the darkness from the remainder of the 
discourse. But in order to make itself understood to itself, whether knowingly or 
unknowingly, it leans on other parts of the discourse. This is the crack through which 
“analogy” shines in order to enable the literal and historical reading of Genesis 1 to find 
coherence with itself. But at the same time it shatters it, because it has admitted the profane 
other. This other (analogy) is the very thing that the literal and historical hermeneutic wished 
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to exclude and with it come all of its companions: myth, saga, allegory, metaphor, allusion, 
typology and, it must be said, modern science. 
But while it is impossible to escape khôra, there is another step that can be taken. On 
closer examination the interpretation or possibly the intra-lingual translation of the “days” of 
Genesis 1 into literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour days could be likened to Derrida’s 
detour: pas de sens. On the one hand, in and of itself, the statement “six literal, historical, 
consecutive 24-hour days” in the context of Genesis 1 is, according to its self-definition, of 
(de) no (pas) meaning (sens). But on the other hand, if it is allowed to step beyond itself 
towards another—any other—it is taking a step (pas) of (de) meaning (sens). The step away 
is like a dance step that in the moment forgets itself as it glimpses the other. Once glimpsed 
there is no going back. This is why the step that marks the centre is resolute and angry and 
fearful. It cannot even acknowledge the other, let alone consider its validity. There is no 
meaning, only the repetitive phrase at the centre which must be held at any cost—sacrificing 
the other is a small price to pay. 
3.3.3. Playing with Science 
As I have continually reiterated, the SDA interpretation of Genesis 1 as literal and 
historical is really a backlash to the perceived threat of the theory of evolution that serves to 
undermine not only the short chronology of the earth but also the idea of a weeklong creation 
event. As Canale says: 
During the Faith and Science International Conference no argument or evidence has been 
presented that may intellectually compel the Church to adopt the deep time/evolutionary 
version of the history of life on our planet. Consequently, Adventists need to reaffirm the fact 
that a theological understanding of Genesis 1 as describing the literal-historical-six-24-hour-
consecutive-days period through which God created out planet is essential to the theological 
thinking of Scripture, and therefore, to the harmonious system of truth that gave rise to 
Adventism and its global mission.
850
 
For Canale, the theological consequences of accepting “the deep time/evolutionary version of 
the history of life on our planet” are so dire as to undermine the very basis for the existence 
of the SDA Church.
851
 I do not concur with Canale’s fears, since, as I have previously 
indicated, there is a heterogeneity that has pervaded Adventism from its earliest years and 
still persists to the present day. Nevertheless, Canale basically affirms something that is 
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relatively obvious when worldviews collide: our scientific worldview affects our theological 
worldview. In the case of “deep time/evolutionary” science the theological effects are not 
insignificant. 
But one must also acknowledge that if scientific formulations and conclusions affect 
theology, then our theological pronouncements have scientific repercussions. There is, 
perhaps, an inevitable “scientific” conclusion that must be drawn from the SDA affirmation 
“that the seven days of creation were literal 24 hour days forming a literal week”
852
 and its 
connection via Exodus 20 to the Sabbath commandment: “Remember the Sabbath day by 
keeping it holy. . . . For in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all 
that is in them, but he rested on the seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day 
and made it holy.”
853
 
Each week is seen not only as a seven day period (one of the seven days being a rest 
day), but also a week that operates in parallel with creation week. This is evident when one 
considers that the very existence of the SDA Church depends to a relatively significant extent 
on the fact that Sunday, although a seventh day of sorts is not the legitimate seventh day. This 




























Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
 
The illegitimacy of Sunday as the day of rest stems from the fact that it does not 
parallel the seventh day of creation week. In responding to the suggestion that one day in 
seven is the spirit of the commandment (“six-and-one days”) the authors of Questions on 
Doctrine responded:  
                                                          
852
 General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, “Statement on Creation: The Bible’s Worldview” 
(June 23, 2010), http://adventist.org/beliefs/statements/bible-worldview.html (accessed September 7, 2011). 
853
 Ex. 20:8, 11 (NIV). 
854












We dissent from the change of the original wording—the ‘six days’ and the ‘seventh day,’ of 
the fourth commandment of Exodus 20—to the unbiblical expression ‘six-and-one days,’ or a 
mere proportion of time for to us such a change of phrasing involve a definite change of intent 
to which we cannot agree.
855
 
The objection to Sunday as an alternative to Sabbath (Saturday) has found its way into 
SDA eschatology. Although this eschatology is not uniformly accepted by all SDAs, it is 
certainly a dominant view. It revolves around the belief that at some point in the future 
Sunday observance will be “enforced by law” (by Roman Catholicism either directly or 
indirectly), at which point Sunday will become “the mark of the beast” of Revelation 13: 
But when Sunday observance shall be enforced by law, and the world shall be enlightened 
concerning the obligation of the true Sabbath, then whoever shall transgress the command of 
God, to obey a precept which has no higher authority than that of Rome, will thereby honor 
popery above God. . . . As men [sic] then reject the institution which God has declared to be 
the sign of [God’s] authority, and honor in its stead that which Rome has chosen as the token 




This theological reasoning presents the ultimate polarisation between Sabbath and Sunday 
observance. A time will come when all those who observe Sunday as opposed to Sabbath 
will, according to this apocalyptic vision, be, in effect, Satan worshipers. The distinction 
between Sabbath and Sunday could not be more absolute. 
My concern, though, is the precise delineation of days and hours in this rejection of 
Sunday as a legitimate rest day. Since creation week represents, and I use Canale’s wording, 
“literal-historical-six-24-hour-consecutive-days,” there is a question that requires an answer 
so that one can anchor the starting point of the 24 hour period represented by the first day: 
Where was God standing when God created? Of course, I could reiterate that there was no 
sun on the first day, but the point I would like to outline is somewhat different. It is quite 
obvious that every day on the planet does not fall at the same instant owing to the rather 
obvious fact that the earth is spherical. SDAs are particularly aware of this because Sabbath is 
kept globally from sunset to sunset. This means that SDAs worldwide are all keeping Sabbath 
at different times. An SDA in Cape Town will be keeping Sabbath while Sabbath for an SDA 
in San Francisco will only begin around nine hours later. But this cannot be, because each 
literal 24 hour week must be paralleled precisely with the precedent week of creation. But the 
marking of time is given by the sun, which owing to a spherical revolving earth, does not 
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allow for a precise parallel, at least not from sunset to sunset. The commandment is literally 
impossible to obey, unless the earth is flat! “God has given no commandments which cannot 
be obeyed by all.”
857
 This is not intended to be a facetious point. 
Since the days ratchet around one another, there is an imaginary line drawn upon the 
globe called the International Date Line (IDL). This line, running longitudinally through the 
Pacific Ocean designates the point at which each calendar day “begins.” Now although the 
line is a human construct, it is nevertheless instructive with regard to SDA Sabbath 
observance. Since Sunday observance is anathema in SDA circles, but nevertheless is 
alongside the Sabbath in that it occurs 24 hours later, an interesting dilemma occurs at the 
IDL.  
The previous table can be reconstituted (below). One needs to realise what this 
actually means in practice for the notion of the mark of the beast (acceptance of Sunday 
worship once it is enforced by law). A person who observes Sunday rest immediately to the 
west of the IDL will receive the mark of the beast, while observing exactly the same day (the 
same 24 hour period of time) as a Sabbath keeper to the east of the IDL. This is because the 
24 hours on the west of the line named Sunday is the same as the 24 hours on the east of the 
line named Saturday. This is the extreme instance of the simple fact that although there is a 
move in the SDA Church to align the creation week of Genesis 1 with “literal-historical-six-
24-hour-consecutive-days” in order to then align this week with every subsequent week, it is 
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The commandment to keep Sabbath as it was experienced by Israel in the Old 
Testament faced no such inconsistencies. Quite obviously, the Sabbath always fell at 
(roughly) the same time for the whole people of Israel. Even so, the writer of Genesis 1 did 
not feel the need to incorporate the notion of “literal-historical-six-24-hour-consecutive 
days.” Of course, this fundamentalist Adventism could subscribe to a flat earth and argue that 
science has not yet caught up with the Bible (and, presumably, that Sabbath to the east of the 
IDL has not yet caught up with Sabbath to the west of the IDL)—so much differing and so 
much deferring. I am, of course, playing and playing does require a sense of humour and the 














Nothing is sacred to Derrida. One could phrase this differently by a simple 
substitution. Khôra (is) sacred to Derrida, which simply means that khôra is inviolate. There 
is no means by which khôra can be reached. It precedes all the dichotomies that provide the 
numerous traditional religious partners associated with the sacred: profane, unclean, 
common, unholy, demonic and so forth. These ideas seek to exclude others, but they cannot 
exclude khôra because khôra is the condition for their existence. Khôra is of a different order 
and remains untouched, no matter how virulent the defamation. But khôra also provides 
space for all others. It is itself wholly other, totally unlike everything inscribed on it, but there 
is no exclusion with khôra. This means that to sacralise khôra is to sacralise everything. 
Khôra is sacred, and everything is sacred to khôra. There is no outside, no place of rejection. 
More than this, all that is inscribed on khôra is accompanied. It is not alone, but is inscribed 
with différance. Khôra and différance are partners, which is a reason why it can be said of 
différance that “khôra is its surname.” The whole point of the other is that we are not alone, 
that we don’t want to be alone, that there is another, and this other is accepted.  
And whenever another, even a tout autre, is encountered there is an option. We can 
either play with the other, or we can exclude the other. Différance is this play. Radical evil is 
this exclusion, right here at the root, at the origin, at the beginning. Exclusion is out of step 
with khôra and out of step with différance. The reason that Derrida takes issue with 
logocentrism, the metaphysics of presence, ontotheologies, religion and even the name “God” 
is because they are not merely ideas that make no difference. They serve to isolate and 
confine, to identify and define, and in this very endeavour deny the other.  
Creation narratives—the Timaeus and Genesis 1—are driven by play, by the creative 
spirit that introduces something other, something different. This is why an exclusive 
definition inscribed at the centre of creation is in disharmony with creation. Whether one 
wishes to credit the demiurge or God with the creative power, it is first and foremost creative. 
That the earth was formless and void prior to creation and that this abyss can be likened to 
khôra is not merely a hermeneutical game. It is acknowledging that there actually was a 
creation event, that something wholly other, something unique was created. This was not 
merely a forming and filling of pre-existent matter that could be accomplished by a slightly 
imaginative factory worker with the right implements. To insist that the fundamental point of 
departure, the inviolable truth, the sacred centre of Genesis 1 is that it consisted of six literal, 












at a manufacturing plant, a factory, after which the worker/s are glad for the arrival of the 
weekend—the Sabbath—so that they can rest.  
The meaning of creation is first and foremost play. Its primary aspect is creativity and 
not the drudgery associated with work. Creative work is play. The centre of Genesis 1 is not 
six literal, historical, consecutive 24 hour days. This logocentrism is down a detour 
somewhere, let us not forget that. Khôra retains the inscription and logocentrism is down a 
similar detour not very far away, but every inscription that strives to establish its exclusivity 
is only concealing itself from every other, rejecting the other, profaning the other, 
condemning the other, denying the other.  
Still, this dissertation is a hermeneutical exercise of sorts. But hermeneutics is not a 
trivial matter, particularly when one is tying one’s conclusions to religious beliefs that serve 
to establish the identity of a community. Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify a 
hermeneutical method that has its origins in something pre-originary, outside of the logic of 
language, beyond the logos. It either resonates with one or it does not—there is no body of 
empirical data, no metaphysical stream of signifiers that can be presented as evidence for its 
supreme validity. There are, however, conclusions or implications of employing what I 
playfully call “a structural hermeneutic of the triton genos.” These conclusions include: 
1. The other is not only acknowledged, but is valued because of the other’s status as 
other. 
2. Play is at the centre of this hermeneutic which means that it is not rigid and 
governed by strict inviolable rules. The rules of the game are changeable and substitutable. I 
have used différance, detours and khôra by name (appellation), but there are others. There are 
always others—other centres around which this play happens. Derrida has other ideas that 
could serve as substitutions: the supplement, deconstruction, the trace, justice, faith, 
inventions and so on. But while Derrida is a font of ideas when it comes to différance, one 
should recall that différance is at play in language and to just speak Derrida’s name in 
response to différance and inscriptions on khôra is unnecessarily limiting. There are others. 
3. No matter how restrictive and exclusive a particular interpretation of a text may 
appear, the play of différance remains. There is a triton genos. This triton genos is not really 
a third, as we might count to three. There is nothing magical about the number three, as 
though there is something wrong with two or one or, even, four. The third route, the third 
detour, the third step, the third genus are just other ways and, they don’t even resemble the 












detours miss the highway and différance is not a neologism, the triton genos is of a 
completely different order—not a building, not a path, not a word or a concept—tout autre. 
4. Although a structural hermeneutic of the triton genos values deconstruction and 
negative theology, it does not have to follow the path of destruction and reconstruction or the 
via negativa. There is another road—an affirming detour—that discovers the other via a 
determined affirmation of the same. It is the same, but only more so. While the days of 
Genesis 1, identified as six literal, historical, consecutive 24-hour days imply exclusion, to 
argue about their validity is to descend into a debate which can only be an either/or. A 
structural hermeneutic of the triton genos is not concerned to find a better interpretation or 
the best interpretation, it serves to establish another interpretation by allowing the play of 
différance to happen.
858
 This is accomplished not by denying the validity of the central motif 
of six literal days, but by affirming it. 
5. In order to arrive at coherent conclusions and understandable interpretations, this 
hermeneutic does operate with a centre in place. However, this centre is not a logos that 
precedes the letter, because that which precedes the letter is itself centred on différance which 
is neither a word nor a concept. It, hence, cannot be logocentric, since the centre does not 
properly belong to language. It is not a signifier that indicates a signified. It decentres and 
points to the other, away from itself. In this way it invites the other to be the centre which 
itself leads to further substitutions. The final word is never spoken or written. It is always to 
come. There is always a deferral. But this deferral does not mean there is no validity or point 
of reference. Each substitution indicates another. Each other is a valid and valued inscription 
on khôra. The reason that the play continues is for the sake of the other. 
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Appendix A: The Triton Genos in the Structure  
First Level headings Second Level headings Third Level headings 
1. Searching for the Sacred in 
Derrida 
1.1. Religion and the Sacred 1.1.1. Religion 
1.1.2. Negative Theology 
1.1.3. The Sacred 











3. SDA Uses of the Creation 
Narrative 
3.1. A Hermeneutical 
Framework 
3.1.1. Centring the Discourse 
3.1.2. Différance 
3.1.3. Fundamentals 




3.3. Playing with Genesis 1 3.3.1. SDA Fundamental Belief #6 
3.3.2. The Profane Other 
3.3.3. Playing with Science 
 
 
The above table indicates how the structure of this thesis is divided into triplets for 
each level of headings. At the centre of each triplet is a focal point, which is a decentring 
idea. There is a single triplet of “first level headings” with “Khôra” at the centre. There are 
two triplets of “second level headings” with “the other” and “without form and void” as 
respective centres. There are four triplets of “third level headings” with “negative theology,” 
“detours,” “différance” and “the profane other” as centres. Notice that each centre is not 
subdivided or reduced into further subsections. This is because to do so would defeat the 
point of the structure. Since each “centre” is intended to decentre, any further subsections 
could only serve to define and centre.  
The structure explains the heart of the dissertation. The focal point (triton genos) of 
the dissertation (derived from first level headings) is khôra. One can deduce further centres as 
they relate to each heading. For example, at the centre of “1. Searching for the Sacred in 
Derrida” is “1.2. The Other.” For clarity, each triton genos in relation to the structure is 














 Triton Genos 
The Whole Dissertation 2. Khôra 
1. Searching for the Sacred in Derrida 1.2. The Other 
1.1. Religion and the Sacred 1.1.2. Negative Theology 
1.3. Sacred Centres 1.3.2. Detours 
3. SDA Uses of the Creation Narrative 3.2. Without Form and Void 
3.1. Hermeneutical Framework 3.1.2. Différance 
3.3. Playing with Genesis 1 3.3.2. The Profane Other 
 
Beyond this it should be evident that the third section of the dissertation (SDA Uses 
of the Creation Narrative) has been structured in a manner that is analogous to the structure of 
the entire dissertation. Most obviously this is evident in “without form and void” (the centre 
of chapter 3) taken from Genesis 1:2 which can be paralleled with khôra (the centre of the 
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